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Evidence is the lifeblood of a trial in the common law world and the admissibility of 
evidence in criminal trials is, in particular, an area of immense tension and import. This 
thesis endeavours to shine a light upon a selection of rulings made in criminal trials on 
indictment in Ireland by a variety of trial judges from the Circuit Criminal Court, the 
Central Criminal Court and the Special Criminal Court. These rulings are analysed within 
the context of how discretion is used by the trial judge. The field-work undertaken 
involved interviewing some of the participants involved, including practitioners and trial 
judges. The following also assesses whether the appellate courts in Ireland can be relied 
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The criminal trial in Ireland is a process of competing interests. Its purpose cannot be 
easily distilled to one particular overarching raison d’etre. This thesis focuses upon trials 
on indictment in Ireland which have been observed and analysed for a specific reason. 
Evidence admissibility is an area which is highly contentious in modern criminal trials for 
serious offences. The evidence admissibility rulings made by the presiding trial judges, in 
the trials analysed, is one arena within the trial in which judicial discretion can be 
analysed, where there is a ruling with which to engage. The rulings made on evidence 
admissibility do not take a coherent form. Most evidence admissibility rulings are made 
after an application has been made by the defence legal team who will request that the 
evidence being heard be paused, the jury members be asked to leave the court room and a 
voir dire be commenced. This process is quite often acceded to by the trial judge, but not 
always. The trial judge apologetically informs the jury of the processes involved and 
thanks them for their patience. The voir dire is a very important feature of most criminal 
trials on indictment.  
 The result of a voir dire can, depending on the totality of evidence to be adduced 
by the prosecution being taken by the Director of Public Prosecutions (‘DPP’) on behalf 
of the People, effectively collapse a trial on indictment. For example, if there is an issue 
concerning the arrest of the suspect it could lead to all subsequent evidence being deemed 
inadmissible and leave the prosecution with no chance of realistically progressing the 
matter. A nolle prosequi may well then be entered if the ruling is against the prosecution. 
The voir dire (a trial within a trial as it is sometimes colloquially known) and the ruling(s) 
deriving from this set piece event within a trial is the primary focus of this thesis. It is as 
such because it displays judicial discretion most pointedly within the context of evidence 
admissibility. It is not the only event within the criminal trial process of course which 
shows judicial discretion. The area of sentencing is another process rich for research 
which displays judicial discretion. In some ways, the sentence that a convicted criminal 
receives from the trial court is the piece of information that is most relevant to the victim, 
the victim’s families and to the community at large who will read or hear about it in the 
media. That is of course correct and proper that the sentence is analysed and critiqued, 
however the rulings made in the voir dire process are arguably of more importance as 
depending on how these rulings are decided, the sentencing stage of the criminal trial may 





 The sentencing stage, however, does offer some guidance to evidence 
admissibility. The attempts that the legislature has undertaken in an attempt to curb 
judicial discretion, and the wildly variable sentences for similar offences which have 
sometimes pock marked sentencing in Ireland, have been consistent and steadfast. The 
Judicial Council Act 2019 makes a clear attempt to bring about formal sentencing 
guidelines which the judiciary will have to have notice of when sentencing.1 Academic 
research has aided in the shift towards sentencing guidelines being formed to take into 
account a degree of flexibility which is required in creating an appropriate sentence for 
the convicted person. The sentencing guidelines which have emerged in the United 
Kingdom and in European jurisdictions, and a grid sentencing system in some states in 
the United States, have not removed discretion completely. Furthermore, in People (DPP) 
v Molloy, the Court of Appeal in Ireland, stated that it would be reluctant to impose a 
rigid sentencing approach on trial judges, as it would unduly fetter judicial discretion.2 
What these reforms have allowed for is greater transparency in how the decision was 
reached. In the arena of evidence admissibility, this burgeoning transparency witnessed in 
the sentencing sphere is sadly lacking. Some practitioners interviewed as part of the field-
work for this thesis outlined their concerns with judicial discretion in evidence 
admissibility and emphasised that a robust appellate court structure would be required to 
ensure transparency. However, this desire is in sharp contrast to the decision in relation to 
the discretion to apply the corroboration warning of the Court of Appeal in People (DPP) 
v DN, where Hedigan J, in describing the Court of Appeal’s reluctance in intervening in 
an area of judicial discretion stated: “The learned trial judge had the opportunity of 
observing the witness and coming to a judgment as to his reliability.”3 
 The trial process involves, at times, evidence that is highly disputed between the 
parties. It is a feature of the adversarial system practiced in Ireland. It is also clear that the 
importance of evidence admissibility rulings is highly significant and can form a ground 
for a future appeal. It is important to note at this juncture, that this thesis uses first-hand 
 
1 Tom O’Malley, ‘Sentencing Guidelines, Legal Transplants and an Uncertain Future’ (2019) 29 (4) Irish 
Criminal Law Journal 94-104, 94.  
2 People (DPP) v Molloy [2018] IECA 37, with Edwards J stating at para. 14 of his judgment and that of the 
court: “The main reasons for the Court of Appeal's present reluctance to insist upon the adoption of [the two-
stage, structured] procedure, as opposed to merely commending it as best practice, stem firstly from a concern 
that to impose too rigid and formulaic an approach could potentially unduly inhibit the exercise of legitimate 
judicial discretion; and secondly from a recognition that, as stated more than once by the former Court of 
Criminal Appeal, the failure to adhere to a particular sentencing method or formula will not necessarily result 
in an incorrect sentence.” 





trial notes taken by the author of trials observed by the author which method formed an 
integral part of the field-work phase of this thesis.4 By analysing a selection of evidence 
admissibility rulings, it is hoped to ascertain how the trial judge determines the issue and 
what factors are most prevalent when they reach their decisions on a piece of evidence. To 
perform this task, it is however first necessary to set this analysis within the context of the 
competing schools of thought when it comes to evidence admissibility and the sources of 
law used in determining the issue. The positivist and natural law schools form an 
overarching theoretical bubble for the following analysis. It is important to state that these 
schools are not the only realms of thought which infiltrate the evidence admissibility 
paradigm, but they are used as a polemical analysis of the rulings delivered as an analogous 
force with which to assess, at times, often contradictory rulings from one trial judge to the 
next. They are two important schools of thought for the development of law, not only the 
law of evidence, which is adjectival and highly procedural in nature. These schools of 
thought are also used for an assessment of where the arena of evidence admissibility rulings 
has derived and where it could possibly venture in the future. This polemical comparison 
of the positivist and natural law schools is the focus of Chapter One, however it should be 
viewed as also forming a thread which runs throughout succeeding chapters. The basis of 
fact-finding is the evaluation of evidence, which means that it must be gathered and 
proffered to the adjudicator as an aid to establishing the truth, the precursor to justice. From 
a practical stand-point, one reaction to that premise would be to allow large swathes of 
evidence to go to the jury. This stance links justice to the truth of the matter, but it also 
treats the adjudicator as a rational being who can evaluate evidence in an objective manner. 
The main issue of concern for modern philosophers on the laws of evidence, as constituted 
within the common law tradition, is the identification of which evidence is admissible when 
applied to the concept of justice. The tension within this ideological battle is all the more 
acutely felt as it broaches both the theoretical sphere of the pursuit of justice and the 
practical application of evidence rules.5  
Chapter Two seeks to begin the examination of the use of discretion and if it assists 
the administration of justice. The chapter contextualises and delineates the definition of 
discretion by applying it to the common law’s method of developing law and how the 
 
4 The more detailed methodology of the field work phase of this thesis is set out more thoroughly in the 
relevant chapters to which the field work pertains.  
5 Frederick Schauer, ‘On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law’ 155 (1) (2006) University of 





application of the common law by the courts contrasts with that of applicable legislation, 
while Chapter Three, which draws upon the field-work undertaken, will analyse a selection 
of Irish criminal trials on indictment within a thematic framework. Discretionary decision-
making and the standard of evidence admissibility decisions made by the presiding judges 
are analysed. The focus of this chapter is not so much the impact that a ruling will have on 
the entire trial, but rather how the ruling came about and what indications the court gave as 
to what sources of law influenced their decision.  
 Chapter Four provides an overview of the criminal trials heard in Ireland during the 
observation phase of the field work.6 The Central Criminal Court is analysed, which 
predominantly hears rape and murder trials.7 Trials on indictment from the Circuit Criminal 
Court are also touched upon, with relevant rulings being highlighted for purposes of 
outlining judicial discretion.  It must also be noted that the Circuit Criminal Court is 
assessed by dividing that court between the Dublin circuit and that of the provincial circuits. 
This division relates to the population of Dublin and the volume of matters which are heard 
before the Dublin Circuit. Chapter Five provides an analysis of the exclusionary rule and 
how the alteration made to this rule in Ireland may impact upon judicial discretion. The 
origins of this rule change seen in People (DPP) v JC came about after considerable foreign 
influence. This is the context in which this chapter is written as the Irish Supreme Court 
decided to change the exclusionary rule which had operated since 1990.8 The chapter 
explains why the rule change did not come as a bolt from the ether, but does analyse the 
potential repercussions of the rule alteration in Irish evidence law. 
 Chapter Six details the impact of the JC judgment on evidence admissibility 
rulings in a selection of criminal trials on indictment. Chapter Seven examines the role of 
the appellate courts in tempering the more arbitrary effects of judicial discretion during a 
criminal trial. The chapter argues that the appellate courts’ role is to accept the refinement 
of evidence principles in an effort to make judicial discretion more consistent in evidence 
law.9 It is further argued that this task of refinement is hampered by the deference 
 
6 January 2012 to May 2016. 
7 Rape trials will be compared with other rape trials and murder trials with other murder trials in this calendar 
year. The reason for doing so is ease of access for the reader and author and the issues dealt with in rape trials 
are often quite different from murder trials which necessitate different rulings from the presiding judge.  
8[2015] IESC 31. 
9 The Law Reform Commission’s evidence codification project and the aborted Codification Bill brought 
before the Oireachtas. The appellate courts in this chapter refer to the Court of Criminal Appeal, the Court of 
Appeal (Criminal) and the Supreme Court. The Thirty-Third Amendment to the Constitution of Ireland 1937 
altered the Appellate Court structure in Ireland which had been in its pre-Referendum state since the 1960s. 
The cases which have been studied previously have been on indictment and/or scheduled offences under the 





appellate courts show trial courts, particularly in the determination of facts and that the 
appellate courts in Ireland are too conservative in this refinement role. They should really 
show more ambition in their role as being at a critical apex within the criminal justice 
architecture.  
 The following chapters should be read within the context of the overarching 
theoretical framework which is set out in the opening chapters, but which continues 
throughout. This is the battle of theory which underpins the admissibility debate. The 
field work undertaken by the author has been extensive and the notes compiled were an 
aid in asserting the true occurrences at trials observed within the white heat of a court 
room. Most people are pro-reform to old processes if the reform is necessary and is 
explained. Reform is useless when it is half-hearted. This is a time approaching evidence 
admissibility that requires such reform whereby the transparencies which are necessary 
are visible to those who are affected: the accused, the victim and the community at large 
who are all stakeholders in the criminal justice system, which should be a corner-stone of 
democracy in Ireland.  
 















the Irish court structure. However, as mentioned above, the Circuit Court does act as a court of appeal for 
District Court matters, along with the High Court which can hear both cases stated by a District Court Judge 
and a consultative case stated during the currency of a trial before the District Court. The Irish legislature’s 





Chapter 1: Evidence in theory 
 




The theoretical and factual evolution of evidence law has been influenced by the 
ideological parameters of two integral legal schools of thought: the naturalist and 
positivist.11 Modern evidence scholarship has transformed the way many observers view 
the traditional criminal trial.12 These schools were the catalysts for the burgeoning rules 
of evidence and subsequent glut of evidence legislation in modern times. There are five 
stages of this evolution which are focused upon here: 
 a. the development of the rules of evidence through the natural law tendencies of the 
common law,  
b. the increasingly influential role of defence Counsel in the criminal trial,  
c. the underpinning of the adversarial nature of criminal proceedings,  
d. the increasing prominence of positivist theory as a counterpoint to natural law, and  
e. the modern trial’s adherence to established evidential theories. 
These five stages offer an aid in explaining the theoretical dynamics of evidence 
evolution. At the heart of this evolution is the tension between evidence admissibility and 
exclusion. The Irish Court of Criminal Appeal has summarised the modern situation as 
being:  
A discretion exists in the trial judge to exclude material…although otherwise admissible, 
if the evidence is either of little probative value but is prejudicial, or if it is of greater 
probative value but nevertheless its prejudice outweighs its true probative value. Where 
its prejudicial effect outweighs its true probative value, that discretion should be 
exercised in a manner which best guarantees the fairness of the trial for the accused.13 
 
 
10 Jeremey Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence Specially Applied to English Practice Vol 5, Book IX 
(Hunt & Clarke, London 1827) 1. 
11 Various forms of natural law theory which remain prominent in the present day include, inter alia, those 
of John Calvin, Thomas Hooker, John Locke and Samuel Pufendorf. 
12 Richard Lempert, ‘The New Evidence Scholarship: Analysing The Process of Proof” (1986) 66 Boston 
University Law Review 439, wherein the author states: “Evidence is being transformed from a field concerned 
with the articulation of rules to a field concerned with the process of proof.” 





What is essential for any school of thought is that its members are readily identifiable. 
This factor may seem rudimentary, but it is quite an exacting endeavour, as many legal 
philosophers possess elements of several different philosophical schools.14 Apart from 
commonalities that are required to determine whether a definable school exists, intrinsic 
indicators used to classify members are necessary. It is insufficient, therefore, to simply 
state that philosopher ‘X’ is a member of school ‘Y’ due to their teachings on matter ‘Z’. 
It is of upmost importance that their presence within a school is categorised as being, for 
example, in the liberal or conservative seats, so that the school’s development can be 
interpreted. The enduring feature of all modes of thought is that they are in constant 
competition with other thought-processes. It is within these ‘interactions’ that thought 
development is nurtured and evolution refined. 
The process that allows academics detail the manner a school has or will develop 
its belief system is multifaceted.15 If academics were unable to analyse a school’s 
progression, two significant consequences would occur. First, any future analysis of that 
school would be stifled, as its very existence would be in question and secondly, the 
school’s place amongst the greater philosophical hierarchy would remain undetermined.16 
This cross-pollination of ideals is more difficult to discern if its members cannot be 
accurately identified. It is usually an indication of that school’s prominence if it can 
attract theorists from outside its loosely defined parameters. These machinations result in 
natural and positivist schools sharing foundational features. These similarities— and how 
each school attempts to differentiate their constitutions— form the bed-rock of evidential 
evolution. It suffices, at this juncture, to briefly list the theories which will be discussed in 
the following pages: the natural law theory, the positivist theory of law,17 free-proof and 
best evidence theories, the science of proof theory, the evidence admissibility theory, the 
pure theory of law and the codification theory of law. Not all theories were successfully 
embedded within the criminal trial process; however, they were significant in that they 
shaped the two parent schools’ (ie. natural and positivist) response to perceived 
existential threats.   
 
14 For instance, Bentham’s writings included many interpretations on different sectors of society such as 
politics which could lead to suggestions that he was also a political philosopher. 
15 It may require analysis of a philosopher’s writings/teachings or indeed an analysis of their influence on 
others. 
16 Guido Calabresi, ‘An Introduction to Legal Thought: Four Approaches to Law and to the Allocation of 
Body Parts’ (2003) 55 Stanford Law Review 2113-2151, 2130.  
17 The positivist theory of law possesses ancillary theories which include: the universal law of liberty theory 
and the command-sanction theory. These theories were vehicles of positivist thought and which were off-





It is clear that there was a nascent state in which criminal trials were conducted. 
The first criminal trials were firmly against the exclusion of evidence.18 This reluctance is 
also readily witnessed within the trial history of most other common law jurisdictions. In 
the United States, for example, Amar states that “[N]one of the Founders ever linked the 
Fourth Amendment to exclusion.”19 The first criminal trials in the parent country of 
England were dominated by the common law. In this regard, the law-giver, or 
promulgator, is a central element within the natural law theory, which has been examined 
by Stout in his essay ‘Truth, Natural Law and ethical Theory’.20 Stout’s essential premise 
is that a promulgator, within the natural legal environs, must be a suitably qualified entity, 
ie.  they must possess the necessary authority to command the respect and obedience of 
its subjects in order for their laws to be obeyed.21 For such a figurehead to be able to fulfil 
its duties, they must possess an authority that is capable of superseding all other legal or 
moral codes.22 In other words, the promulgator’s stature must not be easily undermined 
by man-made law. If this is not so, the derived law cannot be pronounced as being 
‘higher’. Nonetheless, the original rules of evidence arrived fixedly within the common 
law realm.  
 
a. Stage 1: The development of the rules of evidence through the natural law 
tendencies of the common law 
 
The development of the nascent rules of evidence in England was a result, primarily, of 
the presence of a jury within the criminal trial process. Thayer’s most enduring argument 
connects the rules of evidence to the retention of a jury.23 Thayer favoured a 
simplification of the common law of evidence which would be administered, initially, 
through the prism of judicial discretion.24 In the Select Cases on Evidence at the Common 
Law, Thayer sought to elaborate upon the theories which formed the foundational 
structures of evidence law. The jury’s role in criminal trials evolved from once being 
 
18Akhil Reed Amar, ‘Against Exclusion (Except to Protect Truth or Prevent Privacy Violations)’ (1996-97) 
20 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 457-66, 459. 
19The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Amar, ‘Against Exclusion’ 459. 









familiar with the evidence before the trial had even begun, to the modern-day scenario, 
where the jury is, or is supposed to be,  ignorant of the intricacies of the evidence before a 
trial commences.25 The earliest jurors were quite often the neighbours of the accused, 
who already knew much of the evidence which was to be adduced due to the vicinage 
requirement of early jury selection methods.26 Most jurors, particularly during the reign of 
Henry II in England were also trial witnesses.27 Jurors became gradually less familiar 
with the matters to be tried, meaning that they were tasked with crystallising those facts 
upon which a verdict could be reasonably based. The jurors undertook this task by 
listening to the witnesses’ sworn oral testimony and adhering to judicial instructions.28 
These witnesses would be intimately familiar with the matter’s facts and could also 
include the accused.29 This process of fact discovery was largely unregulated in the 
earliest criminal trials, which remained the norm in England until the seventeenth 
century.30 The law of the ‘divinity’, which was embodied within the sovereign, would 
effectively dictate how the accused would be tried. 
Some people may ponder as to why the concept of ‘divine law’ and a ‘divine law-
giver’ would be deemed as such a disadvantage, as it could, if properly nurtured, provide 
an adequate degree of legal certainty. Opponents argued, however, that it was 
disadvantageous to the public good to adhere to such a process of law-giving, as for a 
divinity’s reason to be utilised, it first needed to be ‘interpreted’ by some body, which 
usually meant the discretion of an elite group of interpreters.31 This small group of people 
would, in effect, determine how the law would be implemented.32 Such an occurrence 
necessitated, as positivists argued, the use of subjective decision-making which could 
potentially encourage arbitrary rulings within a criminal justice system. Positivists railed 
against the perceived injustices of discretionary decision-making. Naturalists believed 
that ‘divine reason’ would provide certainty and discernible standards of reasonableness. 
Positivists vehemently believed that subjectivism’s foundational presence within the 
common-law system exacerbated its perceived democratic deficit. Bentham, strikingly, 
 
25Frederic M. Maitland and Francis C. Montague, A Sketch of English Legal History (edited by James F. 
Colby) 56. 
26 John H. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (OUP 2003) 64. Vicinage meaning here the 
vicinity from which a jury is selected.  
27 Maitland and Montague, A Sketch of English Legal History 56.  
28Ibid, 57. 
29 Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial 39.  
30Ibid, 68. 
31 This is an issue with which positivists also had to struggle.  





analogised the common law as a study of retrospective adherence.33 The person would 
first act and then be regulated by the common law as to how they ought to have behaved. 
The positivist school attempted to eradicate the perceived injustice of naturalistic 
decision-making. They did this by redefining how a ‘law’ could be best utilised for the 
common-good. 
The natural law facilitated the development of evidence rules at trial in a way that 
was easily commensurate with that school’s identification. Such facilitation was inherent 
in the natural law’s foundational tenets. This law’s defenders argue that it is not an 
abstract concept.34 It is, instead, a system of thought which, like most sophisticated 
structures, possesses exacting principles.35 The central natural law principle is that there 
are moral norms which humans innately comprehend, by doing nothing else apart from 
being human. Morality is common to both schools; one of the key differences between 
the schools, however, is the weight naturalists attach to morality. Aquinas, for example, 
believed that actual knowledge of morality was present in an inherent sense of being 
human.36 This approach would allow the public to rely on moral norms, despite being 
ignorant of their functions.37 Theories underpinned by morality frustrated positivist 
structures.38 This propensity cemented the positivist perception of natural law’s elitism, 
such that only those with superior intellects could truly comprehend this ‘higher-law’.39 
To the contrary, naturalist theoreticians argue that complex decision-making cannot rely 
solely upon pure data analysis as these decisions require greater refinement, inducing a 
moral judgment from the decision-maker.40 Aquinas also wrote of prudentia in one’s 
moral decision-making, which was an interpretation of Aristotle’s phronesis concept of 




33 The ‘dog law’ described a situation whereby to teach a dog their rules of behaviour, the owner would wait 
until their dog behaved badly to punish them which Bentham believed was like how the common law treated 
its subjects.  
34 Boyle ‘Natural Law and the Ethics of Traditions’. 
35 Robert P. George (ed), Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays 10. Communism, democracy, 
capitalism etc. for example, all possess certain fundamental blocks of theory which distinguishes it from other 
competing theories. 
36 George (ed), Natural Law Theory 11.  
37Ibid. 








b. Stage 2: The increasing prominence of positivist theory as a counter-point to 
natural law 
 
The positivist school sought to alter the way in which law interacted with the participants 
in a criminal trial. This school sought the disentanglement of the naturalistic process from 
legal decision-making with an emphasis on greater accountability.42 This aim was a direct 
challenge to legal tradition as positivist theory sought to, effectively, confound the 
fundamental tenets of the common law system.43 The status quo needed to change if 
positivists were to realise their theoretical ambitions. The positivist concept centred upon 
the creation, and adherence to, a corpus of law focused upon the comprehension of what 
law is, by deriving it from rules which possess an inherent authority due to their 
consensual obedience.44 One of the tools utilised by positivists, through which public 
support was hoped to be garnered, was by highlighting the advantages of political and 
legal reform in an effort to reenergise what had been allowed to become jaded. 
An alteration in how law was promulgated, which would appeal to the masses, 
was the positivist idyll. To insist that laws were reduced to writing was to adhere to a 
desire for clarity, accessibility and consistence. It could be argued that this desire was an 
inevitable consequence of the positivist mantra.45 Bentham outlined the argument against 
unwritten law: 
[F]or as to unwritten institutions, as there is no such thing as any certain symbol by which 
their authority is attested, their validity, how deeply rooted soever, is what we see 
challenged without remorse.46 
The authority, positivists argued, is severely undermined by the lack of definition inherent 
in the common law, as it is constantly evolving to meet new demands and social 
idiosyncrasies.47 The positivists grappled with what would be the source of the 
parameters of this ‘new law-making’ process.48 Bentham focused upon the non-obligative 
strands (non-commands and permissions) when elucidating his concept of a ‘universal 
 
42Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and the Common-Law Tradition (Clarendon Press Oxford, 1986) 263. 
43 Postema, Bentham and the Common-Law Tradition 268-69. 
44 Robert P. George (ed), Natural Law Theory 160.  
45Postema, Bentham and the Common-Law Tradition 293. 
46Jeremy Bentham, Fragments on Government 402.   
47Postema, Bentham and the Common-Law Tradition 295. In Bentham’s time, criminal prosecutions were not 
dictated so completely by the state’s authorities. It is somewhat artificial to suggest that the common-law is 
spontaneously altered as it takes a considerable period for rules to emerge and adapt.  
48Ibid, 328, where the author argues that the elite lamented by the positivists in the common law theory could 





law of liberty’. This instrument sought to create laws in a manner that would be infused 
with key features of positivism.49 The method, by which positivists sought to rebut the 
charge that their school shared foundations with natural law was through integrating the 
concept of consistency in its processes in order to off-set the blunter realities of the 
adversarial criminal trial.50 The two leading theories to which positivists attached the 
required consistency were the ‘universal law of liberty’ and ‘the command’ theories. 
These two theories would be the foundational stones upon any future creation of positivist 
evidence law. Two aims can be delineated from positivist theory: man-made law which 
can be issued to the people and a greater accountability in judicial decision-making 
through the development of an appellate court structure.51 
 
c. The ‘universal law of liberty’ 
 
How consistency could be incorporated within a common law system of decision-making 
occupied the minds of both Bentham and Austin. Positivist philosophers grappled with 
making the sovereign’s will less dependent upon discretionary decision-making. The 
method of doing so was through attaching a readily identifiable sanction to positivist 
law.52 The success of this legislative development depended upon two fundamental 
prerequisites of social interaction. First, the law’s administrator must possess the 
authority to sanction which would ensure that it is effectively applied to whom it is 
addressed. Second, the subjects who obey the law must consent with the proposition that 
the authority possesses the necessary power to do so.53 This, in other words, is the law’s 
validation. If the populace does not believe that the sovereign has the authority to issue 
the law, it will not be deemed binding. Austinites, for instance, contend that it is the threat 
of the sanction that is the most pertinent concern to those who are considering whether a 
law should be obeyed. 
Laws possessing such a sanction would be determined by both the negative and 
positive elements of the action which pertained to the law.54 For example, a law which 
hypothetically states that a person “shall lay here on this section of the beach only” 
 
49 There is a contradiction present between Bentham, Austin and Kelsen which will be referred to later in this 
chapter. 
50 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Hackett Publishing, 1979). 
51 This second aim would mean that discretionary decision-making would be significantly reduced. 
52 Colin Tapper, ‘Austin on Sanctions’ (1965) Cambridge Law Journal 271 
53 This consent is often issued implicitly by the targeted population. 





creates a positive act, ie. lying on that section of sand. The ‘universal law of liberty’ 
would act as the positivist filter, identifying which elements of the law were to take more 
prominence in each scenario, depending upon the context in which the law is interpreted 
and applied.55 The positivist method of law-making differed from the natural version in 
that man would be creating such a law for the greater good.56 This analysis is also 
required so that the subject, to whom the legal mandate is addressed, can determine each 
command’s importance. 
The universal law of liberty also provides a method by which one law can be 
compared to another, so that a more consistent decision-making scheme can operate.57 
These comparisons are infused with positivist fundamentals, such as acting in the 
common good to maximise the majority’s utility, thus instilling a sense of consensus.58 
To administer justice, however, identifiable wrong-doers were still required to be 
sanctioned. The universal law of liberty, therefore, offered a hypothetical bridge between 
the positivist administration of justice and the utopian natural law ideals. 
 
d. The ‘command theory’ can reduce discretion 
 
The ‘command theory’ was used primarily as a classification device, which sought to 
simplify the decision-making process.59 The theory’s central proposition is that a 
positivist ‘law’ contains obligatory acts which are to be obeyed. A law, therefore, can be 
either a command, or a prohibition, which attaches an obligatory relationship between the 
law-giver (the sovereign) and the object (the citizen). In the form of a command, the 
object is required to act positively, after which the law will afford protection. The 
prohibition element is enforced to deter a person from performing a prohibited act 
(known as a ‘delict’). The fear of the sanction means that a rational person will not 
usually behave contrary to the law’s intent. The sovereign is expressing an intention that 
the judiciary is not obliged to follow a particular path; however, their actions must be 
 
55Lysaght, ‘Bentham on the Aspects of a Law’. The four strands of the law, as already mentioned, would be 
the command and prohibition (obligative) and non-command and permission (unobligative).   
56 The universal law of liberty was simply a utilitarian device which sought to determine how best to 
administer justice consistently, as sort of a factory-line response to criminal justice. 
57 Ibid, 386.  
58 The essential thesis of the utilitarian ideal was that if the decision-making process was for the common-
good, who could then be against such a process? This fallacy was not lost on the theory’s detractors.  
59 Gerald J. Postema, ‘Law as Command: The Model of Command in Modern Jurisprudence’ 35 (1) Nous 





reconcilable with the system’s norms.60 This process has a democratising effect on 
decision-making, which positivists believed would lead to judicial decision-making being 
less subjective and more accountable. 
The positivist ‘command theory’ also depends upon the existence of a perceived 
sanction created by the law-giver. The sovereign must weave the sanction into law 
without disturbing its general acceptance. Such a task is achieved by emphasising ‘loss’ 
to the object to whom the sanction targets.61 Of crucial importance in securing society’s 
general well-being, for which the sovereign is legislating, is that a decision-maker acts 
with restraint and a sense of perceived equality. Positivist theory dictates that the presence 
of a sanction, attaching to a law which is not generally accepted, will produce inequitable 
decisions.62 
 
e. The ‘science of logic’ 
 
The science of logic was utilised by positivists when exploring the truth-finding process 
within a criminal trial.63 This ‘truth-finding’ process is regulated by the rules of evidence. 
Thayer’s thesis, in this respect, argued that the process of rationalisation should 
predominate in the administration of exclusionary rules. Adjectives such as “logically 
probative” should govern the admissibility of evidence at criminal trials, rather than any 
rebalancing process which was required between the adversarial participants and the 
trial’s structure. The limitations placed upon the admissibility process therefore, primarily 
concerned probity and logic. Thayer did not include relevancy as a determining factor.64 
That jurist sought to curtail the narrowness of the administration of evidence rules, 
whereby logic and rationalism would not always be commensurate with a modern 
interpretation of logically admissible evidence. There are many pieces of information that 
could be proffered as examples of relevant evidence which are not always logical.65 
Thayer challenges readers to ponder on what basis one piece of evidence is deemed 
 
60Lysaght, ‘Bentham on the Aspects of a Law’ 384.   
61Vinit Haskar, ‘Coercive Proposals [Rawls and Gandhi]’ (1976) 4 (1) Political Theory 65, 69. 
62 If the unjust law is applied equably, the subjects may still ignore it. The morality of disobeying a sovereign 
law is therefore another device which the sovereign utilises to uphold its intent. See Michael Walzer, ‘Political 
Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands’ (1973) 2 (2) Philosophy and Public Affairs 160, 171. 
63 William Twinning, Rethinking Evidence: Exploratory Essays (2nd ed, CUP 2006) 61-62. 
64Ibid, 62. 
65 For example, counsel attempting to adduce evidence of a complainant in a rape trial who testifies that she 
had not had sex before she was 15 but is complaining of being raped when she was 12. Legally and technically 





‘logical’? It is theoretically redundant to assume that an objective standard ought to be 
utilised by an impartial adjudicator as this will, manifestly, not satisfy every criminal 
offence. 
Allied to Thayer’s endeavours, Wigmore’s A Treatise on the Anglo-American 
System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law was written with a clarity that was 
previously absent in evidence scholarship and helped to promote the simplification of 
decision-making. That author knew that certainty was required in order to determine how 
the rules of evidence ought to be applied in a trial.66 Wigmore sought greater 
simplification in the application of evidence laws in criminal trials by connecting these 
rules to the foundational principles of the forensic sciences.67 Through connecting these 
principles to the rules of evidence, Wigmore formed the ‘chart method’ of evidential 
analysis.68 The ‘science of proof’ theory further argued that proof clarification, and the 
methods employed in so doing (such as cross-examination), were of greater importance 
than the established rules of evidence. Wigmore differed from strict positivists in that he 
did not want to abolish the rules of evidence. Thayer’s thesis argued for their nuanced re-
application, so that the search for truth would be less arbitrary.69 
 
f. The codification process 
 
The jurist Stephen sought to codify English evidence law, a process which would, in his 
opinion, promote the consistent application and provide an explanation as to why 
evidence law was required to re-balance the adversary trial. In A Digest on the Law of 
Evidence, Stephen attempted to explicate the laws of evidence emerging gradually from 
the courts.70 Such an explanation required evidence law to be isolated from the 
substantive criminal law. Such a ‘separation’ was closely allied to Bentham’s division of 
law into substantive and adjective spheres.71 The ‘best evidence’ theory, for example, was 
challenged by ‘evidence relevancy’, which sought to be the primary catalyst for 
 
66  Twinning, Rethinking Evidence: Exploratory Essays 63. 
67 This connection between the evidence rules and the principles of forensic science is termed the ‘science of 
proof’.  
68Wigmore’s ‘chart method’ of evidence analysis involves organising the available evidence, constructing 
arguments from this evidence which may describe a chain of subjective inferences and designating the weight 
to be attached to the emerging collection of evidence.  
69 Twining, Rethinking Evidence: Exploratory Essays (2nd Ed) (CUP 2006) 64. Wigmore stated famously of 
cross-examination that it was “the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth”.   
70 Twining, Rethinking Evidence: Exploratory Essays (2nd Ed) (CUP 2006) 57.  
71 Ibid, 58. Adjective laws would include rules of procedure along with rules of practice, whereas substantive 





innovation.72 Stephen’s imperative argument further questioned whether procedural rules 
of evidence ought to be utilised.73 If evidence is a distinct corpus of law at all, as Stephen 
challenged, it is best administered not in a vacuum, but as an evolving corpus of rules. 
Evidence law is arguably adjective in nature, however both substantive and adjective law 
are symbiotic entities. How this theory can be reconciled with Stephen’s division of 
evidence and procedural law depends substantially upon the interpretation of both bodies 
of law. It also rests on the interpretation of the criminal trial’s philosophy. 
 
g. Stage 3: The “combat effect” of adversarial criminal trials 
 
The partisan presentation of evidence in adversary criminal trials dictated which evidence 
was admitted and helped to accelerate evidence law evolution.74 Academic lawyers began 
to assess the role of evidence law within the increasingly hostile environs of a criminal 
trial.75 Academics did so through the prism of the schools of legal thought. In this respect, 
a gradual shift occurred from Grotius’ natural law theories to a more structured 
philosophical pattern, which then further lead to a scientific approach to evidence 
admissibility.76 Starkie, for example, in A Practical Treatise on the Law of Evidence, 
regarded a system of rational judicial investigation as being akin to a ‘pure scientific 
examination’, where each party endeavours to seek the discovery of truth in a less 
combative manner.77 
It is arguable that by adhering to the premise of a partisan criminal trial, the 
‘combat effect’ reduced the theoretical importance of evidence admissibility.78 The 
theatre of a criminal trial required that there be a winner and a loser. As each party 
controlled the evidence proffered to the tribunal of fact, rules regulating the presentation 
of evidence were required to enable the fact-finder reach their conclusions by relying 
upon substantive evidence.79 The adversarial nature of the trial process generated rules 
 
72Ibid, 60. The ‘Best Evidence Theory’ stipulates that in common law criminal trials, the evidence that is to 
be proffered before the tribunal of fact to assist in their determination is that evidence which is 
uncontaminated by outside influence and which is most contemporaneous of the incident in question.   
73 The imperative argument here reflects that the essence of evidence law was to be distinct from the 
substantive criminal law.  
74 John H. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (OUP 2003) 102-03. 
75 Twining, Rethinking Evidence: Exploratory Essays 50. 
76Dean Alfange, Jr. ‘Jeremy Bentham and the Codification of Law’ (1969-70) 55 Cornell Law Review 58, 
65. 
77 Twining, Rethinking Evidence: Exploratory Essays 50.  
78Ibid, 103. 





that would determine who would be adjudged the ‘victor’.80 As the role of the parties 
became more defined, the need for a greater corpus of rules governing the criminal trial 
process became of paramount importance.81 It is of interest to note, however, that the 
delineation between the parties was in existence before the ‘lawyerisation’ of the criminal 
trial had begun, with each party’s role altered irredeemably thereafter.82 
The theoretical conflation between the common law’s exclusionary bent and the 
‘free-flow’ theory is best illustrated in an adversary trial context. The parties themselves 
are responsible for the evidence to be presented to the jury. These fact-finders will hear 
only such evidence which the parties are willing to proffer that is most relevant, not to the 
ascertainment of truth, but to each party’s designated aims. The principle of ‘best 
evidence’ was required to be reconciled within the common law criminal justice system. 
This was achieved by the very system from which it originated placing various 
application limitations upon the theory’s remit. This limitation process is one of the most 
contentious issues that has emerged within the criminal trial process since the evolution 
of evidence law began. There is, however, a theoretical contradiction within the common 
law which is not easily reconcilable; the freedom to adduce the best available evidence, 
whilst excluding evidence deemed to be both highly probative and excessively 
prejudicial.83 
 
h. Stage 4: The role of defence Counsel increases in importance 
 
There is a significant weight attached to the exclusionary rules of evidence within the 
common law system which focuses upon the issue of evidence admissibility.84 Best, in 
The Principles of Evidence, examined the evidential rules’ underlying philosophies and 
 
80 Gallanis, ‘The Rise of Modern Evidence Law’ 500, where the author argues that the winner in this 
adversarial contest is usually the person who can adduce more evidence, however a certain caution would be 
required with this analysis as relevance and reliability are other key factors in evidence theory, not just 
quantity.    
81Ibid, 179. 
82 Ibid. 
83 O’Donnell J stated in paragraph 4 of his judgment in People (DPP) v JC [2015] IESC 31: “It should be 
recognised at the outset that the exclusion of evidence of undoubted cogency extracts a significant price in 
terms of the capacity of the court to perform its primary function, and accordingly in terms of confidence in, 
and respect for, the legal system. Such a course must always be justified by considerations sufficient to pay 
that price.” 
84 Mirjan J. Damaska, ‘Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two models of Criminal Procedure: A 
Comparative Study’ 121 (3) (1973) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 506-89, 517. The systems of 
criminal process on the Continent of Europe do also possess resemblances of exclusionary rules such as the 





categorised these as being either investitive or expletive, with the former incorporating a 
tendency towards natural evidence principles. Expletive rules were concerned with the 
adherence to legal rights and duties within a process of adjudication.85 In order to 
highlight the different rules’ dynamics, Burrill in 1856, published A Treatise on the 
Nature, Principles and Rules of Circumstantial Evidence. Here, Burrill used case law, not 
as defined authorities, but as illustrations of philosophical arguments promoting the 
adherence to evidence law in criminal trials.86 The very fact that evidence law adherence 
had to be encouraged underpins the status of judicial discretion in the earliest criminal 
trials. Highly relevant pieces of evidence are still routinely rendered inadmissible because 
they are deemed to be more prejudicial than probative.87  
Two strands of exclusionary rules are located within evidence law. The first set 
(eg. the rule against hearsay or the rule against narrative) developed on the basis that 
without certain rules, truth-finding would be unduly restricted. The second grouping (eg. 
the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence and the exclusion of illegally 
obtained evidence) is differentiated by the fact that they offend the vindication of 
accused’s rights at trial, and such evidence is excluded on that basis. It must be 
remembered that the second set was developed as a result of considerations of legal 
versus constitutional norms, which are, at times, quite different from truthfulness 
considerations.88 One crucial theoretical difference between the argument against the 
application of the rules of exclusion as a basis for the ascertainment of truth, and the 
hierarchical structures of most countries’ legal systems, is that exclusionary rules are 
naturally disproportionately impactful on the trial process for serious offences. Such 
exclusion of evidence ought to be determined more equably, so that the greatest numbers 
of people engaging with the criminal courts (ie.  the District Court in Ireland) are dealt 
with in the same manner as the proportionately few cases which make their way to the 
superior criminal trial courts.  
The expansion of defence Counsel’s function in the criminal trial is a descendent 
of the first set of exclusionary rules. Between the end of Henry II’s reign (1189) and the 
 
85 People (DPP) v JC [2015] IESC 31, 51-52. 
86Ibid, 55. 
87 Mirjan J. Damaska, ‘Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two models of Criminal Procedure: A 
Comparative Study’ 121 (3) (1973) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 506-89, 513. 
88 An example would be the Curtin v Dáil Éireann [2006] IESC 14; [2006] 2 IR 556 decision where a Circuit 
Court judge’s home was searched with an invalid search warrant which grounded the legal basis for the 
search. The evidence obtained from the search was deemed inadmissible despite it being highly relevant for 





promulgation of the Treason Act 1696 (‘the 1696 Act’) the accused was expected to 
speak to their innocence at their trial. Prior to lawyers dominating the trial process, the 
accused’s testimony in their own defence was deemed to be the best available evidence. 
As the criminal trial evolved towards its modern guise however, criminal evidence law 
sought to prevent the accused from remaining silent at every opportunity.89 The most 
emphatic method of doing so was by denying the accused representative Counsel.90 The 
arbiters of fact were entrusted with the task of extricating the truth. Therefore, the trial 
process became Counsel’s domain, with the admittance of evidence being contestable as 
of right.91 This expansion of Counsel’s role could not have occurred, however, until 
evidence rules were integrated within the fabric of the criminal trial process. The rule 
against hearsay, for example, sought to exclude evidence which would prove the truth of 
an out-of-court statement’s contents which, by its exclusion, it was thought, would 
maintain the integrity of the trial.92 
The introduction of the rule against hearsay in England’s criminal courts came in 
the early seventeenth century and concurrently served to promote the merits of cross-
examination. The rule against character evidence also developed in the early seventeenth 
century but was not applied uniformly by the judiciary until the 1650s.93 The rule against 
character evidence’s incorporation differed slightly as evidence against the accused’s 
character could already be given as testimony by a witness under oath. The rationale for 
this rule focused upon excluding prejudicial evidence as its detrimental effect on the 
accused outweighed its probative value.94 Along with the exclusion of potentially highly 
probative evidence, the introduction of the corroboration rule (cited from the early 1740s) 
was primarily devised as being exclusionary.95 The corroboration rule sought to regulate 
the jury’s decision-making process when reaching a verdict by incorporating a judicial 
 
89Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial, 39. Adjective law is a term of art which has been often 
used in evidence texts to describe the law of evidence.  
90 There was a perceived direct correlation between an accused’s legal representation and the ease to which 
the truth of the matter could be suppressed. 
91Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial, 126. 
92Ibid, 179-80. The original rationale for the development of the rule against hearsay evidence being 
admissible was three pronged: 1. that accepting a report of an out-of-court statement was against the best 
evidence rule as that person who uttered those words would be required to testify in court; 2. the out-of-court 
statement maker was not placed upon oath and his/her testimony lacked veracity; and 3. the out-of-court 
statement maker had not been cross-examined in court, which would serve to challenge the evidence as 
proffered.   
93 Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial, 195.  
94 It was deemed, in effect, to be contaminated evidence. 
95 Ibid. Corroboration is when a piece of independent evidence goes to support the validity of a separate and 





warning. This warning would alert the jury to the absence of corroborative evidence 
which could be potentially detrimental to the accused. Confession evidence was also 
excluded under specified circumstances. The rule sought to effectively exclude 
confessions made by the accused on the basis that, in certain circumstances, the accused 
would not have been thinking rationally when uttering the confession.96 The rule 
prohibiting such confessionary evidence was an about-turn, as in previous eras, original 
confessions were prized pieces of evidence, which the prosecution endeavoured to admit 
at trial.97 These initial evidence rules were applied by the judiciary sporadically at first. 
Proponents of the rules argued that verdicts would be more reliable and less susceptible to 
public disquiet.98 The incorporation of these rules at trial meant that Counsel’s role was 
more important. Counsel could now make more submissions on contentious admissibility 
points, resulting in a greater number of judicial rulings also being required.   
Trial judges were pivotal in determining the parameters of Counsel’s role, on 
either the prosecution or defence side. A judicial decision concerning evidence 
admissibility will have profound consequences for that trial. The starting point for judicial 
decision-making is the realisation that a decision is required to be made, but not 
necessarily justified by the trial judge. Counsel were, and still are, expected to abide by 
these judicial rulings.99 Legislative parameters, however, were required to be placed upon 
the burgeoning adversarial trial.100 The 1696 Act, for instance, dramatically altered the 
future course of the criminal trial process in England by allowing defence Counsel for 
treason charges.101 It may have been a limited emergence of an ‘equality of arms’ 
between the prosecution and defence; nevertheless it did convey a seismic shift in attitude 
towards the accused in law-makers’ minds.102 With the recognition of the need to provide 
balance, the adversarial  trial was effectively fused to the developing English libertarian 
legal culture.103  
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The adherence to an adversarial criminal trial also possessed ancillary 
consequences.104 By incubating the processes’ combative nature, the legal architecture 
was forced to accommodate more equable measures, resulting in the accused having ever 
greater access to Counsel. By allowing this access to legal representation, the prominence 
of the historic ‘accused speaks’ trial was diminished.105 The 1696 Act heralded the 
demise of the free-flow of evidence in criminal trials in England, being replaced by an 
evidential movement laden with admissibility obstacles.  
The emergence of evidence rules in England gathered pace from the beginning of 
the eighteenth century with evidence exclusion being gradualist in nature.106 Defence 
counsel was permitted at this time in more felony cases than ever before, with the cross-
examination of prosecution witnesses permissible by 1735.107 Remnants of the ‘accused 
speaks’ tradition, however, remained. Defence counsel was only allowed to cross-
examine certain witnesses, with the accused still being expected to defend themselves 
orally at trial.108 If the premise that a decision was now required to be made regarding the 
application of an exclusionary rule is accepted, the consequences are obvious in the 
allocation of risk between the parties at trial.109 Proponents of the exclusionary rules’ 
abolition argue still that the verdict’s accuracy is naturally increased by applying 
exclusionary rules, as only relevant and reliable evidence is admitted.110 However, it is 
not that the evidence admitted after having been first filtered through the exclusionary 
rule mechanism is relevant; it is rather the fact that the evidence excluded is also relevant 
and could aid in reaching more informed verdicts. If rules of exclusion were abolished, 
such judicial discretion would clearly be reduced, as would Counsel’s role.111 There is, 
therefore, an unpalatable symbiotic relationship between Counsel’s role in an adversarial 
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i. The selection of admissible evidence and free proof theory 
  
A central concern within common law jurisdictions is the selection of admissible 
evidence. This challenge is more acute as it broaches both the theoretical and practical 
application of evidence rules.112 Both are not always commensurate. At the heart of the 
selection method are two competing theories of evidence admissibility: the theories of 
free proof and best evidence. Bentham’s free proof theory was introduced as being a 
logical evidence assessment device. This theory presumes that if a person is tasked with 
adjudicating the factual accuracy of a given scenario, that person ought to first possess all 
available evidence. The basis of fact-finding is the evaluation of evidence, which means 
that it must be gathered and proffered to the jury in a coherent presentation.113 Not only 
does the principle link justice to truth, but it also attempts to treat the lay-juror as a 
rational being, who objectively evaluates evidence. Deeper analysis of the application of 
the ‘free proof’ theory reveals differing acceptance levels for its tenets. Bentham deemed 
the ‘free proof’ theory as a solution to the ailments of the criminal trial as: 
…evidence [is] admitted if logically relevant— if the consideration of some piece of 
evidence made a proposition more likely than it would have been without that evidence- 
and was then given the weight that its intrinsic and particular probative value justified.114 
If the free proof theory prevailed, the accused would be allowed to adduce rebutting 
evidence, subject to exclusionary rules.115 The process of adjudication requires 
parameters for the ‘triers of fact’ to adequately assess the available evidence. These 
boundaries of evidence assessment do not adequately deal with the issue of probative 
evidence being excluded. How the exclusion of evidence can be reconciled with the 
administration of justice is a matter which has occupied the minds of jurists from Gilbert 
to Cross.116 The best evidence was required at common law to be adduced to the court 
which was that evidence most contemporaneous to the event to be proved. Advocates of 
reduced exclusion argue that the best evidence principle encompasses the admittance of 
all available relevant evidence if the trial process can cater for it and is consequently 
wholly unworkable.117 There is a clear convergence between, on the one hand, Bentham’s 
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ideal of ‘free proof’ and on the other side of the same hand, common law advocates 
requiring the implementation of the ‘best evidence’ principle to discern the truth. 
 
j. Stage 5: Probability rejected in jury deliberations 
 
The most significant consequence of the establishment and implementation of evidence 
rules in criminal trials was that they forced juries to perform a very difficult task, for 
which most were, and still are, ill-prepared. The jury must use a combination of common-
sense and probability to evaluate the likelihood that a certain course of events occurred, 
based upon the admitted evidence.118 This is not to argue that if the tribunal of fact was 
afforded every piece of gathered evidence that the use of probability would not be 
engaged. This argument is supported by the definition of evidence which Stein provides 
as “…an item of information which evidences or leads to an additional piece of 
information.”119 Probative evidence needs to aid in the process of fact-determination. 
Modern-day trials are inherently conservative processes with any innovation 
coming only gradually. As has been detailed above, juries became the most important 
factor in an adversarial criminal trial for both parties, as evidence law became more 
integral to criminal trials. The lay-jury is an entity which requires precise analysis. Issues 
pertaining to the jury-deliberation process in a criminal trial in Ireland remain to the 
present-day. Jurors usually rely on their own intuition in deciding whether a strand of 
evidence confirms the proffered hypothesis.120 Each juror effectively estimates the 
frequency of an action occurring under the set of circumstances which would have been 
outlined during the trial. Each juror then employs a principle of either complementation or 
multiplication in assessing whether the action occurred.121 The higher the frequency of 
these two principles allows for a greater probability that the action sought to be proved 
occurred. If this ‘frequentist theory’ is consistently applied, probability atomises the 
proposed fact. The use of probability is arguably epistemologically regressive, as gaps in 
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the factual nexus caused by exclusionary rules often result in further questions as to how 
a jury reached its verdict.122 
People v Collins is an example of the probability theory being used by a jury.123 
State prosecutors encouraged jurors in this trial to utilise the probability method of fact-
determination in reaching their verdict in an armed bank robbery case. Two highly 
distinctive co-accused were the alleged bank-robbers.124 The trial centred on the expert 
testimony of a mathematics professor who provided oral evidence regarding probability 
theory. The expert evidence confirmed that the probability of several separate events 
occurring is equal to the probability that each event will occur individually.125 The trial 
judge accepted this evidence and the jury found the accused guilty. The Californian 
Supreme Court reversed these convictions. That court found on four grounds that the 
mathematical probability evidence was inadmissible. This was a significant blow to those 
who sought greater illumination of the decision-making process. 
The California Supreme Court failed to admit the expert evidence due to the 
reservations it held concerning frequency theory. The use of probability in Collins was 
uncorroborated by empirical evidence.126 The jury’s probability assessment assumed that 
all eye-witness testimony in the case was wholly accurate.127 The expert evidence, thus, 
could not be afforded significant weight as the probability that a random couple 
possessing a combination of the accused’s characteristics, was assessed by the court, to be 
entirely different from uncovering the probability that an actual couple with the accused’s 
characteristics could be innocent. The  decision in Collins illustrates that common law 
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evidence rules still dominate over mathematical probability in evidence law.128 There is 
also an argument, developed in American literature, which proffers that more accurate 
fact-finding techniques, secured by adhering to mathematically based probability theories, 
would not withstand the corrosive nature of the exclusionary rules of the Anglo-American 
trial process. Collins also suggests that there are some ‘values’ within the adversary 
criminal trial which would be effectively usurped by scientific methodology.129 These 
‘values’ are the remnants of the foundational pillars of evidence exclusionary law created 




The most important aspect of the evolution of the criminal trial is the consistent exclusion 
of evidence regardless of the divergence in theoretical positions which have been present 
for centuries. The jury has evolved from a respected institution of the criminal trial 
process, to a body that is now not trusted to assess the evidence without first excluding 
certain types of evidence. It is a paradoxical evolution. The coherency and legitimacy of 
the verdict is deemed to be enhanced by effectively reducing the amount of evidence that 
a jury can utilise in reaching their verdict. Others would have thought that the accuracy of 
a decision is increased, rather than reduced, by the addition of probative evidence that can 
be assessed. 
A further challenge lies in determining whether a judge’s decision-making process 
is positive or negative. This can be ascertained by analysing the context in which the 
ruling is made. The ruling must conform to the criminal procedure, which curtails the 
discretionary element in the decision-making process. This means that the ruling is not 
made by adhering to rules unique to that trial; rather it is arrived at by adhering to 
adjectival evidence law, which is uniformly applicable to all criminal trials. The object of 
an act compels the actor to perform a task in a specified manner, which aids in identifying 
those who have conformed to the law. What is most crucial when developing a coherent 
decision-making procedure is that the consequence of the admissibility ruling is a product 
of the process by which it is made. This context will, consequently, affect the law’s 
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application. This theoretical underpinning was contradicted by the rejection of 
mathematical probability being applied to the jury deliberation process. 
The use of discretion is of central importance to the functioning of common law 
theories. It can enforce the rules of evidence, either strictly or precisely, whenever the 
case requires the presiding judge to adjudicate on an evidential issue. Judicial discretion is 
required for the maintenance of stare decisis which is a law-making process.130 Judicial 
discretion ought to be focused towards achieving the effective implementation of laws 
that reconciles with the aim of a criminal trial. In the following chapters this desire will 





















130 The utilitarian values of positivism distinguish stare decisis from the common law by adhering to the 
‘context of utterance’ concept which asks the observer to envisage to whom the law-giver (sovereign) was 
speaking as the law was issued. Stare decisis is the system by which a lower court is bound by the decision 





Chapter 2: Discretionary decision-making in criminal trials 
 
Introduction 
This chapter argues that the process of evidence admissibility within the adversarial 
criminal trial is influenced by discretionary decision-making which leads to inconsistent 
decision-making. In Ex Parte Chase, judicial discretion was ridiculed: 
The discretion of a judge is the law of tyrants, it is always unknown; it is different from 
different men; it is casual and depends upon constitution and passion. In the best, it is 
often, at times, capricious; in the worst it is every vice, folly and madness, to which 
human nature is liable.131 
Clarke J stated the issue of discretion in the following terms in this jurisdiction:  
It is appropriate to pause to emphasise that the use of the term ‘discretion’ in this context 
does not imply that the court can do as it pleases…In truth what the law requires is that, 
in deciding whether to admit or exclude evidence…the court is required to take into 
account a broad range of circumstances before determining whether, on balance, the 
evidence should be admitted or excluded.132 
It is intended to examine in the following chapters if the use of discretion improves 
consistency in decision-making.  To do so, the following contextualises and delineates the 
definition of discretion by applying it to the common law’s method of developing law. A 
common law system can be assessed and contextualised by illustrating how that system 
evolves.133 The common law’s traditions are, however, a diverse cornucopia of custom, 
culture and social history. These ingredients permit courts to utilise discretion when 
assessing evidence admissibility applications.134 Each common law jurisdiction possesses 
characteristics that are mutually consistent in the development of its criminal justice 
system.135 Central to this development is the role of the courts in common law 
jurisdictions. The courts’ role in developing binding rules is therefore central to 
determining the admissibility of evidence.136  A key aspect of the development of 
common law rules is the confidence that such rules give to those who depend upon their 
coherent implementation. Such coherency effectively engenders the ‘rule of law’. The 
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development of evidence rules appears to mirror the development of social rules of that 
time.137   
A striking observation is that the common law can be formed from both legal and 
non-legal sources.138 This process allows for law to be developed through an inter-
disciplinary approach; the common law itself being established through tangential 
development from the canon law’s jus commune.139 The common law is sustained by a 
rule’s application, after which the public possesses an expectation that they will benefit 
from its application.   
  For all its supposed dynamism however, the common law’s process of 
development possesses notable disadvantages. This process of rule-making possesses 
inherent tensions and arguably sits uneasily in modern criminal justice systems. For 
instance, this process of developing law in a somewhat ad-hoc manner co-exists alongside 
a competing strand of statute law creation which also contains considerable judicial 
discretion.  The ‘separation of powers’ doctrine provides tension between the legislature 
and judiciary.140  
This tension is evident in how an Act of parliament is judicially interpreted, which 
ultimately proposes to delineate parliament’s intention. For instance, in Cruise v 
O’Donnell, the Supreme Court interpreted s 4E of the Criminal Procedure Act 1967 in a 
manner which directly impacted upon the issue of evidence admissibility and trial 
coherency. The Supreme Court in Cruise determined that s 4E could not be utilised in a 
manner that would, in effect, determine the admissibility of evidence which went beyond 
the parameters of the statements of proposed evidence in the Book of Evidence. This 
interpretation of the statutory provisions of the 1967 Act places more emphasis on 
devising a more efficient trial process.141  
Legislative interpretation affords the judiciary great discretion within a common 
law system.142 What emerges from this tension is striking. It may be too simplistic to state 
that the debate focuses upon the idiosyncrasies which are inherent in a legal system 
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dependant on both ‘judge-made’ and statute law. Such a crudely phrased dichotomy does, 
however, serve a worthwhile purpose.143  
By pitting these two branches of government against each other, both positivist 
and naturalist schools are engaged by proxy. By conducting analysis in this manner, a 
more complete narrative can be offered as to how common law jurisdictions have reached 
solutions through rules, whilst also maintaining the separation of governmental powers. A 
thorough dissemination of the interactions between common law and statute law can be 
found by analysing the utilisation of evidence law. This is so because evidence law 
includes seminal interactions between the tendentious triumvirate: constitutional; statute 
and common law.  
 
a. Tensions between sources of law 
Jurisdictions adhering to common law norms depend upon the rule-making 
framework associated with customary obedience. Custom is an important element in the 
creation of the common law.144 It is defined as “a law or right not written which, being 
established by long use and consent of our ancestors, has been and daily is put in 
practice.”145 Over time, customary law evolved to become statutory law. In the United 
Kingdom, where the common law first prospered, customs were categorised into 
‘customs of the realm’ and ‘particular customs’.146 When these strands were reduced to 
writing, they were re-classified as ‘statutum’.147 Customary laws were bestowed with the 
title ‘decisions’, which arrived after much deliberation, many amendments and debate.148 
Only after a period of deliberation could a decision be placed upon the statute book.149 
These actions by the ancient English parliament created the burgeoning parameters of the 
relationship between common and statutory law.  
 Statutes became more sophisticated and complex over time. It was seen that the 
better drafted statutes resulted in dramatically less ambiguity when courts came to 
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interpret their intended meaning. The discovery of a legal instrument’s true intention is 
often a rather abstract exercise. Henchy J’s dissenting judgment in Norris v Attorney 
General described the differences felt between implementing statute law and case law:  
In a case such as the present, where the legal materials we are considering are written 
instruments (ie. statutory provisions on the one hand and overriding constitutional 
provisions on the other) and are not amenable to the judicial development or extension 
which would be the case in regard to unwritten or case law, we must take those legal 
materials as we find them.150 
For example, Bennion believes that legislative meaning is issued by the courts’ 
interpretation, after the legislature has first pronounced what the legislation 
constitutionally connotes.151 It is the courts’ interpretation of the statutory text that is 
crucial however. Any pronouncement as to what the statute means adds context to the 
courts’ role of interpretation. This would seem, prima facie, to be a logical analysis; 
however what weight, if any, is to be given to any such pronouncement by parliament. 
Modern parliaments frequently vote on and commence Acts without first knowing their 
intentions regarding that Act’s parameters. A difficulty flowing from interpreting 
legislation is the fallacy analysts need to indulge in order to compile a coherent 
assessment of that legal instrument. In practical terms, members of parliament frequently 
operate under the ‘party whip’ system and often pass legislation without having fully read 
its text.152 The parliamentary voting process is included theoretically within the concept 
of the legislature’s will.153 Most modern statutes include a document known as an 
explanatory memorandum which is supposed to set out that Act’s purpose and how it 
should be interpreted. This ‘intention’ will paradoxically extend to that Parliament’s 
members who are not in government and have even voted against the legislation. Once 
the draft legislation is passed, it then moves to a phase of dormancy until it is utilised and 
then eventually falls to be interpreted by the courts.   
 In interpreting legislation, these courts are placed in a difficult position.154 The 
court is, in effect, left with tools based upon statutory interpretation techniques to 
complete this taxing task. These techniques are commensurate with the different sources 
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of the common law. These sources are varied and reflect the schools of thought from 
which they emerge.  
The two dominant philosophical schools of legal thought underpinning laws of 
evidence are positivism and natural law. Bentham’s legal positivist ideals centred round 
an imperative theory. Hart recommends that law should be based on the explicit 
commands issued by a sovereign legislator, with a supporting sanction present to deter 
non-compliance.155 A prominent feature of Bentham’s strand of positivism focused upon 
the eradication of morality from the process of law creation.156 Such a schism was seen as 
a direct affront by common law proponents.   
A process of implementation of law which adheres to morality as a guiding force 
in the creation of law, can, as Bentham and Hart agree, lead to an unparalleled disconnect 
between an elite law-making body and the people (ie. the sovereign).157 It could be argued 
that such an isolated process encourages the law’s mystification. Fuller argues that if the 
public cannot identify with a law’s constitutionality, that law does not serve the public.158 
If the population is removed from the law-making process, their rights are inevitably 
injured as those rights’ development is stunted.  
 
b. Positivist v Natural Law 
Polemical legal sources, after concentrated analysis, quite often possess similar, if not 
identical features. For example, Austin’s positivist leanings attach neatly to one of the 
essential features of the common law’s foundations.159 Austin’s theory of imperation rests 
upon a ‘habit of obedience’ principle, which closely associates with the customary 
inclination of natural law.160 This means, essentially, that the people must obey a rule 
over an extended period, such that the rule’s consistent application forms a legitimate 
expectation.   
Further contradictions are also present. Bentham’s theory of positivism dictates 
that only the sovereign can impose law. This is so as a law must be in the form of a 
command or prohibition and a sanction must attach. However, Hacker’s ‘dual mandate’ 
theory eradicates the Benthamite prerequisite that an object must suffer detrimentally if 
 
155 H.L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory (Clarendon Press, 1982) 
17-18. 
156 Hart, Essays on Bentham 18. 
157 Ibid, 28. 
158 Peter P. Nicholson, ‘The Internal Morality of Law: Fuller and His Critics’ (1974) 84 (4) Ethics 307, 323. 






they do not comply with the command/prohibition principle.161 As the positivist legal 
theory develops, it may, at times, align closer to its opposing perspective, as both legal 
structures are normatively bound.162 When a law has been promulgated and comprises a 
punitive clause, the theory abounds that there is present greater certainty from a statutory 
version than a common law rule.163 The reality suggests however that the inconsistencies 
associated with judicial discretion are inherent in both the common law rule-making, as 
well as those present in statutory interpretation.164 To compound matters, is the fact that 
the common law evolves at a steady pace. 
 The common law’s development depends upon new ‘test’ cases, points of law or 
constitutional challenges brought by private or public parties. The common-law 
progressed organically from a set of customs which formed rules, only after gaining the 
respect of, and being obeyed by, the community. In other words, there was no set of rules 
offered  to the people initially; it was up to the people to create their own framework.165 
The judge possesses a body of rules which, when combined, will aid in delivering their 
final judgment.166 The judge ultimately uses discretion in determining what is most just 
when faced with two disputing parties.167 This  adherence to discretion is best illuminated 
by analysing the process of a trial in which the rules of evidence are operative.   
Evidence admissibility ultimately determines the course that a contested 
adversarial trial will take.168 The presiding judge, in this respect, is the final arbiter as to 
which evidence is admitted to go before the tribunal of fact in deciding guilt.169 Academic 
arguments have attempted to gauge how this process of evidence admissibility-
determination works.170 The judge in a common law system essentially looks towards 
precedent as guidance for their decision, along with reference to applicable constitutional 
rights. This means that a presiding judge may interpret the rule—which is often vague—
differently from other judges hearing a case with similar facts. The rule(s) essentially 
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remain constant; it is their implementation which varies. The common law is 
distinguished from other legal systems by its adversarial trial, as judicial discretion is 
afforded a constitutional footing. 171 As Frank laments: 
…with respect to any given judge, it is almost impossible to tell, in any specific case 
involving conflicting testimony, how much he will be influenced by the rules.172 
However, once the evidence is admitted after legal submissions, the jury will perform its 
function.173 This would seem, from a lay perspective, to be quite logical. The reality, 
however, can be quite different from the perception.  
  The criminal trial procedure is applied to form a criminal trial process. Formal 
evidential rules are applied in order to reach a verdict in a criminal trial, if that is possible.  
The interpretation of procedural rules and how these rules are applied is therefore of 
paramount importance.174 Frank starkly suggests that judicial decisions, regarding 
evidential arguments, are based on no more than guesswork and common-sense 
analogies.175 Essentially, if and when  a judge is faced with legal argument from two 
opposing counsel concerning an evidence admissibility issue, that trial judge  estimates 
whether such evidence possesses more prejudicial features to the accused than probative 
features to the interests of the public.176 This decision on evidence admissibility can be  
based on factors which are variable, such as the judge’s mood at that time, on that day. 
Moreover, most formal rules and principles of decision-making are rendered impotent in 
the face of such arbitrariness as variable factors are particularly difficult to regulate. 
 Proponents of discretionary decision-making argue that judicial decisions are not 
merely instinctive.177 Rather, deciding judges must have recourse to previous decisions 
made concerning similar facts. However, what if the previous decision was 
constitutionally abhorrent? The presiding judge may seek to confine the previous decision 
as just pertaining to that first case. Alternatively, they may follow the decision reached in 
the previous case, as to do otherwise would confound the law’s certainty.178 This dilemma 
could be framed as being which action or inaction offends the administration of justice 
 
171 Jerome Frank, ‘Are Judges Human? Part One: The Effect on Legal Thinking of the Assumption That 
Judges Behave like Human Beings’ (1931) 80 (1) University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American 
Law Register 17, 42.  
172 Frank, ‘Are Judges Human? 42.  
173 Jerome Frank, ‘What Courts Do in Fact: Part One’ (1931-32) 26 Illinois Law Review 645, 651. 
174 Frank, ‘What Courts Do in Fact’ 652.  
175 Ibid. 
176 Ibid. 
177Harold Hongju Koh, ‘Setting the World Right’ (2006) 115(9) Yale Law Journal 2350, 2368 for an excellent 
counter-argument to discretionary norms. 





the least. Highly technical rules of evidence imply the action or inaction in determining 
their application and the extent of such deployment. These exceptions cater for cases 
where it would offend the rule of law if such evidence was not admitted.179 If the trial 
judge decides to follow precedent, that judge  will provide consistency which will be 
constitutional in determining the evidence admissibility issue. This judicial function is 
presupposing that the decision is legally correct. When the precedent is incongruous to 
the other decisions on that topic of evidence law for example, the counter-argument 
alludes to the illogicality of perpetuating a rule that is clearly incorrect. To do so would, 
in effect, bring the administration of justice into disrepute. It appears that the trial judge is 
faced with an unenviable task, with two vying paths. 
  The problems faced by trial courts are based most fundamentally on the accepted 
desire that the administration of justice be consistent.180 Through the judiciary’s ingenuity 
and, most significantly, the system in which they operate, a side-lining mechanism of 
troublesome precedent has been engineered and is utilised by the judiciary. There are two 
distinct methods deployed to achieve this task, the “contextual” and the “re-
interpretative” approaches to confining a previous decision to its own factual-nexus. The 
contextual method is implemented by the judiciary when contextualising the previous 
decision by limiting its application to the facts of that case with which it is associated.  
The “re-interpretative method”, in contrast, does not dismiss the incorrect 
judgment, but rather re-interprets where its ratio decidendi is located.181 The latter 
method is more problematical than the former. If the ratio of the first judgment is in area 
‘X’ for example, but the re-interpretative method states that it is in area ‘Y’, which 
statement of the law is more correct? The re-interpretative method seeks to convince 
practitioners, and the wider community, that a judgment which possesses two ratios 
provides an inevitable, mutually acceptable balance.182  
 These two differing approaches raise the question as to whether the doctrine of 
stare decisis ought to be accepted in the modern common law legal tradition, where 
constitutional norms interact with judicial decision-making. Stare decisis was initially 
 
179 T.R.S. Allan, ‘Hearsay Exception Subject to Relevance. Relevance Subject to Hearsay’ (1985) 44 (3) 
Cambridge Law Journal 345. 
180 Jerome Frank, ‘What the Courts Do in Fact: Part II’ (1931-32) 26 Illinois Law Review 761, 767. 
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applied in order to provide consistency.183 It is quite another matter to state that it 
provides the consistency of correct decisions.184 
The doctrine of stare decisis has been so well established within the common law 
that it has endured for centuries.185 In London Street Tramways Co. Ltd. v London County 
Council the doctrine of stare decisis, and its application, threatened the common law’s 
development in creating consistent legal principles.186 The point of law sent to the House 
of Lords was succinct: 
It is therefore desired to argue… the general question whether the House is bound by its 
own decision on a point of law in a previous case.187 
Halsbury LC in delivering judgment stated: 
… a decision of this House once given upon a point of law is conclusive…That is a 
principle which has been, I believe…established now for some centuries.188 
The Court felt constrained by the weight of precedent and its use.  
The treatment of the London Street Tramways Co. Ltd. decision by subsequent 
courts was varied.189 In Kay v Lambeth LBC, for example, Lord Bingham stated: 
While adherence to precedent has been derided by some, at any rate since the time of 
Bentham, as a recipe for the perpetuation of error, it has been a cornerstone of our legal 
system.190 
This may be a true reflection of the importance bestowed upon the role of binding 
precedent; however, the English courts have considerably weakened this foundational 
block. A Practice Direction issued by Gardiner LC stated: 
Their Lordships nevertheless recognise that too rigid adherence to precedent may lead to 
injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the proper development of the law. 
They propose, therefore, to modify their present practice and…depart from a previous 
decision when it appears right to do so.191 
 
183 Rudolph Laun, ‘Stare Decisis’ (1938) 25 (1) Virginia Law Review 12. 
184 Note, ‘Stare Decisis’ (1920) 34(1) Harvard Law Review 74. 
185 Note, ‘Stare Decisis’ 74.  
186[1898] AC 375 (HL). The facts of London Street Tramways can be stated briefly as follows: the respondents 
required the appellants to sell to them portions of their tramways pursuant to the Tramways Act 1870. The 
appellant sought the respondents to pay a price for their company which represented the price of the company 
as a going concern, including the profits which were made. Evidence was adduced of the appellant company’s 
profits but was rejected by the evaluator who refused to accept an evaluation based on profits accumulated. 
The appellants finally appealed to the House of Lords on a point of law.     
187[1898] AC 375, 376 (HL). 
188Ibid, 379. 
189 Ibid, 375. 
190[2006] UKHL 10, [2006] 2 A.C. 465 (HL), para. 48. 





 In Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd, the English and Welsh Court of Appeal applied 
the rationale evident in the House of Lords’ Practice Direction.192 That decision held that 
the Court of Appeal is bound by its own decision and those of courts of coordinate 
jurisdiction. Lord Greene MR offered three exceptions to this general rule, allowing the 
court to depart from what otherwise would have been binding authority. However, in The 
Royal Court Derby Porcelain Co. Ltd v Raymond Russell, Bucknill LJ stated that: 
If it is permissible in a case of this kind to consider public policy, it seems to me most 
undesirable that one division of this court should give a decision which is inconsistent 
with a decision given by another division of the court. As far as one can, I would like to 
keep the law as certain as possible…193 
Stare decisis’ application has arguably created greater uncertainty than first thought, 
particularly when evidential issues come to be resolved. Central to evidence admissibility 
hearings is the use of statutory interpretation by the trial judge.  
 
c. The judiciary’s role 
Broadly speaking, statutory interpretation allows the judiciary decide cases by imposing 
their interpretation as to what the legislature meant in a specific statutory provision. 
Judges apply a statutory provision in accordance with that legislature’s intention.194 The 
legislature is taken to possess a unified intention. However, this is too simplistic. It is not 
always possible to discern the legislature’s unified intention. An in-depth analysis into 
this intention, however, cannot be undertaken by a trial judge.195 The fact that appellate 
courts are available within the legal architecture cannot justify unduly expeditious 
decisions which should be made with appropriate consideration.  From observations 
derived from this thesis, it is arguable that trial judges are required to perform mental 
gymnastics without a safety-net on numerable occasions throughout a criminal trial.196  
    Statutory interpretation is also heavily reliant upon discretion as a tool.197 Of 
course there are governing interpretational norms, such as an international statute will be 
construed in another State as it has already been in its State of origin.198 Pervasive norms 
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194 Ernst Bruncken, ‘Interpretation of the Written Law’ (1915-16) 25 Yale Law Journal 129, 130.  
195Bruncken, Interpretation of the Written Law’ 130. 
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of statutory interpretation are of assistance when rules of statutory interpretation are 
sparse and incorporate discretion.199 For example, the principle that criminal statutes are 
strictly construed arguably reduces discretionary interpretations, but equally may not 
derive the legislative intention of parliament. Traditional aids to the process of statutory 
interpretation engender discretionary decision-making rather than provide more consistent 
alternatives.   
Societies in these jurisdictions expect the judiciary to rise above the fray and 
suspend aloft in interpretative solitude. This expectation may be unrealistic when 
considering that judges too are human beings with inherent psychological prejudices. 
Therefore, the task facing a judge must be defined by what the process can realistically 
attain. Judge Learned Hand reduced statutory interpretation to the concept of 
“proliferation of purpose”.200 Meanwhile, Justice Frankfurter of the United States 
Supreme Court defined the challenge thus: 
…I should say that the troublesome phase of construction is the determination of the 
extent to which extraneous documentation and external circumstances may be allowed to 
infiltrate the text on the theory that they were part of it, written in ink discernible to the 
judicial eye.201 
When Justice Holmes of the US Supreme Court opined that “the meaning of a sentence is 
to be felt rather than to be proved", he was succinctly implying that a person’s own 
discretion must be utilised when interpreting a statute.202 The use of discretion in 
interpreting statutes in evidence admissibility increased as more evidence law was 
developed.  
 
d. Gradualist development of evidence law 
The evolution of evidence law has been pivotal in the increased use of discretion 
in evidence admissibility. The rule against hearsay, for example, is one of the most 
impugned rules of evidence still implemented in modern trials.203 This rule has been 
altered since its inception, better to suit the modern criminal trial. This development also 
 
199 However, the interpretation Acts of various jurisdictions have outlined certain basic common presumptions 
which only aid the practicalities rather than the theory of the process. 
200Freund, ‘Interpretation of Statutes’ 213. 
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202United States v Johnson 221 US 448, 496 (1911). 
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signals the malleable nature of the common law.204 The reasons as to why common law 
criminal courts adhere to the central tenets of the rule against hearsay are centred round 
the common law traditions of an oral trial.205 It would seem rather odd that a rule which is 
justified on the basis that it affords confidence and credibility to the  criminal justice 
process, would have then succumbed to  exceptions to the originally stated rule against 
hearsay. To counter the potential rigidity of the rule’s application, some criminal trial 
judges possess a ‘residual discretion’ permitting the inclusion of evidence which would 
previously have been inadmissible hearsay if the necessity and reliability elements have 
 
204 Canada provides an interesting example of how the superior courts in common law jurisdictions can shape 
evidence law development. In R v Khan, the Canadian Supreme Court reviewed the exclusionary rule’s re-
definition. The trial judge in Kahn refused to admit a statement on the grounds that it was not sufficiently 
contemporaneous with the alleged assault to fall within the parameters of the rule against hearsay’s exception. 
Consequently, the court at first instance acquitted the appellant. On appeal by the prosecution, it was held by 
the Ontario Court of Appeal that the trial judge erred in law. This test focuses on the admission of unsworn 
evidence pursuant to s 16 of the Canada Evidence Act (1985). The acquittal was set aside and a re-trial 
ordered. The Canadian Supreme Court held, however, that s 16 possessed two significant prerequisites: 
a. That the person giving evidence is sufficiently intelligent; and 
b. They possess an understanding of the duty to tell the truth. 
It was held on appeal that the trial judge had placed excessive weight on the statement-maker’s age, even 
though both requirements had, prima facie, been satisfied. Section 16 (2) of the Canada Evidence Act (1985) 
further states that the evidence offered in compliance with this provision by a child under 14 shall not be 
conclusive. Other and more corroborating evidence will be required. Additionally, under s 16.1 (3), the 
threshold to meet, for unsworn evidence from under 14s to be deemed admissible, is whether they can 
understand and respond to specific questions asked of them. The decision in R v Kahn led to the subsequent 
trilogy of cases of Smith, B (KG) and U (FJ). In R v Smith, the Canadian Supreme Court heard a prosecution 
appeal against a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal which granted separate orders quashing a murder 
conviction and for a re-trial to commence. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. That court held that the 
statements made by the deceased in the first two telephone calls were inadmissible under the “state of mind” 
exception to the hearsay rule. The third telephone call would be inadmissible under the “state of mind” 
exception as it did not prove any factual assertion leading to the alleged act, while the fourth telephone 
exchange was deemed irrelevant. The court held that the Ontario Court of Appeal was correct in utilising the 
“state of mind” exception; however the rule against hearsay does not exclude evidence which is outside 
established categories of admissibility. Instead, the rule against hearsay should not be treated as pertaining to 
“ossified categories”, but ought to be viewed as rendering greater evidence admissibility. The court re-
emphasised the two-limbed test for admissibility: necessity and reliability. The court highlighted that judicial 
discretion was of paramount importance in evidence admissibility. A significant iteration of the hearsay rule 
came in R v Khelawon. At first instance, the out-of-court statements were deemed to be admissible. The trial 
judge relied upon the Canadian Supreme Court decision in R v U (FJ). By relying upon U (FJ), similar fact 
evidence acted as a corroborative factor in satisfying the reliability component of the Canadian exception to 
the hearsay rule. As a result, the accused was convicted. He then appealed his conviction and sentence to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal. A majority of that court allowed the appeal on the basis that the trial judge had erred 
in law in admitting videoed statements. The appellate court distinguished U (FJ) from the present case on 
two succinct grounds: 1. the statement-makers in U (FJ) were in court but not called, nevertheless being 
available for cross-examination, and 2. the statements in U (FJ) both related to the same incident. The 
respondent appealed to the Canadian Supreme Court. Applying the double principled test of necessity and 
reliability, a unanimous Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The court agreed with the necessity argument 
on the basis that the statement-maker was now deceased, but it was felt that the statement failed the test’s 
reliability element. 





been first proved.206 Two exceptions to the rule against hearsay are touched upon below 
as illustrative examples of evidence law evolution.  
 
Conclusion 
The common law can deliver dynamic legal thinking that is unpredictable.207 There is a 
fine balance to be found between administering justice flexibly and simply authorising 
judicial law-making, which contravenes Aristotle’s conception of the ‘separation of 
powers’.208 Adhering to the concept of stare decisis in common law jurisdictions creates 
potentially unjust results, but that it is a necessary evil in providing legal certainty.209 If 
the strictures of stare decisis were not applied, the rule of law would cease. It has been 
argued that the arbiters of fact are unduly dependent upon judicial discretion when 
determining evidence admissibility which can be unduly significant in deciding the guilt 
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Chapter 3: Judicial discretion in evidence admissibility— an overview of 
the criminal trial on indictment in Ireland 
 
Introduction 
The criminal trial in Ireland is a complex entity possessing essential elements which, 
theoretically, ought to complement each other in a seamless process of truth-discovery. 
The “truth” in this context, refers to the perception that a criminal trial on indictment can 
pinpoint what occurred in the matter. It is not altogether certain that the aim of truth-
discovery is best served by the idiosyncrasies of the adversarial criminal trial model. The 
very procedures of the criminal trial in Ireland, for example, could be viewed as militating 
against the primary aim of the trial.210 The primary “aim” of the trial is not easily defined 
either. On one hand, it is the discovery of “truth” on the other, it is the implementation of 
“justice”. These terms (ie. truth and justice) are quite subjective. This chapter will analyse 
a selection of Irish criminal trials within a thematic framework. Discretionary decision-
making and the standard of evidence admissibility decisions made by the presiding judges 
are analysed in a contextual framework. This theme will be aligned to secondary themes 
included in the chapter, which serve to provide context to the decision-making process. 
These secondary themes include the process of evidence presentation by the participating 
counsel and the quality of analysis by the key participants of the authorities opened to the 
court. These themes provide an evaluation of the process of judicial decision-making on 
evidence within a criminal trial in Ireland. The Central Criminal Court provides an 
excellent basis to assess evidential procedure and is done so here within the context of 
rape trials heard by the court.211  
The first section of this chapter provides an overview of the criminal trials heard 
on Indictment in Ireland between January and December 2012 (inclusive). The Central 
Criminal Court is the first court analysed. This court predominantly hears rape and 
murder trials.212 Trials on indictment from the Circuit Criminal Court will then be 
analysed. This court is assessed by dividing the court between the Dublin Circuit and that 
 
210 For instance, the essence of the exclusionary rule has traditionally been to exclude evidence, which is 
highly probative and relevant, but infringes upon a constitutional, as opposed to a legal right held by the 
accused.  
211 The Central Criminal Court hears a limited range of serious offences in this State, with rape and murder 
cases being the vast majority of its caseload.   
212 Rape trials will be compared with other rape trials and murder trials with other murder trials in this calendar 
year. The reason for doing so is ease of access for the reader and author and the issues dealt with in rape trials 





of the provincial circuits.213 Within the analysis of the Circuit Criminal Courts, the 
offences will be further categorised in relation to the broad outline of the most common 
offences coming before the Circuit Criminal Court at that time: offences of a sexual 
nature, offences against the person (ie. assault), offences against property and corporate 
crime.214 The Special Criminal Court’s (SCC) rulings on evidence admissibility are also 
analysed in this chapter.215  
  The SCC predominantly hears scheduled offences as defined by statute before a 
three-judge court. Offences before this court are essentially offences in relation to 
dissident republican activities and membership of illegal organisations, and, due to the 
expansion of the court’s remit, offences in relation to organised crime gangs. Each 
observed court is analysed by calendar month rather than legal term for ease of access.216  
 
a. Field study methodology 
 
Each included trial was chosen using filters. All criminal trials were read and assessed for 
rulings pertaining to evidence admissibility. Not every trial on indictment in this State 
during this period was usable as raw data since some did not provide any judicial rulings 
on evidential matters. This acted as the first natural filtering mechanism, however very 
few trials possessed no judicial ruling(s). The second filtering aid saw a categorisation of 
the rulings which were made by the presiding judges in the analysed courts. These rulings 
were categorised in a two pillar frame-work, with evidence admissibility rulings in one 
and non-evidence admissibility rulings in the other. These two filtering structures allowed 
for a far greater targeted analysis of judicial discretion in evidence admissibility, and in 
 
213 The Circuits that are present within this State are the following: Dublin, Cork, South-West, South-Eastern, 
Western, Eastern, Northern and Midland circuits. 
214 These categories are loosely defined and are not rigidly constructed; however, this categorisation reflects 
the diversity of offences which are heard in this court of limited jurisdiction. 
215 Part V of the Offences against the State Act 1939 (as amended) created the SCC and is retained under 
executive order. This is a process which has not been without criticism from the United Nations Human 
Rights Commission in the matter of Kavanagh v Ireland due to the fact that a constitutional right, (ie. a trial 
with a jury) is denied the accused brought forward to this court by the DPP, a decision which is non-
reviewable.  
216 It must be noted at this juncture that the legal year is rather elongated, interspersed as it is with several 
vacation periods, the longest being between August-October of each year. It must also be noted that several 
courts continue throughout these designated periods with duty judges being scheduled to a rota of appearance 





particular, what factors were determinative of the judicial ruling, be they statutory or 
common law.217 
 
b. Analysis aids  
 
Each criminal trial possesses a particular file number which is afforded it by the court 
registrar.218 Each criminal trial also possesses a ‘live’ transcript of the proceedings heard 
in that particular court room on that day and is administered by the Courts Service of 
Ireland.219 This transcript is made available to the trial judge after each day’s hearing and 
is usually available  that evening.220 The ‘Digital Audio Recording’ (DAR) system is 
officially controlled by the court registrar.221 This system is deployed in the Criminal 
Courts of Justice at Parkgate Street in Dublin, and in every criminal trial court in the 
State. This digitised system translates the spoken word in court to an official transcript, 
which is then formatted and indexed, which states when a certain witness commenced 
their evidence for example and at which page this can be found on the transcript for that 
day. This study conducted by the author was primarily achieved using such official court 
transcripts. 
 
c. The voir dire 
The voir dire section of the trial process is the period of a trial by which contested 
evidence can be either admitted or disallowed entry to the main trial conducted before the 
jury. Counsel submissions and the judge’s ruling are particularly analysed in order to 
assess the process by which evidence is admitted at trial. The second half of this chapter 
contrasts the voir dire procedure observed in the Central Criminal Court to a case that 
 
217 It also needs to be stated that counsel at times managed to agree on certain issues together, which meant 
that evidence admissibility issues which would have required a judicial intervention did not necessitate such 
an action. An example would be of one side intimating that a witness would be called to which the other side 
objects, but a ruling is averted due to counsel deciding better of calling that witness. This occurrence happened 
on occasions in the courts observed.    
218 This is a system which is implemented by civil servants working as registrars in the Courts Service of 
Ireland, under the auspices of the Department of Justice and Equality.    
219 This system is known as ‘Digital Audio Recording’ which produces a verbatim transcript in Word and pdf 
formats of that day’s proceedings in all court rooms in Ireland.  
220 The trial judge is sent the Word and pdf (soft copy) via e-mail and receives a hard copy which is sent the 
next morning. The hard copy is an exact copy of the soft copy but is bound as some judges prefer to work 
with a hard copy. Most transcripts are available from 19:00 if the hearing for the day ends at approximately 
16:00.  
221 An easy reminder for all present in the court is that when the red digital clock is running just in front of 





was observed by the author before the Dublin Circuit Criminal Court. Analysis of the 
influences which are inherent in the trial judge’s ruling reflects the defining source of law 
in reaching that decision. It must be noted that the voir dire of a criminal trial is the focal 
point for evidence admissibility. There are certain features that distinguish the procedure 
from the substantive trial. The trial judges observed by this author explained to the jury 
that these matters were based in law and that only evidence would be given to the jury 
which was fit for that purpose. In such a case, the jury, in effect, was told that they had no 
interest in the voir dire.222 On very rare occasions was it mentioned by  counsel seeking a 
voir dire the actual time estimate for the issue to be resolved.223 Usually, the trial judge 
told the jury that they hoped to have the matter canvassed within a “reasonable 
timeframe”. If the voir dire began with the estimate being just a matter of minutes, but it 
transpired that the issue would take considerably longer, the observed trial judges were 
extremely conscious of the jury’s time and communicating to them the revised time 
estimate.224 Only very rarely would a trial judge, of their own accord, intervene and ask 
the jury to retire, as an issue would need to be dealt with in a voir dire. It was largely left 
to the moving party to raise a legal matter and request that the jury exit. 
In People (DPP) v McCann, the Court of Criminal Appeal suggested that it was 
clearly more efficient if admissibility issues concerning certain types of evidence (eg. 
confessions) could be dealt with at the outset of the trial, presumably meaning before any 
other evidence was heard by the jury.225 This idea has not been fully implemented in all 
criminal trials on indictment in Ireland. In an interview conducted with an experienced 
Central Criminal Court Senior Counsel by the author, the issue of potential manipulation 
of the voir dire process was discussed:  
…they have to be arguments that you can stand over, but it is legitimate to try and 
challenge everything as much as you can, currently there’s a view that a voir dire can 
 
222 On some occasions the trial judge had mentioned to the jury that from time-to-time in a criminal trial 
matters arose which necessitated counsel to canvass the issue with the trial judge in their absence. This issue 
was raised in the judge’s preliminary remarks before the prosecution counsel opened their case.   
223 This was usually done before the jury came down to the court room for the day’s evidence. In such 
scenarios, the trial judge would have been aware that a major issue of contention had come between both 
counsel which required to be ruled upon.  
224 This was a common concern amongst all the trials observed, ie. the jury’s time and the court being hyper-
sensitive to communicate with them about the trial’s schedule.  
225 [1998] 4 IR 397 (CCA). O’Flaherty J stating at 415 of the report: “Consideration should be given to the 
introduction of a system whereby contests on the admissibility of evidence—when clearly foreseen by 
prosecution and defence—could be resolved at the outset of the trial so that, as far as practicable, a jury may 
hear all the relevant and admissible evidence in a coherent and uninterrupted progression and without the 
need for the jury to withdraw to their room, or otherwise absent themselves from the courtroom, for protracted 





only be taken where there is a substantial point…that you have to have a stated basis upon 
which you say the prosecution’s evidence fails the admissibility test, and that you are not 
entitled to a dry run and... a dry run voir dire as a manipulation of the system.226    
The process of evidence admissibility still remains a time consuming factor and prolongs 
trials on indictment in Ireland, however this may be a necessary evil and surely it is more 
just to put the prosecution to their burden of proving their case beyond a reasonable doubt 
with evidence that is admissible. In a series of judgments of the superior courts in Ireland, 
beginning with Byrne v Grey, it has been held that evidence admissibility issues cannot be 
predetermined through the mechanism of a judicial review hearing.227 
 
d. Central Criminal Court- overview 
 
There was a total of 74 trials heard in 2012 in the Central Criminal Court.228 There were 
42 rape trials. These 42 rape trials were heard by eight different trial judges (seven males, 
one female).229 Of these 42 rape trials, two trial judges heard 20 rape trials.230 That does 
not mean however that very much occurs on that first day, as often the hearing is but a 
few minutes in duration so that one side can apply for an adjournment to a future date, 
which may or may not be on consent with the opposing party. Bearing that qualification 
in mind, the trials that last for quite a number of weeks are not necessarily being heard 
each day, but those trials are still technically on-going and will be heard on the next date 
as agreed by the parties with the court.231  
Each trial is taken to be concluded upon sentencing being pronounced by the 
presiding judge, if applicable, or when a verdict has been delivered of not guilty, or when 
the judge discharges the jury, or when a successful Galbraith application has been made 
on behalf of the accused.232 Taking the entire sample of the Central Criminal Court, the 
 
226 Interview transcript on file with author dated 21.07.17.  
227 [1988] IR 31.  
228 The legal year (October-July) is divided into four ‘legal terms’ between which are vacation periods. These 
terms are defined regarding religious observation dates are as follows: Michaelmas term (October-
December), Hilary term (January-March/April, dependent on when Easter falls), Easter term (April-May) and 
Trinity term (May-July). 
229 The different trial judges were as follows: McCarthy J, Carney J, Sheehan J, White J, Clarke J, Butler J, 
O’Malley J and Birmingham J.  
230 McCarthy J (9) and Carney J (11) heard these 20 rape trials. Sheehan J (6), White J (6), Butler J (3), 
O’Malley J (2), Clarke J (1) and Birmingham J (1).  
231 Each week mentioned adheres to the modern working week of Monday to Friday inclusive.  
232 An R v Galbraith application can be made by the accused’s counsel at the end of the prosecution’s case. 
This application is to essentially to implore the court to direct the jury to find the accused not guilty as the 





average rape trial lasted for just under thirty-two days.233 The longest recorded matter of 
rape in the court list lasted for 140 days in 2012. The shortest being just under one day.234 
These statistics are included for the following contextual reasons:  
a. they serve to establish that the correlation between evidential matters to be ruled 
upon and the length of the actual trial, is not always proportionate, and 
 b. these statistics provide an opportunity to determine whether the trial’s length 
induces more or less pressure on the presiding judge to make quicker rulings so that the 
trial can proceed. 
 
e. Trial rulings- murder 
 
There were a total of 66 rulings made by trial judges of the Central Criminal Court in the 
28 murder trials throughout 2012. These rulings were required as an application had been 
proffered by counsel which necessitated that court to determine the matter for one party 
or the other. Not all of these 66 separate rulings concerned admissibility of evidence 
matters. It is worth noting that these 66 rulings were not always reduced to writing by the 
court and delivered in a reserved judgment,235 which is common place in the civil courts 
for instance.236 These rulings were usually delivered within moments of the parties 
closing their submissions on the respective application requiring determination. Of these 
66 rulings delivered in the murder trials for 2012, 35 directly concerned the admissibility 
of evidence.237  
 
233 This figure is calculated on the premise of when the matter was first dealt with in the list to the sentencing 
date (if applicable) or when the matter was concluded for another reason (ie. jury discharge).  
234 These figures are sourced from official trial transcripts.  
235 A reserved judgment is a judgment which is issued at a later date after the judge has heard the oral 
submissions from all parties and after the judge has read the written submissions of all parties. The reserved 
judgment will take the form of a written judgment.  
236 This is so as the trial judges of the Central Criminal Court are always concerned with the jury’s time not 
being wasted as a matter of priority. A reserved judgment describes the scenario where a judge has listened 
to the evidence/submissions of the parties on the issues to be ruled upon and then decides to take some time 
to consider the evidence/submissions further, as well as considering the law, in order to deliver a written 
judgment on another date; the usual course in the criminal trials observed was for the judge to deliver their 
ruling immediately the next morning, or on a Monday if the matter was canvassed on the previous Friday. On 
some occasions, which were admittedly rarer, the presiding judge would state his decision on the matter 
immediately after having heard the evidence/submissions but did not state the reasons for such a decision 
until a later date, which are written down in a more coherent ruling. This method of stating the decision first 
and leaving the reasons for another date is not wholly satisfactory, but it at least means that the trial can 
effectively continue with due expedition.     





Six different trial judges heard these 28 murder trials in 2012. Three of the six trial 
judges heard 22 of these 28 murder trials.238 The most murder trials heard by a judge was 
eight, and this judge in turn delivered 18 rulings within his set of murder trials.239 In three 
of Carney J’s eight murder trials no ruling was delivered whatsoever.240 McCarthy J, who 
heard seven murder trials, delivered a ruling in each of the trials before him in 2012. 
White J also heard seven murder trials and delivered rulings in five of those seven. 
Sheehan J heard five murder trials and delivered a ruling in all but one. O’Malley J heard 
one murder trial and did not deliver a ruling during this trial.  
 
f. What evidential issues were ruled upon?  
 
Carney J delivered eighteen rulings during the eight murder trials over which he presided 
in 2012. In January, Carney J presided over three trials in the Central Criminal Court, of 
which two were rape trials and one was a murder trial. In these three trials, he made a 
total of 16 rulings which impacted the course of the trial. The first ruling was grounded 
upon common law, as it referred to an application to withdraw the case from the jury due 
to delay. The second ruling was dealt entirely on the premise that facts are the domain of 
the lay jury and not of the judge, and so no substantive law was utilised in reaching this 
decision regarding the sufficiency of the evidence. In the second of Carney J’s trials, he 
was called upon to make two rulings during the trial. The first ruling of this second trial in 
January focused on causation in a murder trial.241 The experienced trial judge cited a legal 
text on this issue and within that text highlighted well-known jurisprudence at common 
law. Not only was domestic jurisprudence consulted but also foreign examples were 
highlighted which were commented upon in the legal text cited. The second ruling in the 
same trial concerned the availability of the defence of duress to a murder charge in Irish 
criminal law. The trial judge stated that he had reviewed the Irish jurisprudence on this 
 
238 Two trial judges heard just 1 murder trial each in 2012.  
239 Carney J was, at this time, the leading criminal trial judge in the Irish State and was the administrator of 
the criminal list in the High Court (ie. the Central Criminal Court). 
240 It is an observation from this author that the rulings delivered by Carney J during a trial tended to be short 
and to the point. It was very rarely, in the transcripts that this author has analysed, for this judge to deliver 
lengthy rulings and the reasons for such. The advantage of such short rulings is that the trial process is not 
held up unduly, however the disadvantage is that a thorough reasoning behind the ruling is not available for 
the record and for the parties. Each judge has their own style, which is but human nature; however, the 
provision of reasons for such a decision would allow greater analysis for the parties and prevent appeals 
against such decision based on a failure to provide adequate reasoning.  





issue and believed it was not available in Irish law. The common law jurisprudence was 
implicitly relied upon. 
  The third trial, over which Carney J presided, afforded an excellent opportunity 
for the trial judge to provide the reasoning behind his decisions, as numerous rulings were 
required in this particular rape trial. The first ruling in Carney J’s third trial concerned the 
admissibility of photographic evidence. In this ruling no authority was cited and the 
reason for admitting the evidence was based solely upon the trial judge’s discretion of not 
believing that the Gardaí had unduly delayed in getting to the crime scene. The third 
ruling was centred upon the admissibility of evidence and was again ruled upon without 
any authority being cited. The reasoning behind the decision to admit the evidence on this 
occasion was due to the “preciousness of the application”.242 The fourth ruling concerned 
leave to cross-examine a witness. The judge allowed this to occur based upon fairness 
grounds, without any authority being cited. The fifth ruling concerned background 
evidence being allowed into the trial. Counsel for both parties cited relevant case-law; the 
judge ruled however, without referring to such and admitted the evidence. The next ruling 
was based upon the admittance of evidence and was dealt with in an unsatisfactory 
manner for all concerned with one counsel taking grave exception to a judicial 
comment.243 The eighth ruling concerned the sufficiency of evidence available and 
whether there was evidence present to put to the jury. The judge decided, without citing 
authority, that there was and that the determination of facts was the domain of the jury. If 
the judge had decided that there was not sufficient evidence to go to the jury, the charge 
would have been withdrawn. Another ruling was delivered in a manner which rendered 
discerning its reasoning a very difficult task. The application centred upon the 
corroboration warning to be given by the judge to the jury in the judge’s charge phase of 
the trial. No ruling was explicitly given in this regard as the trial judge seemed to take 
umbrage with the premise of the application by counsel. During the nine observed rulings 
during the criminal trials, the presiding judge gave quick rulings to evidence admissibility 
applications. There appeared to be a contemptuous attitude from the judge towards most 
 
242 The “preciousness of the application” is a term used on more than one occasion by this particular trial 
judge and refers to the context in which counsel applies for a particular piece of evidence to be admitted in a 
manner which lead this trial judge to believe that the reason for making such an application was with an eye 
to a possible future appeal in the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). It is a colloquial term which has a 
certain schadenfreude quality.   
243 It was unsatisfactory in the sense that the ruling was mired with what was effectively a shouting match 
between the judge and counsel which left little or no room for a proper consideration of the law and an 
analysis of the ruling to be offered by either the judge or counsel. Instead, it was a tit for tat shouting exchange 





of the applications made, as if these applications were considered a waste of the court’s 
time. The judge did not refer to authority during his rulings even if authorities were 
opened to him during the application.  
The overriding observation was the entire absence of statutory law being referred 
to by the judge when dealing with the various applications made by counsel for both 
sides. The rulings delivered appeared to be reached by recourse to the common law. The 
standard of reasoning given to counsel was sparse and, in some rulings, as cited above, 
was entirely absent. It would, however, be difficult to state categorically that these rulings 
were arbitrary and capricious. What could be said, with more certainty, is that the absence 
of a structured process of ruling upon matters leaves the administration of justice difficult 
to follow for the lay person. 244 There was a link between the discretion implemented by 
the judge and his reliance on the common law. There would appear to be a link between 
the benefits of discretion and the flexibility the common law affords.  
 
g. Comparison with other judges 
 
McCarthy J heard three trials in the Central Criminal Court in January 2012 (two of 
which were murder trials, one rape trial). The judge would be called upon to make five 
rulings in total during the course of this trial.245 The presiding judge, in making his ruling 
on this application, explicitly stated that he had recourse to legal texts. This is again 
evidence that rather than statutory law being the predominant factor, a certain weight was 
placed upon non-statutory sources of law, as these authorities were opened to the court 
during the application.  A considered and thoughtful ruling was delivered in the second 
admissibility ruling, which concerned the diminished responsibility defence.246 This 
ruling was dominated by the use of the Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006, with a mere 
acknowledgement to the common law on this issue. The discretion involved was curtailed 
due to the adherence to the procedure created by statute and the reasoning for doing so 
 
244 This is referenced at this juncture to highlight the fact that the most senior criminal trial judge in the State 
seemed to regard the common law of Ireland as being entirely dominant when making rulings. This is primary 
evidence to suggest that main argument made in this thesis, that the Irish criminal trial process is overly reliant 
upon discretionary judicial decision-making.  
245 People (DPP) v S.B., trial notes on file with author. 
246 This ruling was delivered the morning after the application had been made, allowing some time for the 





was far more transparent.247 When courts use statutory law in their rulings, it is easier to 
pinpoint the reasoning used than when the court refers to case law, which may possess 
different interpretations as to its significance.  
The third ruling focused on what questions may be posed to a witness during 
cross-examination. The witness had given evidence of previous sexual history concerning 
the accused before the jury, which counsel for the accused applied to have ruled 
inadmissible due to irrelevance and its prejudicial character.248 In ruling that the evidence 
was admissible due to relevancy, the trial judge did not refer to any substantive law on the 
matter, merely deciding that, in general, background evidence is determined on relevancy 
grounds.249  
 The final ruling in this trial concerned the applicability of the provocation 
defence. The trial judge decided against offering this defence to the jury and did so based 
on the common law on the issue.250 
The third and final trial for McCarthy J in January was a rape trial.251 There was 
only one significant ruling made in this trial, which concerned a possible infringement of 
the accused’s constitutional right to have access to a solicitor whilst in Garda custody. 
The impact of this admissibility ruling, if allowed, would mean that the evidence garnered 
by the Gardaí during that particular detention period would be inadmissible.252 The judge, 
in a thoughtful ruling (which was delivered the morning following submissions), first 
stated the facts as he thought them to be and that he found the accused in the witness box 
to be deliberately evasive of the truth.253 The trial judge then prepared to apply the test, 
which was derived from Irish and UK jurisprudence, as well as that of the European 
 
247 This observation would point to the fact that when adhering to statutory procedure the ruling made was 
far more transparent about reasoning and the submissions made were more focused also. The use of common 
law as the main determinant in a ruling tends to leave judicial reasoning far more difficult to discern.  
248 If this evidence had been ruled inadmissible, the jury would also have been discharged as they would have 
been irreparably contaminated. 
249 The fourth ruling centred on the scope of the questions to be posed to the witness. The trial judge was not 
called upon to make a substantive ruling on this matter as both counsel agreed on the correct course of action. 
250 In the second trial presided over by McCarthy J, which was another murder trial, the judge was asked to 
rule upon just one evidence application. The ruling concerned an application for the trial to be adjourned to a 
future date and this was acceded to on the basis that the test to be applied was whether there was a risk of an 
unfair trial to the accused due to the delay. This test was formulated in the jurisprudence on the matter and 
galvanised the judge’s opinion on the application. This process highlights the discretionary aspect of judicial 
decision-making and is what this thesis is establishing through the associated field-work. 
251 People (DPP) v M. McA trial notes on file with author. 
252 Usually an accused would be issued with a ‘C 72’ form by the Member-in-Charge of the Garda station in 
which the accused is being detained. The C 72 form contains the rights that a detained person possesses and 
a Garda member would normally explain the rights to the detainee whilst they are reading the document.  
253 Appellate courts are extremely reluctant to overturn trial judge’s rulings based on demeanour of a witness 





Court of Human Rights.254  The test was whether the facts as found amounted to 
reasonable access to a solicitor for the detained person. In finding that there was no 
breach of the accused’s constitutional rights, the trial judge placed variable levels of 
weight on the authorities cited to him by counsel.255  
The observed trial judges largely did not reserve judgment on their rulings on the 
legal matters which they were obliged to rule upon. These rulings, within the context of 
the trial, were highly significant as these arguments pertained directly to the evidence that 
would be allowed go to the tribunal of fact in reaching their decision. These trial judges 
were experienced and most of the authorities would have already been familiar to the 
court.256 
 
h. Discretionary warning applications 
 
One of the main areas of judicial discretion centres on the decision as to whether to 
impose a corroboration warning on the jury after they have received their charge, and the 
prosecution and defence have delivered their closing speeches.257 There was a balance to 
be struck between which source the trial judge relied on most heavily, and the competing 
dynamics of both sources of law, ie. case law and statute. The basis for the decision 
reached by some trial judges appeared to be the facts of the case before them rather than 
any overwhelming consideration of the cited sources. The different sources of law will be 





254 The referred to cases by McCarthy J in the course of his only ruling in this trial were the following: - 
Lavery v Member-in-Charge of Carrickmacross Garda Station [1999] 2 IR 390; People (DPP) v Buck [2002] 
2 IR 268; Salduz v Turkey (2008) 49 EHRR 421; and Cadder v Her Majesty’s Advocate [2010] UKSC 43.   
255 Cadder was, in effect, an appeal from the decision of HM Advocate v McLean [2009] HCJAC 97 which 
was a case which contained a similar factual nexus to Cadder in that both Cadder and McLean had been 
detained pursuant to s 14 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. Both Cadder and McLean made 
admissions to the Scottish police whilst being detained under s 14 but had not been afforded access to legal 
advice before their interviews with the police had commenced. Both Cadder and McLean had not requested 
the presence of a solicitor. The 1995 Act was enacted partially in response to the Thomson Committee’s 
Criminal Procedure in Scotland (Second Report) (Cmnd 6218). The Thomson Committee had decided in 
Chapter 7 of its report that the public interest in allowing the police question a suspect outweighed the right 
that the suspect possessed to access legal advice. Any access to legal advice prior to questioning was at the 
discretion of the police.    
256 However, an observer receives the impression that more time should be afforded to these evidential 
matters. 





i. Sources of law which impacted upon judicial rulings 
 
S 7 of the Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act 1990 
Section 7(1) and (2) of the 1990 Act can be recited in full to analyse its effect, with sub-
section 1, stating: 
Subject to any enactment relating to the corroboration of evidence in criminal 
proceedings, where at the trial on indictment of a person charged with an offence of a 
sexual nature evidence is given by the person in relation to whom the offence is alleged to 
have been committed and, by reason only of the nature of the charge, there would, but for 
this section, be a requirement that the jury be given a warning about the danger of 
convicting the person on the uncorroborated evidence of that other person, it shall be for 
the judge to decide in his discretion, having regard to all the evidence given, whether the 
jury should be given the warning; and accordingly any rule of law or practice by virtue of 
which there is such a requirement as aforesaid is hereby abolished. 
The process which the judge will need to engage is delineated by the statute, which 
reduces the scope for discretion. There are a number of prerequisites that need to be 
present in the case before the section is actually activated.258 
Section 7 (2) of the 1990 Act states: 
If a judge decides, in his discretion, to give such a warning as aforesaid, it shall not be 
necessary to use any particular form of words to do so. 
This sub-section serves to provide a degree of flexibility about the formula that can be 
used by the trial judge in addressing the corroboration issue. Some observers may state 
that such a section inserts an unnecessary degree of ambiguity into the already tense 
atmosphere of a criminal trial, where the jury might want to seek a degree of clarity from 
the judge. Sub-section 2 allows for such clarity, however this depends upon the presiding 
judge and the formula that they adopt. This is a crucial aspect to the trial as it may be the 
last message that the jury hears before they retire to deliberate their verdict. Any hint that 
the judge has laid a particular emphasis upon a piece of evidence or has taken a certain 
slant towards another piece of evidence, may have a huge influence upon the jury. 
 
258 First, the section is qualified by any enactment which pertains to the corroboration of evidence in criminal 
proceedings. It is not clear from the opening clause whether such an ‘enactment’ is past or putative, or whether 
s 7 refers to both potential modes. Second, the section is not activated unless the alleged sexual offence is 
being tried on indictment. Evidence must have been given by the person against whom the offence is alleged 
to have been committed. If there would be a requirement anyway of warning the jury on the lack of 
corroboration, such a warning must only be given at the judge’s discretion. The judge must also have regard 





Bearing in mind the significant implications that any warning may have on a 
jury’s deliberation process, it is worth remembering that the judicial determination as to 
whether a warning of this nature is merited needs to be hurdled. How this determination is 
reached, it would appear, brings the common law to the fore as the statutory provision 
does not dictate how the determination is reached, only that all the evidence in the case is 
considered. The statutory provision does not state that the evidence is the sole source of 
data to which the judge can have recourse in reaching his decision to issue a warning. 
When one looks at the trial process from the above examples, there would appear to be 
very little time available to a judge to consider all of the evidence in the case. It would 
also be highly impractical to do so as a quicker decision is required to progress the case 
efficiently. 
 
j. The importance of the formula used 
 
Section 7 (2) does not provide a specific formula that is to be used. Due to the absence of 
such a suggestive formula, further discretion is heaped upon the first base of discretion, 
which is used to determine if a warning will be issued at all. The choice of words that are 
to be used will vary considering the context of the case. It is a very difficult position for a 
trial judge however, as many appeals that are taken to the Court of Appeal tend to focus 
on the words used in the charge to the jury. In People (DPP) v Adach, the Court of 
Criminal Appeal heard an appeal from a convicted man who was sentenced for one count 
of rape under s 4 of the 1990 Act.259 The appellant’s grounds for his appeal centred upon 
the wording of the judge’s charge to the jury, which suggested that a non-decisive verdict 
was something that would not be desirous of the Court. It was held by McKechnie J (with 
Moriarty and O’Keefe JJ concurring), in setting aside the verdict and granting leave to 
appeal against conviction, that the trial judge must ensure that no improper pressure is 
applied to the jury in returning a verdict. The judge should not impose their own opinion 
as to how a particular verdict may be an inconvenience or mean increased expense as this 
may serve to reduce a juror’s own honest belief of the matter. The jury is required to 










k. The Circuit Criminal Court- an overview 
 
The Circuit Criminal Court in Ireland is a court of limited jurisdiction which hears 
criminal trials on indictment which do not comprise murder and rape. The Circuit 
Criminal Court, for the purposes of this thesis, will be divided into two main categories: 
Dublin Circuit Criminal Court and the Provincial Circuit Criminal Courts.260 The sample 
of criminal trials, which were observed by the author over a period of a year, focuses 
upon a certain element of the criminal trial process. It does so in order to establish why 
voir dires are called? Could the issues that are usually raised in these voir dires, and 
which delay the trial process for the jury, be dealt with more appropriately, and 
expediently, in a pre-trial hearing, or, do matters raised in a voir dire context, only really 
come to light as the trial proceeds, making pre-trial hearings redundant? These questions 
impact directly upon the discretionary judicial decision-making process which is the 
focus of this thesis.  
  It would be inaccurate to suggest that there have been no overtures of reform in 
the Irish criminal trial process. In 2012, the Dublin Circuit introduced a practice direction 
under the auspices of the President of the Circuit Court which sought to identify “cases in 
which pleas may be entered in advance of a trial date” and for trials listed in the Circuit 
Criminal Courts to begin “at the time and date appointed”.261 This pilot scheme was to 
run from 1st December 2012 and from 1st January 2013 for all new cases returned to the 
Dublin Circuit Criminal Court.262 A pre-trial hearing was envisioned to commence on a 
Friday, at least four weeks before the fixed trial date. This hearing should be attended by 
the accused and a legal representative of both the prosecution and the defence. The 
accused would be obliged to enter a plea at this hearing.263 This required plea was 
conditioned however on two factors: 1. that the matter was going to proceed to trial and 2. 
the plea entered at this preliminary hearing may have been in relation to one count on the 
indictment and such a plea is without prejudice to the accused in any event.264 Once the 
accused has performed this duty, the practice direction places the onus upon the 
 
260 The Circuit Criminal Courts are divided into the following circuits: Dublin, Cork, South-Western, 
Northern, Western, Midlands, South-Eastern and Eastern.  
261 CC 12- Practice Direction-Pre-Trial Procedure Dublin Circuit, County of the City of Dublin dated 
17.10.12. 
262 CC 12- Practice Direction-Pre-Trial Procedure Dublin Circuit, County of the City of Dublin dated 
17.10.12.  
263 Ibid. 





prosecution to supply a number of pieces of information to the court. For instance, 
whether there are any written statements that will be tendered as evidence pursuant to s 
21 of the Criminal Justice Act 1984.265 Whether any formal admissions are being 
conceded by the prosecution pursuant to s 22 of the 1984 Act should also be offered to 
the court in documentary form if necessary.266 
An important feature of the practice direction is that the prosecution must have 
clarified to the court that all of its evidence disclosure obligations had been met to date 
and that no defence requests remained outstanding at the preliminary hearing’s date.267 
The admissibility of interviews was not an issue that would be broached at this hearing; 
however, the formula of words used to constitute their contents could be clarified to the 
court.268 If this measure is adhered to, the memoranda of interview would be ready to use 
at the date of the trial, and, at the very least, any potential issues would have been 
previously raised so that the court could make a ruling without hearing lengthy argument 
in a voir dire.269 In the Working Group on the Jurisdiction of the Courts’ report in 2003 
(‘the Fennelly Report’) there was an evaluation of the process of criminal trials on 
indictment in the three courts covered here, ie. the Central Criminal Court, the Circuit 
Criminal Court and the SCC.270   
The ‘Fennelly report’ is a document that tentatively supported pre-trial hearings 
within the criminal trial process.271 The report states at para. 746: 
The Working Group is aware that the assignment in the Circuit Court in Dublin of a judge 
to deal with arraignments, applications and pleas in a dedicated list may provide the 
occasion for filtering out of cases will not result in a contest and for the resolution of 
other pre-trial issues. 
 
265 Notice should also be given at this stage of any agreement between the parties of s. 21 statements being 
tendered and whether a person making a s. 21 statement is required to attend court to give evidence.  
266 The practice direction allows the defence to remain unmoved as regards any admissions that it may want 
to offer so that the trial may progress more expeditiously. A more substantial document, which may have 
been required, was a list seeking to identify to the court any witness who wishes to give their evidence through 
a live television link pursuant to s 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1999. Any intention to have admitted into 
evidence any video-recording of any evidence should also be stated to the court at this juncture. 
267 This paragraph in the direction document places another onus upon the prosecution to ensure that 
disclosure has been met. However, substantial issues as to third party disclosure remain untouched in this 
process.  
268 In essence, the court sought to ensure that the interview(s) to be introduced into evidence did not require 
any further editing. Any issues that would require further determination by the court should have been 
highlighted at this time. 
269 The alleviation of temporal pressure from the formulation of a judicial ruling would have been a welcome 
development.  
270 Working Group on the Jurisdiction of the Courts, The Criminal Jurisdiction of the Courts (The Courts 
Service, Dublin 2003).  





The report clearly identifies the Circuit Court as the primary area of concern as this court 
deals with a greater volume of cases than the Central Criminal Court. The report goes on 
to state, in the same paragraph: 
However, this object can be frustrated by the fact that counsel for the accused often may 
not be sufficiently instructed to make an informed assessment of the case against their 
client at that stage.272   
In one sense the Working Group supports the concept of a pre-trial hearing device but 
feels that ‘other’ forces would frustrate its effectiveness, such as the lack of disclosure 
from the prosecution to the defence and the book of statements not being ready for 
service being a common lament. It would, therefore, appear that any possible pre-trial 
hearing could only materialise if the pre-trial hearing phase is given its due respect from 
all parties. The report concluded its analysis by commenting: 
Matters such as the substantive rights guaranteed to an accused do not in any event, fall 
within the ambit of an examination of jurisdiction. Quite apart from this consideration, 
however, the Working Group did not see a basis for contemplating alteration of the 
present constitutionality ordained balance between the rights of the accused and the 
legitimate interests of the prosecution in criminal proceedings.273   
The Working Group would not entertain any alteration to the accused’s duty to make 
disclosure in very limited circumstances of alibi evidence and a list of witnesses in an 
unlawful membership charge brought before the SCC.274  Pre-trial hearings had the 
“potential to reduce the need for determination in the course of the trial, by way of a voir 
dire, of issues of admissibility of certain categories of evidence.”275 In particular, the 
Working Group felt that the determination of the admissibility of a warrant or another 
legal instrument, for instance, would be appropriately dealt with in a pre-trial hearing, 
resulting in a more efficient trial process and an alleviation of temporal pressures on the 
presiding judge when formulating their ruling on a discrete matter.276  
It is easy to be critical of the rather tentative overtures made by the 2003 Working 
Group, however what was evidently lacking in its assessment of the use of a pre-trial 
hearing mechanism was an analysis of what the voir dire process is mainly used for in 
today’s criminal trials. The obvious answer is admissibility of evidence issues, however 
 
272 Working Group Report, The Criminal Jurisdiction of the Courts, 195. 
273 Ibid, 203.  
274 Ibid.  
275 Ibid, 204.  
276 Working Group Report, The Criminal Jurisdiction of the Courts, para 774. This measure would drastically 





without stating what type of evidence is in issue, it is very difficult to assess how the 
process can be improved as each trial will be determined individually on its own merits. 
The Working Group believed that a pre-trial hearing would provide “…a means of 
concentrating the efforts of prosecution and accused in resolving those issues which it 
would be proper and feasible to finalise in advance of trial.”277 The Group also 
recommended that a preliminary hearing should be introduced on a pilot basis in one 
court of the Circuit Court in Dublin, one Circuit Court outside of the capital and one 
Court of the Central Criminal Court.278 The proposal stipulated that such pilot schemes 
ought to be assigned to a particular judge and registrar in order to assess its progress, with 
statistical data on the frequency of adjournments to be compiled and the logging of the 
actual durations of the pre-trial process.279 
 
l. Dublin Circuit Criminal Court: an overview 
 
There were 39 trials on indictment observed within the Dublin Circuit in 2012. Due to the 
nature of this court, there is a greater variety of offences present in this analysis than 
witnessed in the Central Criminal Court. These 39 trials were heard by eight different 
Circuit Court judges. The breakdown of the offences heard by these judges in 2012 was as 
follows: 
 
TOTALS OFFENCE TYPE PERCENTAGE of TOTAL 
15 Drugs Offences 38 
4 Sexual Assault 10 
2 Tax offences 5 
1 Theft 3 
1 Fraud 3 
1 Criminal Damage 3 
4 Inchoate offences 10 
1 Knife Possession 3 
1 Robbery 3 
7 Miscellaneous 18 







277 Working Group Report, The Criminal Jurisdiction of the Courts, 205.  
278 Ibid.  





m. The Special Criminal Court: an overview 
 
The observed trials were all matters sent forward for trial on indictment in both Special 
Criminal Courts.280 The SCC is a different court model as it hears trials on indictment but 
does so without an empanelled jury.281 The court comprises three judges, usually one 
from the District Court, Circuit Court and High Court levels.282 Walsh outlines that the 
two features of differentiation in courts established under Article 38.3.1.° of the 
Constitution are that they are not confined to the strictures of Articles 34 and 35 of the 
Constitution of Ireland and they do not sit with a jury.283 Not being bound by Articles 34 
and 35 means that judges appointed to the Court do not have to be appointed strictly with 
the requirements of the Constitution.284 The Special Criminal Courts are creatures of 
statute pursuant to Part V of the Offences against the State Act 1939 (as amended).285 The 
sequence of occurrences in a trial of the SCC is different from that of the ‘ordinary’ jury 
trials. During the trial, the bench will be asked to hear a voir dire, rule upon the evidence 
offered in the voir dire, and then they are asked to erase the matter from their minds if the 
evidence sought is ruled to be inadmissible.286 Despite this somewhat surreal procedure, 
the Gardaí tend to prefer cases being sent forward to the SCC as there is no jury and so 
the risk of intimidation is significantly reduced.287 The machinations of the SCC work 
 
280 The Special Criminal Courts should only be in existence when the Executive is satisfied that the ordinary 
courts are inadequate to secure the administration of justice and the preservation of public peace and order. 
That is the central argument of objectors to the Courts’ existence within the Irish Criminal Justice system. 
Section 38 (2) of the 1939 Act authorises the government to establish more than one Special Court.   
281 There are currently two Special Criminal Courts in existence since 2015 and in operation since 25th April 
2016.  
282 The High Court judge on the bench, being the most senior, will usually communicate with counsel and/or 
witnesses; however, the other two members of the bench are free to ask questions of counsel and witnesses 
too.  
283 Dermot PJ Walsh, Walsh on Criminal Procedure (2nd ed., Round Hall, 2016) 87.  
284 This has the effect that the judiciary of the Special Criminal Courts (totalling 20 between both Courts, 8 
High Court, 5 Circuit Court and 7 District Court) are directly appointed by the Executive and can be removed 
by the same body.  
285 Section 35 (5) of the 1939 Act means that the Court will remain in force as long as Part V remains operable. 
Dáil Éireann is required to pass an annulling resolution which will terminate Part V’s operation. Section 35 
(4) details that the Executive is required to also publish a Proclamation which would need to declare that Part 
V of the 1939 Act is no longer in force. The second Special Criminal Court was required, the Executive 
believed, due to a severe back-log of cases in the Court with the next available trial date being mid-2018. The 
Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005 allows for the Special Criminal Court no. 1 to transfer a triable 
matter to the Special Criminal Court no. 2. 
286 It must also be emphasised that the provisions of Article 38.1 which affords an accused a trial in due course 
of law does indeed apply to Special Criminal Courts. 
287 The decision reached by the Directing Division of the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions is of 
significant weight. It is also a relatively regular occurrence that both Senior Counsel will agree that the 
evidence proffered in the voir dire will be allotted the status of evidence in the trial itself so as not to duplicate 





more quickly than the ordinary courts.288 It is a very difficult task to ask any trial judge to 
become judge and jury and for the integrity of the trial process to be upheld, but this is 
precisely what is being demanded by the Irish criminal justice system.289 There is also an 
element that the Garda investigations which result in charges going to the SCC are 
different in nature. They are different in the sense that because the defence will usually 
challenge every stage of the investigation and detention phases, the Gardaí input 
appropriate resources to ensure that the Garda procedures will withstand such severe 
challenge. The conditions of evidence admissibility are very difficult to consistently state, 





















288 Conor Brady, The Guarding of Ireland: An Garda Síochána and the Irish State 1960-2014 (Gill & 
Macmillan 2014) 174. 
289 Allied to this difficulty was the extreme reluctance of the judiciary to embrace the SCC when re-established 






Chapter 4: Conditions of evidence admissibility 
 
Introduction 
The basic premise of evidence admissibility in Irish criminal trials is that evidence 
sought to be admitted is relevant to the offence(s) being tried as emphasised by the 
Supreme Court in People (DPP) v Shortt (No. 1).290 A condition of admissibility is that 
the party seeking to have a piece of evidence admitted must first establish its relevance. If 
that party fails, the evidence is inadmissible.291 Relevance would seem to be quite a 
straight-forward concept. The jurist Stephen defined relevance as being: 
… any two facts to which it is applied are so related to each other that according to the 
common course of events one either taken by itself or in connection with other facts 
proves or renders probable the past, present or future existence or non-existence of the 
other.292 
O’Donnell J in Galway City Council v Samuel Kingston Construction Ltd. referred to 
relevance as being “evidence is relevant to an issue when if accepted it would tend to 
prove or disprove it.” The case law surrounding the determination of what evidence is 
relevant and what is not is, at times, contradictory. The Irish Court of Appeal decision in 
People (DPP) v Timmons293 is an easier judgment to reconcile than the decision of the 
House of Lords in R v Kearley.294 The Court of Appeal here found that the items seized 
by Gardaí during the search of a dwelling were relevant pieces of real evidence and could 
be admitted in the trial as evidence relevant to the charge of sale and supply of illegal 
drugs. The rationale of the Court of Appeal was centred on the fact that it made it easier 
for the trier of fact to assess this evidence when determining those facts. 
 On the other hand, evidence will not be admitted if to do so would tend to distract 
the trier of fact from determining the issue. In Browne v Tribune Newspapers plc, Keane 
CJ held that evidence that the plaintiff had received substantial settlements from previous 
libel actions against the defendant newspaper were not relevant to the issue to be tried at 
that moment.295 The decision in Browne is commensurate with the jurisprudence in this 
 
290 [2002] 2 IR 686, 692.   
291 Ibid, 693.  
292This definition was met with approval by Charleton J in Condron v ACC Bank plc [2012] IEHC 395. 
293 [2011] IECCA 13. In a search of a dwelling the Gardaí found and seized two mobile phones containing 
incriminating text messages which tended to go towards establishing a charge of sale and supply of illegal 
drugs. Also found was a list of names and quantities of drugs for each.  
294 [1992] 2 AC 228 (HL). 
295 [2001] 1 IR 521 (SC). The defendant attempted to introduce evidence of previous libel actions and 





area. The evidence adduced by either party in a contested matter must be relevant to the 
issue being tried. Hardiman J in People (DPP) v O’Callaghan expressed the view that a 
judge’s ruling on an evidence admissibility matter during a trial may well be revisited 
later in that same trial.296 That ruling, could, according to Hardiman J, be open to being 
varied, affirmed or reversed depending upon the context of the trial and the nature of the 
evidence sought to be admitted. What is an overarching attitude throughout the case law 
in this area, is that the evidence will not be admitted if to do so would be overly 
prejudicial to the accused in a criminal trial, and in doing so, the probative value of that 
evidence is overshadowed by the prejudice caused to the accused. This is a clear example 
of the judicial discretion which overshadows the criminal trial on indictment in Ireland.  
A selection of criminal trials observed during the course of the field-research is 
analysed specifically for rulings in voir dires which expose judicial discretion and 
influences on the decisions made in evidence admissibility disputes. The importance of 
Counsel’s presentation skills and advocacy varies wildly in Ireland. The impact of a 
confusing presentation or submission by Counsel leaves the presiding judge in a very 
precarious position when it comes to making their ruling on the issue of admissibility. 
The time and economic factors are also paramount in the voir dire process. This impacts 
directly upon the time that a judge can devote to reaching their conclusion on the issue as 
pressure to culminate a criminal trial mounts.297 These restraints impact upon the ruling 
and how it is delivered. Trial judges attempt to rely on the fundamental theory that 
evidence which is more prejudicial than probative will be excluded. However, the 
evidence will still need to be relevant to the issue being tried. 
In a Circuit Criminal Court trial in Galway for example, observed by the author, 
the issue of relevance was linked to the probative versus prejudicial evidence debate. If a 
prejudicial piece of evidence overshadows that of the probative nature of a piece of 
evidence, that evidence is also deemed inadmissible. Considerable judicial discretion is 
entertained in this realm. In the Galway sexual assault trial, pornographic material was 
found in the home of the accused. The defence legal team objected to such evidence being 
admitted “And I'm objecting to that evidence being given, because it is of no probative 
 
296 [2001] 1 IR 584, 598 (SC).  
297 This particular pressure, which derives from having lay-jurors wait whilst a voir dire is being contested 
should not pose such an issue in the SCC, thus allowing for a more nuanced ruling process. This chapter seeks 





value in the context of this case.”298 The trial judge ruled: “Well, I would take the view 
that the probative value of that is far outweighed by the prejudicial effect of it… So I 
would be with you on that...” 
 The judicial discretion evident in these rulings also act to control the role of the 
jury.299 Evidence will be excluded in certain situations but what is not always as readily 
analysed is what Dufraimont states as being the “structuring [of] the  fact-finder’s 
evidentiary analysis.”300  There is an acceptance that the function of the jury will be 
governed by the laws of evidence.301 Fisher counters this stance by suggesting that the 
presence of the jury has encouraged the “erosion of those evidence rules that had spared 
juries the task of deciding which of two competing witnesses lied…”302 On the one hand, 
the laws of evidence have heightened the importance of the jury and on the other, the 
jury’s presence has downgraded the barriers once constructed by evidential rules from 
unreliable evidence.  
 
a. The trial courts introduced 
Central Criminal Court 
The Central Criminal Court is the one court in the criminal justice hierarchy where the 
observer can easily learn the basics of the criminal justice process in Ireland. It is an 
efficient Court. Most of the judges cited in this chapter from the Central Criminal Court 
were very experienced practitioners and then judges of the criminal law. Their rulings, 
some of which have been highlighted above were clearly influenced, to an overwhelming 
extent, by the common law precedents/rules of evidence admissibility, with one judge 
being particularly susceptible to quoting the importance of probity and relevance as the 
 
298 Trial notes, June 2014, on file with author. 
299 Lisa Dufraimont, ‘Evidence Law and the Jury: A Reassessment’ (2008) 53 McGill Law Journal 199. 
300 Dufraimont. ‘Evidence Law and the Jury’ 205. 
301 Phoebe C. Ellsworth, ‘Are Twelve Heads Better Than One’ (1989) 52 Law and Contemporary Problems 
205. In a jury model study conducted by Pennington and Hastie, the following eight jury tasks were assessed 
as being the most effective: 1) The jury members must "encode" the information they get at trial. A competent 
jury must pay attention to the testimony and remember it. 2) The jury must define the legal categories. A 
competent jury should define these categories as they are presented in the judges' instructions. 3) The jury 
must select the admissible evidence and ignore evidence that is inadmissible. 4) The jury must construct the 
sequence of events. 5) The jury must evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. 6) The jury must evaluate the 
evidence in relation to the legal categories provided in the instructions. That is, certain elements of the story 
the jury constructs are particularly important in determining the appropriate verdict. The jury must identify 
these elements and understand how differences in the interpretation of the facts translate into differences in 
the appropriate verdict choice. 7) The jury must test its interpretation of the facts and the implied verdict 
choice against the standard of proof: preponderance of evidence, clear and convincing evidence, or beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 8) The jury must decide on the verdict. 





cornerstones of evidence admissibility. Herein lies the inherent contradiction of the 
common law of evidence. The most relevant evidence can also be highly prejudicial to 
the accused, and will be, more often than not, ruled inadmissible as the judges of the 
Central Criminal Court exercise their discretion.  
 
Circuit Criminal Court 
This Court is distinct from the previous Central Criminal Court in more ways than just 
jurisdiction. This Court is less efficient than the Central Criminal Court, but has a greater 
work-load. This Court is presided over by very competent judges who are usually 
younger than their Central Criminal Court counter-parts. These judges are governed, 
strictly by the precedent of the Superior Courts, particularly the Court of Appeal 
(Criminal).303  Their rulings are again, to a large extent, dictated by the issue of evidence 
admissibility which is the same for all courts observed. Evidence admissibility accounts 
for some 75% of all rulings observed between these courts. When it comes to then 
deciding upon evidence admissibility, the common-law, with its discretionary elements, 
takes a definite primacy, resulting though in very predictable results. This is most evident 
in the Circuit Court as the breadth of matters with which it deals is broader than the 
Central Criminal Court usually. Adherence to discretionary principles inherent in the 
common law does not create unpredictable rulings.  
 
Special Criminal Court 
This is an interesting Court as it is really a throw-back to a bygone era, or at least some 
people would have thought so. It is not as efficient as it ought to be considering its unique 
features. It engages in a fallacy in that the fact-finders and the law-guardians are the same 
entity. One other distinct feature, which is also evident in the Central Criminal Court, is 
that due to the fact that the nature of the crimes coming before these courts are often very 
similar from week-to-week (ie. murder/rape or membership of an illegal organisation), 
there is, what feels like, a pro forma challenge to admissibility by Counsel who, 
themselves, have appeared in quite a number of similar cases. A cynic would cry 
‘Stockholm syndrome’. None more so than the challenge to the admissibility of evidence 
based on a lack of access to a lawyer by the accused. The common law, with its 
foundations in the ‘Judge’s Rules’ and converted into Irish constitutional law, has stated 
 





repeatedly that “reasonable access” is what is required. Despite this, Counsel put forward 
evidential arguments as to why their case is different. Only very rarely are the arguments 
and rulings fresh or different.  
 
b. Jury Court -v- Non-Jury Court 
The procedures are different, however the attempts which the Irish criminal justice 
system makes to try and keep these Courts the same in all but composition is unrealistic. 
It is a court that is inefficient, transgresses upon the very foundation of a criminal law 
trial in an adversarial system such as Ireland, has received admonishment from the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee in the Kavanagh judgment, and yet it still exists and 
its powers have been steadily increased in recent years.304  One would wonder why and 
the evidential answer is that it is required. However, clear differentials of pre-trial 
admissibility ruling hearings ought to be utilised to maximise court time.  
 
c. Evidential rulings in practice 
The use of discretion is, according to a criminal trial judge interviewed, the practical 
running of an orderly trial. There is a wide variation of how judges deal with applications 
involving evidence admissibility. The rulings selected in this chapter are included as to 
highlight how rulings are issued in trials on indictments and how judicial discretion is 
utilised.  
In one Circuit Criminal Court trial in Cork, an application was made in relation to 
the prejudicial wording of a question. The trial judge, in effect, did not make a ruling and 
allowed matters to continue ruling: “Well, we'll see. Who's the next witness?”305 This 
approach of essentially not dealing with the application was admittedly rare from the 
observed trials. Another trial judge explained the different approaches that can be seen in 
a trial by the presiding judge. This difference in approach is seen starkly when it comes to 
evidence admissibility rulings.306 The trial judge of the Central Criminal Court stated 
“…So there’s many very short applications, objections that are made in the course of a 
criminal trial, which a trial judge will rule upon immediately…and you give that ruling, 
as you’re sitting there usually…Now if a longer time is required, the jury will be asked to 
 
304 A second Special Criminal Court was established by the previous Fine Gael/Labour government, despite 
reservations from Mr. Justice Butler, not towards its necessity, but rather the timing of a second SCC.   
305 People (DPP) v E.B., trial notes on file with author. 
306 Trial judge will consider every admissibility issue during a trial, however some decisions are far easier to 





go out, if there’s further deliberation required.”307 The trial judge also made reference to 
the jury being sufficiently robust to allow minor transgressions upon the rules of 
evidence: “…juries aren’t to be so wrapped in cotton-wool… for example if somebody 
said “well, that’s a leading question”. I could very easily say, “Well I agree, that is a 
leading question, and don’t ask anymore leading questions”.308 The trial continues 
uninterrupted in effect. The traditional view was that the criminal trial is a unitary process 
which ought to be conducted in a manner which involves few breaks in the evidence if at 
all. This traditionalist view was expressed precisely in People (AG) v McGlynn, where Ó 
Dálaigh CJ stated: “The nature of a criminal trial by jury is that once it starts, it continues 
right through until discharge or verdict. It has the unity and continuity of a play.”309 
 In a rape trial observed in the Central Criminal Court, the jury was asked to leave 
as it was an evidential matter which required time for counsel to ventilate before the trial 
judge. This is not a break in the evidence heard per se, but it is still a disruption for the 
jury. The trial judge in this voir dire suggested that any objection to evidence could 
warrant a voir dire:  
…well you [Counsel for the prosecution] can be heard on this, first of all if you've an 
objection to make --you ask me to say you have an objection and I'll ask the jury to rise.  I 
don't think it's fair that it's made in the presence of the jury. Very well, I'm very reluctant 
to interfere with the cross-examination, unless it's absolutely necessary. 
In an observed Circuit Criminal Court trial for the offence of aggravated burglary, 
identification evidence was contested by the defence.310 Counsel for the defence asked the 
court to exclude evidence of “negligible probative value”. The duty of the court was, 
according to defence Counsel “…to ensure that [the accused] receives a fair trial, and that 
duty may, in certain circumstances, override the duty or the right or the public interest in 
ensuring that he goes to trial.”311 The court also had to protect against a defective 
prosecution identification process.312 Having referred to recent jurisprudence on the issue 
 
307 Transcript of interview conducted by author on file.  
308 Interview transcript on file with author, interview conducted on 14.11.17. 
309 [1967] IR 232, 239 (SC). 
310 Dublin Circuit Criminal Court, 31st March 2014 – 08th April 2014. Trial notes on file with author.  
311 Ibid, trial notes, April 2014, Dublin Circuit Criminal Court, on file with author.  
312 The Court must be satisfied that the prosecution has discharged the onus which falls on its shoulders to 
ensure the fairness of the identification procedure. In this regard, the decision of the Court of Appeal in Ireland 
in People (DPP) v Cooney [1998] 1 ILRM 321 is of note. Counsel for the prosecution argued that a street 
identification process, while not being the preferred identification option, could still be an admissible form 





of informal identification, counsel for the prosecution argued that such identification 
evidence, which occurred outside a courtroom, was reliable evidence.313 
Both counsel relied predominantly upon case law in this area and so this particular 
evidence admissibility ruling should have been influenced by the case law in this area 
dating from the locus classicus of identification evidence in Ireland, People (AG) v Casey 
(No. 2).314 This is of little surprise to many observers as the warnings associated with 
identification evidence have remained firmly ensconced within the common law. Judge 
Hogan, in the Circuit Criminal Court, gave his ruling without rising: 
…This in my view is a case which goes to the jury. There's no doubt about it in my mind 
and I'll tell you why.  We're all agreed that this is a case of identification. Now, to urge 
upon the Court that it shouldn't go to the jury because of the fact that the preferable way 
of identification if at all possible is via an identification parade, that could not have 
happened in this case…But that couldn't happen in this case because an identification 
parade was refused by the accused. So then the gardaí must go to what I would call a fall-
back situation. And in this instance, the fall-back situation was of course the taking of 
photographs… But the situation is this: that even taking 25, supposing there were 24 with 
black hair and only one with blond hair, then you could say the accused was being drawn 
in a certain direction of identification, having regard to the description that she gave. That 
was not the case.  I don't see anything wrong with those photographs going to the jury.315 
In a ruling which dealt with a similar issue of identification, the presiding judge relied on 
the common law.316 The trial judge considered administering a warning as to the risks 
which are associated with the identification of a person in a criminal matter. These two 
rulings are not identical but the issue of identification was to a greater extent the main 
issue of concern in the rulings issued.  
A witness called by the prosecution in another observed Circuit Criminal Court 
trial was making their way down from the witness box. As this witness was approaching 
 
313 People (AG) v Galvin [1962] IR 325 being relied upon by the prosecution in their submissions.  
314 [1963] IR 33.  
315 Trial notes, April 2014, on file with author.  
316 The trial judge ruled: “Well, from first principles it seems to me that if somebody wants to report a 
conversation that they say they heard, that they are entitled to say that they were aware of the speaker because 
they were able to identify or recognise them… But fundamentally if somebody knows an individual, knows 
that individual well, and then hears a conversation and is able to say that they recognised the person that they 
heard speaking. It seems to me that the starting point is that that is prima facie admissible… It seems to me 
that if the jury do hear it, that it will in due course be necessary to give a modified Casey warning, and I 





members of the accused’s family in the body of the court, something was said to this 
witness as she passed by which necessitated the intervention of a close-by court 
sergeant.317 The defence argued that the jury was tainted by the visible show of emotion 
from the family members in the body of the court towards the state’s witness. The 
defence sought the trial to be collapsed as a result. The ruling of the trial judge was 
succinct and followed immediately from the application. In rejecting the application, it 
was impossible to determine what influenced the ruling of the court as no law was opened 
to the court.318 This ruling again highlights the fact that, in the criminal trials observed, 
there are numerous rulings which are not grounded by any opened law.319 
The same application was made in a different trial which concerned s 3 assault 
causing harm in the Dublin Circuit Criminal Court.320 The defence counsel stated:  
…the prosecution gets the benefit of this attachment by this comment by the witness of 
which I was not on notice. And again, in light of the other difficulties that there have been 
with this case, and because as I have said in my respectful submission, it is so finely 
 
317 Trial notes, Dublin Circuit Criminal Court, April 2014, on file with author. Counsel for the accused 
summarised these events: “As the witness left the witness box -- I was oblivious to all of this until [prosecution 
Counsel] brought it to my attention, but I was conscious as the witness left the witness box that she was upset, 
but in particular accelerated as she passed the three people at the back of the court. That's something that I 
caught in my eye as she left… Now… it presents me in a very difficult situation. This Court is aware that [the 
accused] is in custody and in those circumstances there is an obvious penalty in the application I'm about to 
make. But I find myself compelled to make an application to discharge the jury in the following 
circumstances. It's clear that what occurred was discernible from this side of the room, was discernible from 
the position I find myself in…” 
318 The trial judge ruling stated: “Well, I completely disagree with you from what I have said to you and I am 
not going to abandon this trial and have to restart it again and bring in this witness again to go -- to re-give 
her evidence. That in my view would be quite ridiculous. If I thought for one minute there was some matter 
of evidence that -- of substance that I could latch on to and it came from three down there I'd remand them in 
custody now. Because I would regard it -- I would regard it as contempt in the fact of the Court. And I'd 
remand them in custody until such time as the DPP would formulate and perhaps decide whether the DPP 
would commence proceedings against them.  But I'm not going to do that and I don't agree with your 
submission. I'm totally at odds with you on that. I realise you have your instructions. Those three ladies down 
there are not the accused. There is no -- there is no intonation exactly what was said, where it was said and 
how it was said. But certainly all I do know is that people who were much closer to where it's supposed to 
have come from didn't hear it. So, a jury who's a considerable distance further did. Am I to presume that and 
again say that? No. Should I call out the jury and say, "Did you hear anything or anything like that?" No, all 
I'm raising is an unnecessary query in the jury's minds, a thing of nothing…” Ibid. 
319 This is almost a short-hand introduction of common law principles that are so well established, the 
practitioners do not really have to open the principles grounded in law. 
320 In an answer to a question in direct examination a witness gave an answer which in a direct way self-
corroborated another witness’s account of events of the incident. The defence argued that they were not put 
on notice of this answer by this witness as it was not in any of this witness’s statements. The trial was required 
to be collapsed according to the defence. Trial notes, Dublin Circuit Criminal Court, 25th February – 05th 





balanced in the way in which the prosecution is presented, and on the specific 
circumstances in which they are presented, I have to ask that the jury be discharged. 
In an interview conducted with this Senior Counsel, he was asked if some practitioners 
manipulate the trial process by applying for a tactical voir dire: 
Well, it depends on how you determine manipulation, if you are defending something, 
they do say all is fair in love and war, take the view that you are defending something, 
everything is fair until somebody tells you that it’s not, so that it is legitimate to make, 
well they have to be arguments that you can stand over, but it is legitimate to try and 
challenge everything as much as you can, currently there’s a view that a voir dire can 
only be taken where there is a substantial point.321 
The court did not entertain the application, stating: “No, no, I'm not with you.  The 
evidence is what's heard from the witness box, she can be cross-examined on the 
inconsistencies between her statement and her direct evidence.” In this ruling, the judge 
did not refer to any statutory law, nor did they refer to any case law. Like the previous 
discharge application, no particular statutory provision and case law was opened to the 
court.  
In a trial for sexual assault in Tipperary, an application was made by the defence 
for a directed acquittal based on delay/missing evidence.322 The ruling was based on case 
law predominating the issue of trial prohibition for excessive delay/missing evidence 
issues and which was opened to the court by counsel in the course of the application. The 
trial judge referred to case law as justification for his ruling.323 The trial judge in Nenagh 
made his ruling after consideration of the case law opened throughout the application but 
also made specific reference to “the authorities” which can only be interpreted as 
 
321 Interview transcript on file with author.  
322 Trial notes on file with author, Nenagh Circuit Criminal Court, 28.01.14- 01.05.15. 
323 The ruling stated: “[N]ow, the basis of the application is that there is prejudice by reason of this missing 
evidence, and associated with this is the fact that this is a situation of delay, or as Mr Justice Hardiman more 
neutrally puts it, lapse of time. The two are combined. Now there is, of course, as is very clear from the 
jurisprudence emanating in Braddish and other cases, there is an obligation on the State to maintain and 
preserve material gathered in the course of an investigation… Now the authorities make clear that, first of all, 
the onus is on the defence in any application such as this to satisfy the Court that there is a real and 
unavoidable risk of an unfair trial for the accused.  And I am not satisfied that that is the situation here. The 
authorities again make clear that all such applications have to be viewed in the light of all the circumstances 
of the case. I am not satisfied that there is sufficient in what has been put before the Court to demonstrate the 
real possibility that the unavailable evidence -- the unavailability of the documentary material, I should say, 
will render this trial unsafe…  So I refuse the application.” Trial notes on file with author, dated 08th October 





meaning a broader spectrum of case law in relation to this issue than was opened to the 
court.  
In theory the procedure of the Special Criminal Court should not be very much 
different from the jury courts.324 Section 41 (4) of the Offences against the State Act 1939 
sets out that the rules of evidence which are to apply in the Central Criminal Court should 
also apply in the Special. This statement of the law of evidence applicable in the Special 
Criminal Court is not without limitation.325 In People (DPP) v McGowan, it was held that 
the evidence heard in the voir dire can double up as evidence for the substantive trial.326 
However, a significant departure from the procedures seen in the Central Criminal Court 
was the amendment made to the Offences against the State Act 1939 by s 3 (2) of the 
Offences against the State (Amendment) Act 1972.327 In People (DPP) v Ferguson, the 
Court of Criminal Appeal upheld the conviction of a person convicted of membership of 
an illegal organisation based solely on the opinion evidence given by the Chief 
Superintendent.328 
 
324 Alice Harrison, The Special Criminal Court: Practice and Procedure (Bloomsbury Press, 2019).  
325 Section 41 (4) states that “the practice and procedure applicable to the trial of a person on indictment in 
the Central Criminal Court shall, as far as practicable, apply to the trial of a person by a SCC…” (emphasis 
added). These words “as far as practicable” have been analysed and interpreted in case law. A summation of 
these judgments would lead to the observation that practice and procedures of the Central Criminal Court 
should apply in the Special Criminal Court, however if to do so would be impossible or wholly impractical, 
these procedures can be departed from. 
326 The court in McGowan held: …the requirements of section 41(4) of the Offences against the State Act 
1939, in relation to practice and procedure to be adopted in the Special Criminal Court were sufficiently 
complied with when the Garda Síochána witnesses who had already given evidence on the issue of 
admissibility were recalled and formally re-affirmed the truth of the evidence which they had already given, 
without repeating that evidence, and when counsel for the appellants was given the opportunity of cross-
examining the witnesses in relation to the evidence which they had already given, [1979] IR 45, 49. In 
McGowan, the admissibility of statements allegedly made to Gardaí by the accused was contested on the 
basis that to adopt the Central Criminal Court procedure would mean that the evidence given in a voir dire 
would have to be given again as if there were a jury. The Court of Criminal Appeal believed that the wording 
of s 41 (4) of the 1939 Act permitted this circumvention of procedure. 
327 This provision made the opinion evidence of a Chief Superintendent of An Garda Síochána that the accused 
was a member of an illegal organisation to be evidence of that fact. By way of context, since the establishment 
of the SCC as an entity in this jurisdiction, the organisation styling itself as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
refused to recognise the jurisdiction of that Court. In 1972, this stance altered in the sense that accused coming 
before the SCC were now recognising and indeed contesting the charge against them. This meant that the 
Garda investigations needed to discover evidence of membership which would be extremely difficult to first 
obtain and second to have admitted in a trial.  
328 In People (DPP) v McNulty, the SCC acquitted an accused charged with membership of an illegal 
organisation on the basis of an unsworn statement he made to the Gardaí in which he stated that he was not 
at that time a member of the IRA. (Special Criminal Court, 14th August 1973). In Redmond v Ireland, the 
Supreme Court held that an accused may not be convicted of a membership charge on the opinion evidence 
of a Chief Superintendent alone, without corroborating evidence (Court of Criminal Appeal, 27th October 
1975). In Ferguson, the accused had not provided any evidence which contradicted the charge brought 
pursuant to s 21 of the 1939 Act. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal placed a heavy weight on 





This author witnessed the entirety of a trial in the Special in 2015.329 This trial 
concerned membership of an unlawful organisation contrary to s 21 of the Offences 
against the State Act 1939 (as amended). In an application made by the defence which 
concerned the questioning of one of the accused of an offence other than the membership 
offence itself, it was ruled:  
Membership of an unlawful organisation is obviously something that does not occur in a 
vacuum and in every case that I can think of where somebody is questioned about 
membership, activities arise, lawful and unlawful. He wasn't questioned about another 
offence. He was questioned about a gun. He was also questioned about extortion. That 
arose in the context of alleged IRA membership and activities...330  
It appeared that if the Gardaí had questioned the accused in relation to an offence 
distinctive of the membership offence, those questions would be inadmissible. It cannot 
be said with reference to which law this ruling was made, as none was cited.331 There was 
an application made by the defence to have evidence deriving from the search of the 
accused deemed inadmissible as the searching Garda failed to inform the accused under 
which statutory power he was conducting the search. This was an application based upon 
the interpretation of relevant case law authorities and recourse was made to the custody 
 
failed to do so. In the court’s opinion, this fact increased the credibility of the Chief Superintendent’s opinion 
evidence. 
329 People (DPP) v Braney et al (2015, 26th February 2015, Special Criminal Court).  
330 People (DPP) v Braney et al. 
331 SI 119/1987 Criminal Justice Act, 1984 (Treatment of Persons in Custody in Garda Síochána Stations) 
Regulations, 1987 (as amended) (hereinafter ‘the custody regulations’), regulation 12 outlines how interviews 
are to be conducted and remains silent on questioning a suspect about two or more different offences during 





regulations.332 The ruling of the Special Criminal Court went with the defence in this 
instance.333  
Another application made by the defence concerned the extension of detention of 
the accused before he was formally charged by the investigating Gardaí. This application 
involved the interpretation of s 30 of the Offences against the State Act 1939. The trial 
judge ruled that the extension of time was legitimately made by the authorising Garda 
member as the extension was made within the time period allowed for such an extension 
despite there being a discrepancy in relation to the time of arrest.334 Of particular 
significance to this ruling was the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in People 
(DPP) v Kehoe.”335 This ruling formed a strand in a judicial review brought by one of the 
accused.336 Barr J, in his High Court judgment, referred to the Supreme Court decision in 
 
332 Under regulation 17(1) of the custody regulations, the common law position was transferred to secondary 
legislation, where regulation 17(1) states “a member conducting a search of a person in custody shall ensure, 
so far as practicable, that the person understands the reason for the search…” The impact of the custody 
regulations on criminal investigations is quite considerable, however its evidential impact is diminished by 
the provisions of s 7(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 1984.SI 119/1987 Criminal Justice Act, 1984 (Treatment 
of Persons in Custody in Garda Síochána Stations) Regulations, 1987, regulation 17.  Criminal Justice Act 
1984, s 7 (3) states: “A failure on the part of any member of the Garda Síochána to observe any provision of 
the regulations shall not of itself render that person liable to any criminal or civil proceedings or of itself 
affect the lawfulness of the custody of the detained person or the admissibility in evidence of any statement 
made by him.” 
In this ruling, weight was placed on the decision of People (DPP) v McFadden [2003] 2 IR 105 which Counsel 
proffered as expounding the common law position on Garda searches. At page 111 of the report in McFadden, 
it is commented by the court: "It is clear from the evidence in this case that the applicant was at no stage told 
by Garda McHugh why he was being searched or why the contents of his wallet were being examined or 
informed as to the power, if any, that the garda was relying on to justify the search."    
333 “In the particular circumstances here where the applicant was arrested by one officer and then was searched 
by Detective Garda R. there was, in the absence of consent, an obligation to invoke the specific power to 
search.  It's suggested that there was somehow implied consent. We can't find that at all. First of all, the onus 
is on the prosecution and in this particular case there was absolutely no evidence of any consent by Mr B. or 
indeed any of the accused to what was going on. So, we're ruling that the search was unlawful.” People (DPP) 
v Braney et al (26th February 2015, Special Criminal Court). 
334 Butler J stated in the court’s ruling: “He purported to extend the period for a further period of 24 hours 
commencing on the expiry of the first period of 24 hours. This court has held the arrest to have taken place 
slightly earlier than the second attempted arrest which took place. In the circumstances the extension was 
made within the relevant period. There was no question of the accused being detained for any period outside 
the initial period of 24 hours from the initial arrest and equally the extension commenced at the end of that 
period of 24 hours. We're satisfied on the basis of the Kehoe case, in particular the last paragraph of the 
judgment referred to, that we must find in favour of the Director on that matter.” 
335Where at p 448 of the report, McCarthy J stated: “Sub-section 3 [of s 30 of the 1939 Act] enables an officer 
of the Garda Síochána, not below the rank of Chief Superintendent, to direct that a person arrested under the 
section be detained for a further period of 24 hours…In the instant case, the direction stated the exact time of 
commencement and termination of the further period of 24 hours. It is quite unnecessary that the specific 
time of commencement and termination should be stated; for obvious reasons, it may, indeed be undesirable 
to do so, lest there be some entirely bona fide error; it would, in the opinion of the court, be preferable that 
such a direction should merely state that the person arrested is to be detained for a further period of 24 hours 
commencing upon the expiry of the period of 24 hours from the time of arrest [1985] IR 444 (CCA). 
336 Braney, inter alia, sought unsuccessfully to obtain a declaration that s 30 of the 1939 Act was 





O’Brien v Keogh, wherein the Supreme Court outlined that when a statutory provision’s 
constitutionality was questioned, that Court would look at the provision in the “widest 
possible aspect”.337 In holding that the High Court was bound by the decision of the 
Supreme Court in DPP v Quilligan and O’Reilly (No. 3), Barr J could not find that s 30 of 
the 1939 Act was unconstitutional, despite the judgment reached by the Supreme Court in 
Damache.338  
A relevant ruling from the Central Criminal Court turned on whether evidence of 
diminished responsibility could be adduced before the prosecution’s evidence came to a 
close?339 The trial judge ruled: 
The question which arises for me is the issue of the point or juncture at which the 
evidence of the prosecution bearing upon this issue may be called and we know that in 
respect of material or facts or issues which arise ex improviso that there is a long 
established rule. In any event it is the exception rather than the norm to permit to the 
prosecution to call evidence in rebuttal and the ordinary course of events would require 
that in respect of issues of which the prosecution are or reasonably ought to have been 
aware, I think that's a fair summary of the true state of affairs, the evidence must be called 
before the conclusion of the prosecution case subject to the overriding discretion of the 
trial judge.340 
The judge relied, inter alia, upon the Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006 in reaching his 
ruling.341 The wording of the ruling placed a significant emphasis on the discretion 
afforded to the judge by statute and this allowed the trial judge to find that the prosecution 
 
337 [1972] IR 144, 157-158 (SC). Ó Dálaigh J for the Supreme Court stated in O’Brien: “…the Court’s duty 
in testing the provision is to examine it in as wide a manner as if the provision had been the subject of a 
reference under Article 26 of the Constitution, that is to say, the Court must advert as best it can to the full 
scope of the provision away and beyond the problem presented by the circumstances of the particular case 
then before the court.” 
338 DPP v Quilligan and O’Reilly (No. 3) [1993] 2 IR 46 (SC). Barr J rejected the contention that due to the 
fact the right to silence had been given constitutional status since Quilligan was delivered could allow for the 
High Court to revisit its decision in relation to s 30 of the 1939 Act. Damache v DPP [2012] 2 IR 266 (SC). 
339 People (DPP) v S.B., trial notes on file with author.  
340 The judge’s ruling, running to four pages of transcript, was clearly influenced initially by the contours of 
the Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006 (as amended) which specifically outlines the procedure of when and 
how a defending legal team can raise the issue of diminished responsibility for their client: “…at this juncture, 
before the conclusion of the prosecution case, [Counsel for the Defence] canvassed the issue of whether or 
not evidence which goes to the proposition of the diminished responsibility, if it is so, of the accused, in this 
case should be adduced before the conclusion of the prosecution case… [Counsel for the Defence] very 
properly indicated that his position is that the defence was going to be raised and of course there's no 
obligation to raise that defence if one serves in advance, pursuant to the Criminal Justice (Insanity) Act 2006, 
a document setting out the -- one's anticipated expert's evidence.”  
341 These statutory implements appear to influence the trial judge’s ruling, with s 6 (1) and (2) of the Criminal 
Law (Insanity) Act 2006 being cited with particular weight being afforded to its structural nuances in deciding 





could adduce subsequent to the defence doing so. The judgment of Costello J in O’Leary 
in relation to the legal and evidential burden of a person raising an insanity defence was 
raised by the judge, but this was not relevant to the question posed by Counsel. It 
appeared to the author that when the judge used the parameters of the statutory provisions 
as a basis for their rulings, those rulings tended to be easier to understand and to be better 
structured.  
The second ruling to be analysed with regard to evidence admissibility focused on 
whether the accused’s sexuality was relevant and admissible as an expert psychologist 
witness testified in relation to such issues in a consultation with the accused.342 The judge 
did not mention specific texts or judgments that he had consulted in making this correct 
statement of the law in relation to the antecedent dangers admitting evidence of this 
nature.343 Due to the fact that the expert psychologist witness had strayed into such 
territory which they felt was relevant, the judge decided that to allow such evidence go to 
the jury and not then immediately discharge that jury as it had been irreparably 
contaminated, could be ameliorated through the use of cross-examination. In this short 
ruling by the judge, the common law devices of evidence admissibility were deployed so 
as to counter-act the potentially severe prejudice that the witness’ testimony brought. The 
presiding judge did not, if at all possible, face the very real possibility that the jury may 
need to be discharged. However, one could raise the point that solving a problem such as 
this, which is a vagary of the oral trial, places much emphasis on the skill of the advocate 
to properly cross-examine the witness’ testimony. 
Another ruling from the same presiding judge, this time in a rape trial, allowed the 
judge to use discretion in admitting evidence deriving from the accused’s detention.344 
Every accused person has certain constitutional rights, along with legal rights, whilst they 
are being held in custody by the Gardaí during their investigation of a crime.345 This 
ruling centred on the constitutional right of the accused to have reasonable access to his 
lawyer whilst being detained under statute for questioning by the Gardaí. The 
consequence of a finding that the accused had been denied his constitutional right, would 
be for some, if not all, of the resulting evidence from this detention to be ruled 
 
342 This ruling was again derived from People (DPP) v S.B.  
343 A certain amount of implication is required by the observer in so far as the judge in question is an 
experienced trial judge, and former practitioner of the criminal law. Such an evidential rule has been stated 
in many texts and judgments of the common law.  
344 People (DPP) v M. McA., trial notes on file with author.  
345 One of first tasks for a Garda Member-in-Charge to do when a suspect is being detained under statute is 





inadmissible. The ruling, would predictably turn on the phrase “reasonable” access and 
whether this was afforded by the Gardaí, bearing in mind that Gardaí also possess a duty 
to investigate crime.346 
The judge then proceeded to assess the relevant case law on this issue, of which 
there is a growing corpus.347 Having identified relevant Irish and European Court of  
Human Rights decisions, the judge ruled that the accused had not suffered a breach of his 
constitutional right of reasonable access to a solicitor whilst being detained.348 The 
common law was the clear influence in this ruling: 
I'm not prepared to hold, and don't hold, that on the true interpretation of the convention, 
or by reference to those authorities, it is required, as a matter of, as it were, law under the 
convention or the Human Rights Act that solicitors be permitted to be present during 
interview.  Even if that were the case, I do not believe it to be the law that when 
a solicitor cannot reasonably be procured, the gardaí can't investigate an offence and, 
effectively, their powers of interview and investigation would be rendered a nullity in 
many instances.  I don't believe the European convention goes that far.  So, there we are, 
I am satisfied that there's no breach of the constitutional right of the accused…349 
The reference made by the presiding judge to the European authorities, in particular, 
seemed to be of little weight in his determination of the issue, with the domestic Irish 
authorities holding greater weight.350 The same judge presided over a rape trial which 
contained a number of very detailed rulings, which is a common trend for this particular 
trial judge, which makes analysing his rulings in a pressurised environment all the more 
 
346 Such a question can only be answered by first setting out the facts that pertained to the accused, which the 
judge did with a heavy reliance on the custody record as filled in by the Member-in-Charge, which was 
engaged by the judge: “Now, the first thing is to turn to the facts in relation to the matter. And it will be 
recalled that the member in charge of the Garda Station, at the time when, effectively, he decided on the 
detention of the accused, was -- at the time when he decided on the detention of the accused, Garda N – N. 
H., or in or about that time, at any rate, afforded, in his evidence, notice to the accused of his rights as a person 
in custody, by furnishing to him a document of a well-known type, called a C 72, setting out those rights and 
explaining the nature of those rights to him in the course of reading the document. So, the accused then, in 
the State's contention, signed the custody record to acknowledge receipt of notice of those rights, and 
exercised his rights by seeking the -- to consult a solicitor.” 
347 Lavery v Member -in -Charge of Carrickmacross Garda Station [1999] 2 IR 390; Director of Public 
Prosecutions v Buck [2002] 2 IR 268.   
348 Salduz v Turkey (2009) 49 EHRR 19; Cadder v Her Majesty’s Advocate [2010] ECHR 759. 
349 As will be seen, this particular issue of “reasonable access to a solicitor by an accused” who is in Garda 
custody is often proffered by the accused’s legal team during trials observed at the Central Criminal Court.    
350 The position was, of course, advanced, if only by implication by reference to these decisions, that there 
may be a right to have a solicitor present at all times during interview, apart from any test which might have 
been applicable in terms of attempting to afford the right in question, for example at a difficult time or when 
solicitors refused to attend. This is not a particularly surprising finding in Irish criminal law, and from 
observing the criminal trials for this thesis, it can be stated that the trial judge’s rulings are very rarely, decided 
upon the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, with domestic law definitely holding the most 





enriching experience.351 This ruling focused upon the admissibility of a conversation 
which the accused had with a business partner in which he had arranged to leave the 
business due to financial constraints. Such evidence would be relevant as the defence 
proffered the narrative that the accused had been effectively blackmailed by business 
associates that they would allege that he had committed rape against a certain individual 
if he left the business in a perilous situation. In an unusual scenario, which is slightly 
more convoluted than usual, the trial judge spent some time setting out what was actually 
in issue.352 This trial judge determined the issue by reference to established evidence law 
principles as the issue of admissibility was distilled to the basics.353 This court’s ruling 
focused primarily on the issue of the common law principle of the rule against narrative 
which may have been used to bolster the argument that the accused’s legal team was 
anxious to proffer to the jury and which could have been used to cloud the jury’s mind in 
reaching their verdict. 
 Making broad, sweeping statements about observed trial judges’ rulings is not 
advisable. What can be discerned, however, is an analysis of the structure of how such 
rulings were reached and what was the influence which predominantly grounded such 
rulings. From observing trial judge no. 1, it can be said that the structure was very time 
consuming.354 The observation is that it is a very disruptive occurrence and makes it 
 
351 People (DPP) v JC, trial notes on file with author, Waterford Circuit Criminal Court. 
352 “And what is in issue here is the admissibility of some or all of those conversations and it seems to me, as 
a matter of principle, at least a portion of those conversations are admissible in evidence.  The objection is 
that to give -- to afford evidence before the jury to the effect that Mr C. said that he had, and I'm putting this 
very shortly and only by way of summary, subjected to a threat that the accused and two other persons would 
allege that he had committed sexual offences, that a deadline of 4 o'clock that afternoon was given to him in 
that regard, if he did not agree to the terms set out in the letter.” 
353 The trial judge stated as follows: “Now, of course such reported speech is admissible only if it relates to 
a fact in issue. Now the fact in issue, in this limited context, is the omission, if it be an omission, from the 
letter in question written by [accused’s business partner] in response to that drafted by [accused’s other 
business partner] and the basis of the admission has to, in my view, it has to be said, is established on a very 
rickety scaffold indeed, but first of all because - and I come back to this in a moment because having thought 
about this over the weekend in my view quite a serious matter has arisen - in the first instance it is a nonsense, 
and it was always a nonsense, to pursue Mr N. on the basis of his draft letter without reference to the reply… 
Obviously the core point has to be that there was a discussion about all aspects of this matter, I paraphrase 
for a moment, I'm not necessarily saying this is the evidence which should be led, I'm not going to tell 
a witness what to say, but I am -- that this was raised, that it was discussed with respect to other aspects of 
the matter and that, to put it shortly, a decision was ultimately made and Mr H. acted upon that decision not 
to raise this matter in the correspondence notwithstanding the fact that this allegation was made to Mr H. That 
is the gravamen of the evidence. The nitty-gritty is another matter.  I'm giving that general ruling. I will leave 
it to competent counsel to insure that the matter is restricted to what is admissible and what is 
admissible -- nothing can be admissible if it's not relevant and it seems to me that limited, and perhaps very 
limited, portions of that material is admissible.” 
354 A witness before a jury may have been in full-flow of their testimony, Counsel (for the accused) would 
ask the witness to stop and then proceed to request the judge to ask the jury to retire to their rooms as a matter 





difficult for any flow or logical sequential story-line to be firmly developed in the 
evidence.  
 Nonetheless, the rulings made by trial judge no. 1 were, when placed in the 
context of his other colleagues on the Central Criminal Court bench, of a more nuanced 
nature.355 This being the case, it was, at times, quite difficult to discern his actual 
reasoning and train of thought. Most of the rulings observed were ex tempore and 
reflected the rather meandering nature that these type of judgments often possess. 
Considering the time restraints and external pressures placed upon the judge to keep the 
trial moving along, these rulings were highly informative. The rulings illustrated in 
particular, the tight, vice-like grip that the common law evidential rules possess on the 
admissibility of evidence and the considerable judicial discretion which accompanies 
such a guiding factor.  
Trial judge no. 2 was a male Circuit Court judge. One of the striking features from 
observing this particular judge was the jovial manner in which he conducted the 
proceedings and the courtesy he displayed to, in particular, members of the jury when 
advising them of their role and how the trial would be structured.356 This approach was 
not usual.  
 In the first Dublin Circuit matter which was presided over by trial judge no. 2, the 
possession and smuggling of drugs was in issue.357 The facts were initially set out by the 
trial judge.358 The facts were somewhat convoluted but the question to be determined by 
the trial judge was the admissibility of recordings of conversations had between members 
of An Garda Síochána investigating the possible smuggling and importation of drugs, and 
 
355 The rulings provided by this judge were more detailed than other judge’s efforts and seemed to reflect 
how the judge had tossed and turned the issue over in his mind. 
356 One could imagine that a first-time juror who may not know what to expect from the whole process would 
have been put at ease in the manner that this trial judge chose to conduct the trial. 
357 Contrary to the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 was the main charge brought upon indictment against the 
accused man. 
358 “So, what are the facts?  Now, I'm told that the evidence will be that a Swiss undercover operative, is that 
what I call him, operative, received an e-mail from this jurisdiction, which appeared to be in relation to the 
organisation of drug mules or drug couriers. As a result of that, the Irish gardaí were communicated with by 
the Swiss people, resulting in an investigation being started.  Now, the Swiss under cover people continued 
in contact with the Irish e-mail address, resulting in arrangements being made between the Swiss under cover 
person and the Irish -- and the person at the Irish e-mail address. That was the address which was to provide 
to -- or -- and the contents of that contacts were to provide two drug couriers. And it was intended, as a result 
of those communications, that two men would -- would travel to this jurisdiction to liaise with the people at 
the Irish -- with the Irish e-mail address.  And to facilitate that, the names of two people were identified to 
the people here in Ireland and it followed then, of course, that travel documentation was procured in their 
names and that brought into effect, then, the Irish end of the operation, or Irish side of the operation, because 
two Irish gardaí were directed to assume roles of undercover operatives as well, for the purpose of pretending 






the accused.359 In other words, the trial judge had to determine if these recordings were 
made in pursuance of a lawful surveillance operation which was being undertaken by the 
investigating Gardaí.360 The dominant and most influential piece of legislation which was 
required to be analysed by trial judge no. 2 was the Criminal Justice (Surveillance) Act 
2009 (‘the 2009 Act’) (as amended).361 Section 1 of the 2009 Act actually states what a 
surveillance device in Irish law is and was recited, by way of clarity, by the trial judge: 
And it then -- the Act then goes on to define what a surveillance device is. It means an 
apparatus designed or adapted for use in surveillance, but does not include, and there are 
certain exclusionary positions in that (a), (b) and (c) of that subsection and they, in fact, 
have been referred to by counsel for the defence in certain ratios being put before the 
Court.    
Having reached an initial conclusion as to what the 2009 Act permits by way of defining 
a surveillance device, the judge found: 
[F]irstly it appears to me that the definition of surveillance, as defined in the Act, doesn't 
rule out extending the definition to what has been referred to in, I think, some of the 
articles and a later case which was opened to me. It doesn't rule out surveillance being 
extended to covert surveillance and/or overt surveillance.  
Having set out the definition which it appears was gleaned by the trial judge by reference 
to both the statutory definition as contained within the 2009 Act, and the common law on 
the matter, the trial judge still had to answer if the recordings in the present case fitted 
into such a definition: 
The information that was obtained by the garda under cover or under cover people was 
obtained as a result of either a direct telephone conversation between the garda operative 
and the accused, or as a result of a face-to-face meeting and conversation that took place 
between the garda operative and the accused. Such information was told to him, either by 
means of a telephone, or on a face-to-face basis and that information was being recorded. 
Now, in my view, that situation and the facts as pertain in this case, at that does not come 
directly -- that situation or those facts do not come directly or indirectly or impliedly 
 
359 Three separate meetings had between the Gardaí and the accused, which were all recorded surreptitiously 
by the investigating Gardaí, but these recordings were distinct in the methodology that was deployed by the 
Gardaí in recording said conversations. At the first meeting, the recording Garda had a recording device on 
his actual person at the meeting. For the other two meetings, a member of the Garda had a transmitter on his 
person and the conversation was actually recorded by a recorder at another location.  
360 “Was that recorded pursuant to a -pursuant to those meetings, was that recorded or was the information 
obtained pursuant to or within the- pursuant to a surveillance operation?” 
361 The contention being made by the accused’s Counsel, was that if these recordings, which were highly 
incriminatory, fell within the ambit of the provisions of the 2009 Act, the methodology used by way of 





within the ambit of the definition of surveillance within the Criminal Justice 
(Surveillance) Act of 2009.  Now, the reason being, of course, that this was a direct -- for 
the three meetings, this is a direct conversation.  
Having considered the definition of surveillance, the trial judge sought to weigh the 
accused’s right to privacy with the investigation techniques deployed by these Garda 
members. Having not dealt with this issue in any particular substance, the trial judge 
jumped to whether the conversation, and admissions made by the accused to the recording 
Gardaí were of a voluntary nature. This is a clear sway from the predominantly statute 
based structure of the earlier part of his ruling to the more discretionary common law 
parameters of voluntary admissions.362 
The language used by the judge bear a particular import. We can see the 
introduction of words laden with ambiguity such as “trick” or “inducement”. One would 
imagine that the word “trick” would not be used by the Parliamentary Counsel in drafting 
the provisions of the 2009 Act. The reason as to why such language is not used is the 
ambiguity that it necessarily connotes. Having not dealt with the particular issue at hand, 
ie.  whether or not the admissions made by the accused on the recordings were admissible 
in evidence, the trial judge retreated to the issue of the accused’s personal privacy, when 
stating: 
The reasonable right to privacy or the reasonable expectation of privacy is a right that 
must be judged in the light of the facts in each particular situation and in the light of the 
facts which it is alleged lead to the breach of that right and a person, through his own 
conduct, can create a situation whereby such a right is lost, namely the right to 
a reasonable expectation of privacy. Such is my view that that applies in this case, 
because the principle of the reasonable expectation of privacy must be viewed in the 
context of the actions or activities that one is involved in.   
Having stated that he had dealt with the issue of admissibility, which was not clear that he 
had, the trial judge clearly, as demonstrated from the above quotation, felt it unnecessary 
to exclude the recorded conversations per se, as to do so would naturally mean that his 
ruling on the accused’s right to privacy would be required to be revised, as one could not 
logically be admitted if the other was deemed to be unconstitutionally obtained. 
 
362 The trial judge stated: “Now, then having asked myself, within that context, did evidence emerge or has it 
been submitted that such evidence would emerge, that was -- what -- that what was said by the accused to the 
gardaí was as a result of a trick being played by the gardaí to induce facts from the accused that he wouldn't 





The manner in which this ruling was delivered left the issue of which influence 
determined the matter for the judge very difficult to discern.363 Trial judge no. 2 appeared 
to be initially structuring his ruling towards the strictures of the statutory provision as 
outlined under s 1 of the 2009 Act.364 However, and rather inexplicably, the trial judge 
proceeded to introduce greater levels of ambiguity by defining the statutory text within 
the context of the common law definition of inducement/trick definitions. The result of 
the ruling was correct in law, however, the structure and reasoning behind such a nuanced 
matter incorporated elements of discretion which were not required to be alerted as the 
same ruling would have been reached with adherence to the statutory interpretation 
exercise embarked upon and then abandoned by the trial judge.  
The next ruling by trial judge no. 2 arrived later in the legal year.365 The issue 
requiring to be determined in this drug possession trial was the state of the real 
evidence.366 Having not cited any particular statutory provision which could render the 
answer, the trial judge reverted to the common law, but without first citing any particular 
basis for doing so, nor did he cite any authority for basing such a decision. The trial judge 
plainly stated: 
No, I'm going to go against you on that. I think for example, the ones [plastic bags] that 
were found in the boot when they were found in situ a minute later are clearly tied. As per 
photograph 2.  So otherwise, I don't want the jury to -- the defence to be putting the jury, 
whereby a possible decision might be based on speculation by the jury as to whether they 
were opened or closed. I mean, the evidence is that they were handed over, they were found 
in the boot of their -- wherever this is, part of the taxi this is. Or the Hiace van, sorry, the 
Hiace van this is, and they're clearly closed. Now, you can adduce evidence to the -- as to 
whether they could be seen through, or whether he should have known they were in them, 
or ought to have known… You know the usual course.  But not by means of a photograph 
in the condition in which they weren't… 
The above ruling was particularly weak in that no authorities were cited by the trial judge 
 
363 Usually, as can be seen from the previous extracts of trial judge No. 1 from the Central Criminal Court for 
instance, the influential material and sources are very clearly defined or implied. This was not the case in this 
ruling in the Circuit Criminal Court. 
364 Section 1 of most modern statutes enacted by the Oireachtas in Ireland is considered to be the definition 
/interpretation section of that statute which details in essence how certain key words or phrases are to be 
defined and/or interpreted, which reduces the discretionary element.   
365 People (DPP) v A.K., Dublin Circuit Criminal Court, July, 2012, trial notes on file with author. 
366 Plastic bags obtained by the Gardaí which contained drugs from the accused’s vehicle which were then 
opened by the Gardaí who had received them sealed, were in issue. The question, simply put, was whether 
the actions of the Gardaí in opening the previously sealed bags amounted to evidence tampering, thus 





in reaching his determination. Furthermore, the sphere in which the determination was 
made, be it common or statutory law, was not broached, which allows discretion to be 
utilised. What can be garnered from this ruling is that the issue of real evidence (ie. 
physical exhibits which the jury can feel and touch) is a very significant source of 
evidential material and can hold considerable weight with the jury if adduced within the 
context of the trial as a single unitary entity. Trial judge no. 2 deliberately pointed out to 
Counsel that real evidence must be given to the jury in the manner it was retrieved from 
the scene by the investigating officers with as little interference with its make-up as is 
humanly possible. The basis of this ruling, was, therefore, entirely discretionary, whose 
parameters were not defined, nor were they sought by Counsel.  
In the same trial, trial judge no. 2 had to determine an issue of admissibility raised 
by the defence Counsel.367 The issue of confidential information which had passed to 
investigating members of the Gardaí was objected to.368 Counsel for the accused 
stipulated the restraints placed on evidence admissibility by citing the rule against hearsay 
which is a corner-stone evidential rule. The clear indication by the defence in this matter, 
through his distinct use of language, was that this was a matter which could be disposed 
of appropriately through recourse to the common law. This systemic acquiescence that 
the issue requires discretionary in-put by the presiding judge, was not challenged by 
opposing Counsel. The occurrence to note, however, is that the defence posed the issue in 
such a manner, that in the Circuit Criminal Court, the judge did not possess a discretion as 
to whether or not he wanted to entertain the evidence which was deemed to be “hearsay”. 
This development is a striking difference from the language and inquisitive process used 
in the Central Criminal Court when an issue of admissibility is to be determined. 
The ruling in this matter sided with the prosecution, who had argued for exclusion 
on the basis of the hearsay rule:   
And as to the substance of the point in relation to confidential information, a previous 
judgment in this court by Mr Justice Fennelly to the effect that there is no need to refer to 
 
367 People (DPP) v A.K. (Dublin Circuit Criminal Court, July 2012), trial notes on file with author. 
368 The issues raised were succinctly listed by the defence Senior Counsel as follows: “Now, there are a 
number of gardaí who were members of the national drugs unit, who were observing events that evening. 
And firstly, I am clearly objecting to any confidential information that they say they were in receipt of. And 
I don't think there can be any difficulty about that, because it is clearly hearsay. Secondly, I'm objecting to 
them giving evidence to which unit of the Garda Síochána they're in, because I cannot see how it is of any 
probative value in the case.  It doesn't matter what unit they're in, other than to be saying to the jury we have 
some sort of secret knowledge. But thirdly and principally, what I'm objecting to is the type of surveillance 
evidence that occurs prior to the pub, prior to the taxi getting to the Pub. So the car is seen, the taxi is seen on 






all confidential information has being opened….  
The trial judge’s ruling was succinct but was based, one could reasonably discern, from 
the aforementioned authorities which were opened by Counsel on both sides. The judge 
stated in essence that: 
No, I'm not in agreement with the defence on this point. I'm persuaded by the arguments 
set out by the prosecution and I'm going to allow that… evidence in, in the round. The 
situation is this, of course it would be a different matter if as that such -- if it appears that 
the contents of that confidential information could be led by another guise, which would 
be prejudicial to the accused. And then of course, that's a different matter. But simply to 
say that as a result of confidential information the guards did certain things, then, in my 
view, that's allowable. 
The merits of whether this was a correct ruling can be debated, but any contentions must 
be framed within the realm of the common law dictates of the rule against hearsay in Irish 
criminal law. 
Trial judge no. 3, observed again in the Dublin Circuit Criminal Court, delivered a 
ruling which provides an example as to how the presiding judge is required to adhere to 
statutory constructions.369 The Act in question was the Criminal Justice (Surveillance) 
Act 2009, to which reference has been previously made.370 The prosecution attempted to 
obtain leave from the Court to disclose certain documents under s 15 of the 2009 Act.371 
The accused’s Counsel did not object to the disclosure, and wanted clarification from the 
Court as to whether such leave sought by the prosecution was actually necessary: 
And whilst Counsel for the accused was taking instructions from his client in respect of 
 
369 People (DPP) v E. O’L. and M. O’L., trial notes on file with author, February 2012. 
370 Strictly speaking, the issue was not of evidence admissibility per se; rather it was a precursor to evidence 
being adduced at trial before the jury. Disclosure of evidence is governed by, in particular, sections 13 and 
15 of the 2009 Act. 
371 Section 15 of the 2009 Act states: “15. (1) Unless authorised by the court, the existence or non-existence 
of the following shall not be disclosed by way of discovery or otherwise in the course of any proceedings: (a) 
an application under section 4 or 6 ; (b) an authorisation; (c) an approval granted under section 7 or 8 ; ( d) 
surveillance carried out under an authorisation or under an approval granted under section 7 ; (e) the use of a 
tracking device under section 8; and (f) documentary or other information or evidence in relation to— (i) the 
decision to apply for an authorisation or an approval under section 7 or 8 , or (ii) anything referred to 
in paragraphs (a) to (e). (2) The court shall not authorise the disclosure if it is satisfied that to do so is likely 
to create a material risk to— (a) the security of the State, (b) the ability of the State to protect persons from 
terrorist activity, terrorist-linked activity, organised crime and other serious crime, (c) the maintenance of the 
integrity, effectiveness and security of the operations of the Garda Síochána, the Ombudsman 
Commission, the Defence Forces or the Revenue Commissioners, or ( d) the ability of the State to protect 
witnesses, including their identities. (3) Notwithstanding subsection (2), the court may authorise the 
disclosure, subject to such conditions as it considers justified, if in all of the circumstances it is in the interests 
of justice to do so. (4) In this section—“organised crime” has the meaning it has in Part 7 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 2006; “terrorist activity” and “terrorist-linked activity” have the meanings they have in section 4 





the direction given by the Court in answer to the application, there being no objection 
from the accused or either of them to that application, though invited, issue was raised by 
Counsel for the accused on the return, indicating that the approach of the prosecution 
would seem to have been unnecessary, having regard to the provisions of section 13 of 
the Act of 2009. 
Trial judge no. 3 did clarify that this was the first occasion in which he had to, in effect, 
interpret the vagaries of the 2009 Act, which he framed as the following: 
His [Counsel for the Defence] argument is that for the purposes of the prosecution of the 
particular offence here, the documents that were essential to those purposes have been 
identified.  
In other words, if these documents were alerted to, a more important emphasis would then 
be placed upon the nature of the documents than the defence was prepared to accept such 
documents merited. Counsel for the prosecution, on the other hand, argued that: 
…the documents relating to this motor vehicle… is not required for the purposes of the 
prosecution of the offence as provided for under section 13 of the Act, but he believes 
that it was something that needed permission or authorisation of the Court under 
section 15. And all I [Trial Judge no. 3] have to say is it's a very fine line of definition 
between what is essential or necessary for the purpose of prosecution of offence and what 
is relevant in the overall presentation of the case.372 
In a perceptive passage, the trial judge interpreted his role in determining this matter as 
not being usurped in any manner by the 2009 Act. In fact, the 2009 Act, as interpreted by 
this trial judge, buttressed his belief that judicial discretion would be required to reach an 
intelligible determination of the matter: 
…there is provision within the Court's remit to exercise discretion in this area in the event 
that the Act is not strictly complied with. 
It is illuminating to find that judicial discretion, rather than being curtailed by statutory 
drafting, can actually embed its usage.  
Trial judge no. 4 dealt with a very lengthy ruling in this criminal trial brought on 
indictment in the Circuit Criminal Court.373 The trial judge stated the issue by framing the 
parameters of a lawful arrest: “[T]he issue then is whether the arrest… was lawful. 
 
372 This is a striking microcosm of the challenges faced by trial judges on a daily basis. Obviously, this thesis 
is dealing with the criminal branch of the law, and observers can witness, at first hand, the tensions between 
statutory and common law. Whether or not statutory law can seek to reduce the element of judicial discretion 
when determining issues of evidence in criminal trials was analysed by trial judge no. 3. 
373 People (DPP) v J.B. and D. K., (June 2012), trial notes on file with author. The matter of evidence 
admissibility centred round the lawfulness of the accused’s arrest, which would consequently determine 





I accept the restraint on their movement by Detective Garda Connolly was an arrest.” 
Having cited Professor Walsh’s book on criminal procedure as a secondary source of law, 
trial judge no. 4 agreed that the accused were detained for a period without an arrest being 
lawfully effected, but that such a detention was necessary in order for a lawful arrest to be 
so effected.374 The issue was then whether or not a lawful arrest could be effected when 
the purported lawful arrest was actually made. The common law was deployed in order to 
come to a solution of this issue by the trial judge. Her judgment is heavily reliant upon the 
case-law opened: 
Counsel for the Prosecution has opened the Kehoe case as reported in [1986] ILRM 690. 
This was a different case to what occurred in the matter at trial, when one looks at the facts. 
In the Kehoe case there seems to have been gunfire over a period of perhaps some 40 
minutes. In the current case, while firearms were involved in the earlier events… no gardaí 
had apparently drawn guns at the green area, nor was there any concern in that regard in 
light of the fact that only two mobiles were ever a cause for concern at that stage. In the 
case of Quinlivan v. The Governor of Portlaoise Prison and Ors. in [1998] 1 IR 456 a re-
arrest after Mr. Quinlivan had been released from unlawful custody was upheld. In the 
instant case there was no release. The detention, in effect, continued. 
The trial judge, having consulted the previous case law on the issue, determined that the 
option open to her, and which was most appropriate, was to sever that piece of 
unconstitutional detention from the time of arrest, which trial judge no. 4 determined to 
be lawful: 
Arising from that, in this case I found that the accused were detained by Detective Garda… 
at… for the purpose of holding them for others and, as such, this period was not in 
accordance with law but that this was followed by the lawful arrest shortly after at 12.20 by 
Detective Garda…. Obviously the consequences are that anything that arose between the 
period, the unknown period from perhaps 12.14/15 to 12.20, is not admissible but the arrest 
itself at 12.20 is in accordance with law and I say that it can be separated in the 
circumstances of this case from the period of time when Detective Garda …stopped them 
for the purposes of being arrested at 12.20. 
The above decision is clearly reliant upon the facts of the case that had already been 
adduced in evidence, and by the issue of severability. The trial judge felt capable of 
 
374 The trial judge’s ruling was: “I am satisfied that no statutory power was invoked by Detective Garda … 
and in effect, and I say this was done without malice, he was holding the two men until his colleagues could 






isolating the period in which the accused were unconstitutionally held from that period of 
time in which the arrest was conducted.  
The standard of ruling which was witnessed in the Dublin Circuit Criminal Court 
was variable. First, the same issues of restraint in how much in-depth analysis that a 
presiding judge can afford to undertake is directly compromised by the reality of 
pandering to a jury who are normally anxious for the case to proceed so that they can get 
back to their normal lives. This fact, is, of course, quite understandable. However, does 
such an occurrence allow for the best rulings to be delivered by the trial judge? The 
finding that this thesis would proffer is that such a time constraint coerces judges into 
delivering less than fully developed rulings within the heat of a criminal trial. Having 
raised this cogent issue, it would be too simplistic to say that the Circuit Court bench do 
not attempt to analyse the issues before their court. The standard of ruling observed in this 
snap-shot selection would suggest that Circuit Court judges admirably attempt to engage 
with the material and come to a solution. 
The overwhelming influence upon the crucial issue of evidence admissibility in 
the Circuit Court is the common law precedent which has been delivered by the Superior 
Courts (ie. Court of Appeal (Criminal), Supreme Court and indeed the High Court). These 
judgments from these Courts are binding on the lower courts in a way that should, one 
would feel, reduce the amount of judicial discretion in issue. This is not the case. The 
above extracts have demonstrated that trial judges feel it incumbent upon them to follow 
decisions of the Superior Courts, however they are free to exercise considerable 
discretion in the manner in which these decisions are applied. It is this subtle nuance 
which unbridles the judge from slavishly adhering to previous precedent and retains the 
discretionary sharpness to the rulings of evidence admissibility. 
An example of evidence admissibility being ruled upon by the three judge panel in 
the Special derives from a high-profile criminal gangland trial.375 The initial expectation 
before engaging in this period of analysis would have been that with a non-jury court 
being in train, the time devoted to deliberating and reaching a solution would have been 
greatly expanded, thus improving the standard and overall quality of the rulings delivered 
by the bench. Furthermore, the initial expectation would be that the encroachment onto 
the constitutional right of an accused person in this State to be tried before a selection of 
his peers was an infringement that could not easily be justified.376 Some supporters of the 
 
375 People (DPP) v W.D. & J.D. (SCC, February 2012), trial notes on file with author. 





retention of the SCC have argued that it fulfils a vital role in the administration of justice 
in a small and enclosed jurisdiction such as Ireland.377 A more balanced view of the 
SCC’s position within the criminal justice court hierarchy could argue that the right to a 
jury-trial is, in effect, off-set by the fact that the rulings within the course of the trial, are 
not made under the time-pressures seen  in the ordinary criminal courts . It is an argument 
that will be tested in the following analysis.  
 In the above cited trial, Counsel for one of the accused sought leave of the court 
to adduce evidence from a taped Garda interview with the witness in which directly 
contradictory evidence was given contra an earlier statement which the female witness in 
the trial had made in relation to a person associated with the accused.378 Counsel for the 
co-accused supported such evidence being adduced as it would tend to show that the 
witness was simply not credible: 
But what I am concerned about, Judges, obviously, is that this Court would be left under 
an illusion by this witness concerning her position vis-a-vis certain matters in 
circumstances where we can show that she made actually contradictory and inconsistent 
statements having regard to her testimony and the statements that she gave [previously]… 
The paucity of authority opened to the bench on the matter by all Counsel involved was a 
reflection perhaps on the bench being already overly au fait with the issues in being.379 
The ruling of the bench-delivered by the High Court judge- on this issue of admissibility 
was short and not very descriptive, stretching to just under two paragraphs of typed 
transcript: 
…the letter sought details of all telephone calls and attendance records between G.D. and 
Ms C. whilst Mr D. was incarcerated in Portlaoise. Whatever was said in the application, 
it is wholly exceptional to have evidence such as these taped conversations and, whatever 
was said in the application, this Court ordered the production of the tapes for the purpose 
of dealing with the allegation by the defence of the set-up or whatever, of the allegation 
that she was saying she was setting the person up.  We are quite satisfied that neither 
 
377 Dessie O’Malley, Conduct Unbecoming: The Story of One of Ireland’s Most Extraordinary and Influential 
Politicians (Gill Books, Dublin 2014).  
378 The application was framed along the following parameters: “My lord, some moments ago this witness 
denied that she had ever described T. O'N. as a creepy bastard who goes around raping people…I'm asking 
the Court to hear expressions of opinion and fact by this witness which contradict her evidence before this 
Court today. I know this takes a bit of time, but if this person is prepared to engage in the expression of an 
opinion and a statement of a fact which deliberately contradicts her evidence here today under oath, then it's 
a matter which your lordships are entitled to listen upon.” 
379 However, some authority which would have aided the bench in reaching their decision would have given 





party are entitled to go beyond that on the tapes. Call Mr G.D. if you like. So, that's our 
ruling.  
Having made the ruling to exclude such material in the defence’s attempt to effectively 
discredit a witness, Counsel for one of the accused argued that the ruling was ill-
conceived and requested the Court to revise the ruling: 
… had I known, Judges, you were going to make a ruling to the effect that you were 
going to exclude this material, I would have brought you through the relevance of the 
material to demonstrate to you, Judges, why I am saying this is absolutely central to the 
issue of the innocence of Mr D…380 
In an unusual turn of events, the bench heard further submissions from the Defence and 
actually rose for a period of time so that they could consider their ruling together. In a 
more thorough treatment of the matter on this occasion, the ruling was still brief but 
seemed to at least reflect the nuances and subtleties of which Counsel for both accused 
and the State seemed to be impressing upon the bench to take greater care. The 
subsequent ruling failed to outline any semblance of structure, even after the trial had 
been adjourned: 
…we made an order in this case that the tapes be made available to the other side on a 
specific basis. The narrow basis was that there was a specific allegation that at some time 
this witness suggested precisely that she was going to set up or stitch up Mr D. The 
broader matter arising from that is that it's alleged there was an animus between her and 
the D.  Now, we will not permit just a general playing of any tape. We're not going to 
restrict the defence in cross-examination at all. The defence can put something to her in 
relation to that narrow issue or fairly narrow issue… 
This was a ruling by the three-judge bench which arguably lacked discipline. Counsel for 
the accused had stressed, but not by precedent, that this issue was more intricate than first 
seemed. It was not through any force of authority that the bench felt it necessary to 
reconsider their initial ruling. It was through the use of common-sense that an evidential 
source could be utilised for different purposes depending on its context. 
The second example proffered from a different SCC trial involved a differently 
constituted bench. The first ruling which was delivered in this trial for IRA membership 
 
380 Such a development was predictably seen as being highly impertinent by this particular Defence Counsel, 
which is demonstrated in the following exchange between Defence Counsel and one of the three judges: 
“Defence Counsel: in my respectful submission, it would be an injustice if Mr D. was not allowed to 
pursue some of the matters that are raised in these particular tapes, and I can labour the Court with 
particular references -- 





contrary to the Offences against the State Act 1939 (as amended) went to first principles, 
in that the application made by Counsel on behalf of the accused was that the arrest was 
unlawful, resulting in the evidence garnered subsequent to that being inadmissible.381 The 
application focused on whether or not the arresting Garda had developed a belief that the 
accused was an IRA member before the arrest or whether the belief was garnered on the 
day of arrest only. Such a distinction was concretely based upon the statutory provisions 
for arrest under the 1939 Act. The ruling by the three-judge panel held that: 
We are in the course of a voir dire at the moment, and in the course of that, the 
submission has been made that the defence has been ambushed in that the evidence 
contained in the book suggested that the belief of Detective Garda R. was gleaned only on 
the day of the arrest…There is nothing in his statements indicating that there was no prior 
knowledge or belief, we therefore refuse the application. So, we continue with the voir 
dire.  
The ruling was based on a mere analysis of the statements and not on any authority that 
was opened to the court, or indeed by authorities with which the court was already 
familiar. This rather pithy ruling is offered as a typical example of how the SCC operates 
with the bench taking it upon themselves to curtail lengthy submissions by Counsel and to 
focus on the facts as presented through the evidence which is admissible in law, so that 
controversial evidence can then be adjudicated upon more efficiently. 
The selected ruling comes from the same trial as the previous paragraph.382 The 
application again challenged the arrest of the accused in Dublin city and the admissibility 
of evidence of a search conducted by investigating Garda members of a house in Dublin 
2. The fundamental grounding of the application on behalf of the accused was an 
interference with the accused’s constitutional rights, such as liberty and inviolability of 
their dwelling. The consequent ruling was a little more in-depth than previous efforts in 
the same trial, and in dismissing the application, the Court held: 
In his first submission the accused’s senior counsel, said for reasons given that the 
evidence of opinion of the arresting garda of suspected membership was unreliable, and 
should not be accepted. This Court is satisfied that the evidence was given and in the 
absence of contrary evidence and that for the purpose of this application the Court must 
accept it. 
 
381 People (DPP) v S.F. (Special Criminal Court), trial notes on file with author. 





Turning to the issue of admissibility from the fruits of the search by Gardaí, the Court 
stated: 
Evidence was given of the search of the premises [in]…Dublin 2, and the recovery of 
certain objects, principally firearms and ammunition, therefrom.  The said search was 
carried out under section 29, which has since been declared to be repugnant to the 
Constitution. The accused was neither the owner nor occupier of these premises. Further, 
the accused is not charged in relation to possession of any of the items recovered. There 
has been no breach of the accused's constitutional or legal rights in this regard and the 
Court rejects the application of the defence. 
The above ruling was based, primarily, upon the constitutional rights of the accused, 
along with the provisions of the 1939 Act. The striking element of this ruling however is 
the non-use of the severability tool which was used to effect in a ruling on admissibility in 
the Circuit Court seen previously. The arrest and search were conducted in different 
locations in the SCC trial, but the Court wanted to rule on these two issues together 
without severing their sequential differentiation and evidential probity.  
It would be naive to suggest that such an occurrence proves a trend or a distinct 
procedure in the non-jury court from that of the Circuit Criminal Court. What can be 
stated, based on this author’s field-work, is that the SCC is the most engaged in a 
proverbial game of chess with itself. This somewhat churlish remark can be substantiated 
when one looks at the language used by the sitting judges of the SCC who are engaged in 
voir dires of important evidential matters. They are to hear evidence, in whole or in part, 
and then attempt to disregard such evidence that is deemed inadmissible on one of the 
variety of grounds as to why evidence can be ruled inadmissible. These very same judges 
will then ground opinions of fact as they are entitled to do when determining the 
admissibility issue. The SCC bench perpetuates a dangerous fallacy that the arbiters of 
fact and of law can be one and the same entity without any consequence. This is a 
contention which cannot be justified even by the most ardent apologists for this Court.   
 
Conclusion 
The preference for discretionary rulings by the courts observed is of paramount 
importance to the criminal justice structure. Any interference or infringement upon such 
discretion made by the statutory authors is rebuffed. However, as was seen in the Circuit 
Court example above, the 2009 Surveillance Act inculcates judicial discretion in evidence 





has created a licence for ambiguity, which cannot be easily revoked. Despite the 
prominence of discretionary elements, the predictability of the rulings is striking. These 
rulings all occurred prior to April, 2015, before the Supreme Court altered the Irish 
exclusionary rule in the People (DPP) v JC. Nevertheless, the different trial courts show 






























Chapter 5: Ireland’s exclusionary rule in the spotlight  
 
Introduction 
Media sources have tended, in recent years, to tell the Irish public what is important and 
why it is so. This shows a growing influence of the media on ordinary life which is 
certainly not a new phenomenon.383 The role of the fourth estate is a pivotal one in a 
functioning and progressive democracy.384 However, with such a role comes great 
responsibility, with such a duty being to report the facts in a manner that allows the 
reader, listener or viewer to ultimately make up their own mind on how to think on a 
certain issue. The ready clamour for sensationalist headlines and methods of reporting are 
unfortunate features of modern media culture. That is why when a ‘landmark’ decision is 
hailed by the Irish media the people ought to take such a declaration with a rational 
scepticism. This chapter eschews such sensationalism and speaks to the rationalist mind 
by placing any ‘landmark’ decision in criminal evidence law within its correct setting, the 
criminal trial process. Thus, the primary focus of the following chapter will be on 
Ireland’s exclusionary rule; however it is unrealistic to suggest that the Irish rule has 
remained immune from foreign influence. This is the context in which this chapter is 
written as the Irish Supreme Court, with a 4:3 split in People (DPP) v JC, decided to 
change the exclusionary rule which had operated since 1990.385 It is difficult to assess 
what future alterations will be made as the exclusionary rule has experienced 
‘amendments’ periodically in this jurisdiction and in other jurisdictions which share the 
common legal foundations.386 
As an observer of the exclusionary rule in criminal law, one could be forgiven in 
thinking that this area of law lurches from one seismic shift to the next, with little to no 
mention that this tendency in evidence law has always been evident ever since the first 
 
383Edward E. Bernays, Crystallizing Public Opinion (New York Boni and Liveright 1923). 
384 The Fourth Estate is taken as meaning the people and organisations that report the news, or news 
journalism as a whole, regarded as having a certain unofficial political influence. 
385[2015] IESC 31. For further analysis of the decision reached in JC, See Yvonne Daly, ‘Overruling the 
Protectionist Exclusionary Rule: DPP v JC’ (2015) 19(4) International Journal of Evidence and Proof 270; 
Clare Leon and Tony Ward, ‘The Irish Exclusionary Rule After DPP v JC’ (2015) 35(4) Legal Studies 590; 
Ní Choileáin and Anna Bazarchina, ‘Admissibility of Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence after DPP v JC’ 
(2015) 20(4) Bar Review 83; Dermot PJ Walsh, Walsh on Criminal Procedure (2nd edn, Thomson Round 
Hall, 2016) 784; Nial Fennelly, ‘The Judicial Legacy of Mr Justice Adrian Hardiman’ (2017) 58 Irish Jurist 
81; Aisling O’Connell, ‘Case Comment: DPP v JC’ (2017) Irish Judicial Studies Journal 66; Yvonne Daly, 
‘”A Revolution in Principle”’? The Impact of the New Exclusionary Rule’ (2018) 2 Criminal Law and 
Practice Review 1; Liz Heffernan, Evidence in Criminal Trials (2nd edn, Bloomsbury 2020), chapter 12.   
386 I use this term ‘amendment’ not in a statutory or constitutional sense, but rather as an alert to the fact that 





days of a discernible corpus of evidence law emerging in criminal trials.387 This is 
significant for two primary reasons: 
a. it demonstrates that the criminal trial procedure has always demonstrated itself to be 
willing to evolve, often through necessity; and 
b. the sensationalist underpinnings of such changes are seen for what they are— 
sensationalist reporting to salve a particular ‘news agenda’.  
This chapter does not seek to predict the future pathway of the exclusionary rule in 
Ireland; rather it seeks to explain how it is the Supreme Court majority in JC (Denham 
CJ, O’Donnell, Clarke and MacMenamin JJ.) arrived at a position where such a change 
was deemed necessary. In part one of this chapter, the tensions between the different 
theoretical standpoints of evidence exclusion are delineated. In part two, the 
jurisprudential development of the exclusionary rule in Ireland is charted. Part three seeks 
to analyse the JC judgment, with part four placing such a change in the correct context, 
which is the criminal court room and argues for further changes to the Irish criminal trial 
procedure so that the true impact of the rule change in Ireland can be assessed. This 
chapter seeks to deliver to the reader a sense of the ever-changing face of the criminal 
trial. Many observers would think that very little has changed from the outside, however, 
like most topics in life, if one dares to look a little closer, it may be found that a new path 
is being forged, with unintended consequences. The chapter continues with part one 
which seeks to set the particular theoretical parameters of the exclusionary rule.   
 
a. A matter of theory 
 
The exclusionary rule in Ireland does not operate within a vacuum. Rather its context is 
best illustrated, not exclusively, but most regularly in the criminal trial sphere. What is 
also clear, from both the academic and practical authorities on the matter, is that the rule’s 
application and purpose are not always reconcilable. In fact, the rule can be quite 
inconsistently applied in many jurisdictions which adhere to such a premise. For instance 
Shrock and Welsh, in their seminal work on the American exclusionary rule, highlight a 
derivative use concept, which shows that the use of evidence from an illegal source is 
never worthy of admittance.388 This derivative use theory is qualified for our purposes by 
 
387 Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial. 
388 Thomas S. Shrock and Robert C. Welsh, ‘Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional 





the following two factors however: (a) it is cemented within the American constitutional 
parameters of their Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution which is clearly different 
from the Irish context, and (b) the theory only regulates use, not acquisition. It is not 
controversial to state that Shrock and Welsh both utilise the ‘deterrent’ and ‘judicial 
integrity’ rationales for their development of the American exclusionary rule, which bears 
very close resemblance to the Irish version.389 To elucidate these two rationales further 
would be a thankless task if one does not set these principles in their proper theoretical 
frameworks. The ‘deterrence’ rationale of the exclusionary rule is located within the 
fragmentary model or the ‘common law’ method of prosecution.390 In contrast, the 
‘judicial integrity’ rationale is housed within the unitary model of criminal prosecution.391 
One of the most striking differences between the fragmentary and unitary models of the 
criminal process is the treatment of illegally obtained evidence. The fragmentary model 
accommodates illegally obtained evidence in a way that the unitary model just cannot do 
so. The deterrence rationale could only really operate successfully within the fragmentary 
model as each stage of the criminal process (investigation, trial and sentence) is akin to 
individual fiefdoms in their own right. The unitary model does not entail such a division 
in the process. 
Both models (fragmentary and unitary) possess a keen sense of establishing and 
maintaining public trust in the criminal justice system. The fragmentary model operates 
on the premise, in effect, that the public will lose confidence in a system which does not 
utilise highly probative evidence in the prosecution of crime because it has been deemed 
to have been obtained by unlawful means. Contrastingly, the unitary model promotes that 
concept that public confidence is successfully maintained when the government (and its 
agents) is held to the same standards and abides by the same laws as the rest of society. 
 
389 For instance, in People (DPP) v JC [2015] IESC 31, Clarke J. (for the majority) speaks of the deterrence 
principle being the basis for the Irish exclusionary rule.   
390 Shrock and Welsh, ‘Up from Calandra’ 255. On the one hand, the ‘fragmentary (also referred to as the 
‘fair trial’) model’ dictates that the court’s task is to facilitate a fair trial. All else is of secondary consideration. 
The court is obliged to admit illegally obtained evidence if to do so would ensure the desired result. Such a 
concept, it is argued by Shrock and Welsh, is grounded on the writings of the jurist Wigmore, who stated: 
“…the admissibility of evidence is not affected by the illegality of the means through which the party has 
been enabled to obtain the evidence.” Dean Wigmore, ‘Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and 
Seizure’ (1922) 8 American Bar Association Journal 479. This holds true for Wigmore even if that party is a 
government official 
391 On the other hand, the ‘unitary model’ concentrates on the promotion of a ‘one government’ approach to 
the prosecution of crime whereby the exclusion of evidence is deemed a method by which the court avoids 
violating the established rule of law. Within this model, the court acts as the final buffer between the 
government potentially offending the rule of law and the loss of the public confidence within the criminal 





The trial process is this chapter’s main concern; however it is axiomatic that the 
preceding and succeeding elements of the process impact upon the trial. Both the 
fragmentary and unitary models appear to accept this premise. In order to function, the 
fragmentary model’s version of a criminal trial is a hermetically sealed entity, oblivious 
to the noxious emissions which the preceding investigatory phase may conjure. The trial 
is viewed as being self-contained, allowing the judiciary to remain untroubled with the 
detritus of the potentially unsavoury investigatory techniques— deployed by certain 
branches of the government—in order to obtain sufficient evidence to pursue a 
prosecution. However, if one was to accept the fragmentary model’s basic assumption, 
the obvious question to canvass is whether the court endorses the illegality by simply 
ignoring such discrepancies? The unitary model does not act in such a segregated manner. 
One phase of the process links inescapably to the next. An illegality committed in one 
stage will effectively contaminate the subsequent phases if condoned. 
The fundamental difference between these two models (fragmentary and unitary) 
is best typified through the treatment of responsibility. Put simply, an observer may ask 
themselves where does most responsibility lie in a given criminal case to ensure that the 
process can advance with all operative evidence being tendered?392 The fragmentary (fair 
trial) model places this onus of responsibility upon the investigators to develop evidence 
extrication methods which allow the product to be used at trial. Alternatively, in the 
unitary (judicial integrity) model, the equivalent responsibility is entrusted to the court.393 
This marked difference of approach centres upon the conception of a criminal trial. The 
fragmentary model champions the ‘fair trial’ doctrine, whilst the unitary model espouses 
the ‘fair prosecution’ concept.394 A trial and a prosecution are defined by their objectives. 
Therefore, a trial is the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused person by a 
court which engages a judge and jury.395 A prosecution is of a different substance. It is 
concerned with the continuation or the pursuit of an action with the intent that the process 
reaches its conclusion.396 A prosecution can only be initiated— and continued— if it 
possesses evidence to put before the trier of fact which serves to convict or acquit an 
accused. There must be sufficient levels of evidence to be employed when required. If 
not, the prosecution and the trial will cease. Clearly, a trial is not concerned solely with 
 
392 This focuses upon whether the evidence that is presented at trial is of a useable quality. 
393 Shrock and Welsh, ‘Up from Calandra’ 258.  
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evidence that will return a conviction. The trial is conducted by the court, which is 
impartial by definition. 
The unitary concept develops a court which is concerned with the integrity of the 
entire criminal trial process (from investigation to sentencing). This burden is placed 
upon the court by society so that it can remain confident that the criminal process is being 
administered in a just manner. As a direct consequence, the court cannot be tainted by 
illegality. Such illegality is focused upon the life-blood of all trials; the evidence. Hence, 
if the court admits corrupted evidence into the trial, the process is then also corrupted.397 
The fragmentary model is concerned with the trial only. The fragmentary trial wants to 
reach its end with a discernible result; it does not want a ‘tied’ score. Such a result is 
more likely to be accomplished if more relevant evidence is admitted to the trial.398 
However, such an aim does not come without some compromise. Not all relevant 
evidence may have been seized legally, or in an Irish context, constitutionally. This poses 
an insurmountable dilemma for the unitary model which is effectively bypassed by the 
fragmentary model. The unitary model cannot sustain itself if tainted “fruits from the 
poisonous tree” are admitted.399 The fragmentary model, as a self-contained, highly 
segregated entity is not levelled with such tricky reconciliations of practical difficulties. 
The court, in a fragmentary scheme, is left in blissful ignorance of any potential 
illegalities which may have been perpetrated by agents of the executive branch of the 
government. The court here is not concerned with indiscretion earlier in the process. It is 
only concerned with admitting relevant evidence for both sides at trial.  
Shrock and Welsh do not agree with the premise grounding the fragmentary ‘fair 
trial’ model. Their central argument is that the rights held by an accused which pertain to 
a fair trial are not contiguous only to rights evocable at the trial itself. Rather such rights 
are available through the trial process; from investigation (which includes the obtaining of 
evidence) to the sentencing hearing if such a hearing is applicable.400 The conclusion they 
reach is that the fair trial (fragmentary) model affords the impression that the court “need 
feel responsible only for the conduct of the trial”.401 The authors maintain that the 
 
397 An analogy would be a computer operating an anti-virus software. If the software fails to pick-up a virus 
and admits it to the computer’s mainframe causing corruption of files, the confidence in that software is 
obliterated.   
398 This can be seen in many spheres of life where more data will provide a greater possibility that a result 
will be sustained.  
399Nardone v United States 308 U.S. 338 (1939). 
400 Shrock and Welsh, ‘Up from Calandra’ 260.  





fragmentary model possesses degrees of arbitrariness which are just not reached by the 
unitary model.402 This cannot be sustained however. Both Irish and international writers 
have developed the theory that the trial contains distinct phases, with each stage providing 
its own unique contribution to the over-all trial process. Each unit of the process is 
reciprocal to the next, ie.  the trial cannot occur if sufficient evidence has not been 
attained beforehand. Similarly, a guilty plea or a finding of guilty by the triers of fact will 
be based partially on the evidence obtained by the investigators pre-trial. It is an 
unsustainable line of argument particularly if one disagrees with Mr. Justice Holmes’ 
contention that there is no distinction to be made between the government as a prosecutor 
and the government as a judge.403 This lack of contradistinction offends not just the 
constitutional separation of powers doctrine, but it also antagonises the argument, 
propounded by Shrock and Welsh, that the exclusion of evidence is a mode of judicial 
review.404 It would be somewhat quixotic to suggest that a form of judicial review could 
be implemented with such a shortage of first principles such as nemo iudex in causa 
sua.405 
The Holmesian theory on the criminal trial will not succeed in a fragmented 
model. The premise of the theory should not be analysed through the prism of the entire 
trial process, as to do so would render it practically meaningless. Rather, it is suggested 
that the Holmesian theory ought to be viewed myopically, with evidence admissibility 
being the cause célèbre. Therefore, a brief juxtaposition of the Holmesian theory and the 
two modes of trial (fragmentary and unitary models) will reveal serious discrepancies. 
Such disparities are given lucidity by a logical application of both models’ 
suppositions.406 It is apt to ponder if the Holmesian viewpoint is reconcilable to the 
unitary model? The unitary model does not view the criminal trial process as being 
divided into neat departments with their own governing regulations. Instead, this model 
views the flow of evidence from investigation to sentencing through the trial itself as 
single continuum. Viewed in this light, it would appear that the Holmesian thesis is more 
aptly sheltered under this canopy. Nonetheless, the judicial integrity prerequisite of the 
 
402 Shrock and Welsh, ‘Up from Calandra’ 261. 
403Olmstead v United States 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
404 Shrock and Welsh, ‘Up from Calandra’ 261. 
405 David Gwynn Morgan and Gerard W. Hogan, Administrative law in Ireland (4thed, Round Hall 2012).  
406 The Holmesian theory on the criminal trial would see the traditional judge/prosecutor distinction 
disintegrate, leaving not a vacuum but an administrative form of guilt discovery. On the other hand, the 
fragmentary model is based upon a ‘fair trial’ bedrock. The trial judge is separate from the investigators and 
any indiscretion committed by the investigative authorities does not concern the judge; it is the relevance and 





unitary model is in peril from a public confidence aspect. However, if the judicial and 
prosecutorial functions are executed by the same entity, apart from being clearly 
unconstitutional, this form of evidence presentation could potentially be entertained by 
the unitary model. This is so as it is the parties who provide the evidence. Potentially a 
judicial function could perform this task but it would require a radical overhaul of the 
traditional trial process, one which was surely unintended by Mr. Justice Holmes.  
The admissibility of evidence in criminal trials depends upon a number of factors, 
such as the charges placed upon the indictment, the plea and the availability of witnesses. 
These factors are dictated chiefly by the evidence that is gathered pre-trial. The common 
law and statute law has evolved to maintain a perceived ‘balance’ between the rights of 
the accused(s) and those of the prosecution, which in Ireland is in the name of the People 
of Ireland at the suit of the DPP. Such an example of the common law attempting to strike 
the aforementioned balance comes from the evidence of previous misconduct, which 
possesses a similar factual nexus to the latest alleged crime.407 The Privy Council in 
Makin affirmed the rule that evidence which tended to demonstrate that the accused was 
previously guilty of criminal acts which are not the acts placed upon the present 
indictment is inadmissible.408 One key observation that could be made at this juncture is 
that such controversial evidence as proffered in Makin was highly relevant and, arguably, 
highly reliable. There was also no impropriety alleged at the hands of the police 
constables in Australia. Rather, it was the prejudicial effect caused to the accused that 
swayed the Privy Council in excluding such evidence. In Makin, the Privy Council based 
their non-affirmance upon the statutory provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 
1883 and the court did not agree that it could affirm a conviction which was based 
partially upon evidence which was deemed to be inadmissible.409 However the exclusion 
 
407Makin v Attorney-General for New South Wales [1894] AC 57 which came before the Privy Council on 
appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The accused were a married couple; John and Sarah 
Makin.   
408 The facts of Makin are well versed for modern day readers; suffice it to state that the accused had been 
convicted of the wilful murder of an infant. The alleged murderers were thought to be have been willing to 
adopt the child, which was to be bound on payment of monies. The body of the said infant was discovered 
buried on the accused’s property in the countryside of New South Wales. The impugned evidence surrounded 
representations made by witnesses who alleged that the accused had ‘adopted’ several other infants in like 
fashion in the past and that infant bodies had been found on other properties then occupied by the accused.   
409 Criminal Law Amendment Act 1883 (N.S.W.), s 423 states: “the Judge by whom any such question is 
reserved shall as soon as practicable state a case setting forth the same with the facts and circumstances out 
of which every such question arose and shall transmit such case to the Judges of the Supreme Court who shall 
determine the questions and may affirm amend or reverse the judgment given or avoid or arrest the same or 
may order an entry to be made on the record that the person convicted ought not to have been convicted or 





of the evidence was based upon common law principles. Why such evidence was 
excluded requires further analysis. 
 
b. Placing Irish exclusionary developments in context 
 
It is incumbent to plot the path from where Irish jurisprudential thought has derived in 
relation to the exclusionary rule, which will aid in the analysis of the JC judgment as to 
where the Irish courts currently lie in relation to the rule.410 In People (DPP) v McMahon 
the trial judge in the Circuit Criminal Court stated a case to the Supreme Court.411 The 
Supreme Court decided unanimously (5-0) that a warrant was required by the Gardaí 
before entering the premises.412 Second, the court held that where evidence has been 
obtained by unlawful means, but without any conscious and deliberate violation of a 
constitutional right, such evidence must be admissible, unless the evidence is excluded by 
the court in the exercise of its discretion.413 The discretionary element to the process of 
evidence admission or exclusion required clarification and the court in McMahon 
provided a degree of clarity in this respect.414 The locus classicus of O’Brien was re-
analysed in McMahon with the distinct divergence of opinion between Kingsmill Moore J 
and Walsh J regarding illegally obtained evidence remaining problematical to later 
courts.415 People (AG) v O’Brien is a seminal judgment.416 O’Brien was a search warrant 
 
reversed arrested or avoided on any case so stated unless for some substantial wrong or other miscarriage of 
justice.” 
410People (DP.P.) v JC [2015] IESC 31; [2017] 1 IR 417 (SC). 
411 [1986] IR 393 (S.C.), the defendants were charged with offences involving gaming machines on licensed 
premises contrary to s. 9 of the Gaming and Lotteries Act 1956. A Garda member, the court heard, entered 
the premises plain clothed without a search warrant. The trial judge asked the following double limbed 
question of the Supreme Court: a. whether a Garda member must possess a search warrant under s. 39 of the 
1956 Act before entering a licensed premises for the purposes of detecting possible offences under the 1956 
Act, and b. whether evidence procured by such a Garda, present on licensed premises for the purpose, and 
without a search warrant, was admissible. 
412 In the absence of a search warrant the Gardaí were deemed to be trespassers.  
413 It is noticeable that the first threshold mentioned by the court is the legal obtaining of evidence. It then 
refers to the higher constitutional standard. If a constitutional right was engaged by the obtaining of the 
evidence it would not be allowed in. However, in McMahon, the court affirmed that if an illegal obtaining of 
the evidence transpired, such evidence would be presumed to be admitted unless a discretionary exclusion 
was exercised by the court. Walsh J. in O’Brien, on the other hand, believed that such discretion should not 
be entertained and if the evidence was relevant, it must then be admitted.    
414 The discretion would involve balancing the public interest in the detection and punishment of crime on 
the one hand, and on the other the public interest in ensuring that individuals are not subjected to illegal or 
inquisitorial methods of investigation. 
415 Kingsmill Moore J in O’Brien argued that where evidence was obtained by illegal means not involving a 
conscious and deliberate invasion of a constitutional right, the court had an inherent discretion as to whether 
such evidence ought to be admitted. 





case which involved a misidentified address on the warrant as being ‘118 Cashel Road’ 
instead of the correct ‘118 Captain’s Road’. The evidence retrieved during the search was 
challenged by the accused, seeking it to be deemed inadmissible. In a divided Supreme 
Court, the interpretation of an exclusionary rule took centre stage. Kingsmill Moore J 
(with whom Lavery and Budd JJ agreed) ruled that the evidence should not be excluded 
as there was no evidence of a deliberate ploy by An Garda Síochána to impinge upon the 
accused’s constitutional rights. Kingsmill Moore J deemed the issue to be an illegal 
search, which required the trial judge to exercise their discretion in receiving the evidence 
or not. Walsh J differed from this stance somewhat, believing that where evidence had 
been obtained by state agents as a consequence of a ‘deliberate and conscious violation’ 
of the constitutional rights of the accused (as opposed to common law rights), such 
evidence must be excluded, except where there are ‘extraordinary excusing 
circumstances’ in being.417 The formulation of the rule offered by Judge Walsh in 
O’Brien acted as Ireland’s exclusionary rule until 1990. The traditionalists would have 
sided with the stance preferred by Walsh J.418 Furthermore the fragmentary trial theorists 
would have agreed with this stance.419 Ó Dálaigh CJ sided with Walsh J in O’Brien which 
appealed to the common law mores of previous generations. Lavery J (the fifth member 
of the court in O’Brien) agreed with Kingsmill Moore J, believing that O’Brien was an 
unsuitable candidate case in which the issue of evidence admissibility ought to be 
considered.420 
Finlay CJ in McMahon accepted the premise that the judgment of Kingsmill 
Moore J in O’Brien represented the law. This was so even though Lavery J’s judgment 
was not wholly conclusive for either side and remains rather opaque. What could be 
stated post-O’Brien was that if evidence is obtained through illegal means, as opposed to 
unconstitutional means, the evidence must still be admitted, unless the discretion of the 
court deems otherwise. It is this last clause that causes the problem in Irish evidence law. 
If the evidence is obtained illegally, it must, if it is relevant, go to the jury (triers of fact). 
At pg. 161 of the O’Brien judgment in the Irish Reports, the nature and extent of the 
 
417 Judge Walsh mentioned the imminent destruction of essential evidence or the rescue of a person from peril 
as being pertinent examples of ‘extraordinary excusing circumstances’.   
418Kuruma v The Queen [1955] AC 197, where Lord Goddard CJ, delivering the judgment of the Privy 
Council, held that the test of admissibility to be applied, in both criminal and civil cases, is whether the 
evidence is relevant. 
419 Lord Goddard CJ in Kuruma cited Olmstead v United States (1928) 277 US 438 before dismissing its 
application to the common law of England.  
420 This opinion is not easily explained as evidence admissibility was central to the factual nexus of the 





illegality will have to be taken into account. In other words, was the illegal action 
intentional, and if so, was it the result of an ad hoc decision, or does it represent a settled 
or deliberate policy? Another consideration was whether the breach of law trivial or of a 
technical nature or was it a more serious imposition upon the legal rights of the accused? 
These matters were to be considered by the court during the trial which required a further 
balancing act to be maintained, which was previously alluded to in People (DPP) v 
McMahon.421 
Finlay CJ in McMahon accepted these considerations to be appropriate, but also 
qualified the foregoing list by stating that they were not exhaustive. This judgment clearly 
leaves room for a more detailed list which a judge will have to cross-reference before 
deciding whether to allow in the questioned piece of evidence. Further in the judgment of 
Finlay CJ in McMahon at pg. 400 of the report, the Chief Justice did not wholly accept 
that all the principles extolled by Kingsmill Moore J in O’Brien were applicable to the 
question of the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence. It was felt that some of these 
concerns would be more appropriately applied to the question of the admission of 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence. Finlay CJ, it must be remembered, answered the 
two questions stated by the Circuit Court with the first awarded an affirmative ‘yes’ and 
the second answered by stating that the evidence (illegally obtained) would be admissible 
unless the court decided to refuse its admission through the use of its discretion. Walsh J, 
Henchy and Hederman JJ. agreed with Finlay CJ. McCarthy J also agreed with the Chief 
Justice but commented upon whether the judgment of Kingsmill Moore J could be 
considered to be the majority offering in O’Brien? McCarthy J added his endorsement to 
Finlay CJ’s finding that Lavery J’s judgment supported the views expressed by Kingsmill 
Moore J, and, as a result, converted that judgment into the majority. McCarthy J did 
express the opinion that exercising such discretion would mean that the evidence would 
be excluded. The confusion of the Irish superior courts surrounding the Irish exclusionary 
rule was maintained.  
In People (DPP) v Kenny, a search warrant was deemed to be defective under the 
provisions of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, however the trial judge had initially ruled 
that the warrant was valid and admitted the evidence at trial.422 On appeal, the Court of 
Criminal Appeal (CCA) in Kenny held that the trial judge was incorrect in determining 
that the search warrant was validly issued by the Peace Commissioner. The CCA upheld 
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the judge’s decision to admit the evidence, but disagreed with his finding that the warrant 
was valid, and so reversed the trial judge’s decision on that issue solely. The appellate 
court clearly followed the judgment of Kingsmill Moore J in O’Brien, alluding to the fact 
that the evidence in Kenny did show that the Garda tried to conduct his behaviour 
according to constitutional mores of that day.423 An automatic exclusion of the evidence 
could not be justified in Kenny as the Garda indiscretion was neither deliberate nor 
conscious. Having satisfied itself of that conclusion, the CCA in Kenny followed 
Kingsmill Moore J in finding that if it is an illegal breach, the issue falls to be determined 
by the appropriate factors outlined in O’Brien which, together, form the parameters of the 
use of judicial discretion.424 On appeal to the Supreme Court in Kenny, that court 
analysed the circumstances in which the search warrant was obtained by the investigating 
Garda, who had obtained the said warrant from a local Peace Commissioner who had 
authority under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 to issue such a warrant.425 Both the Garda 
and the Peace Commissioner were acting in accordance to the procedure which they both 
believed to be in train at that time and had acted in good faith in doing so.426 It was held 
by the Supreme Court (3:2) that evidence obtained as a result of a deliberate and 
conscious violation of constitutional rights of a citizen must be excluded unless the court 
in its discretion was satisfied that there were extraordinary excusing circumstances which 
justified the admission of that evidence or that the act constituting the breach of 
constitutional rights was accidental or unintentional. Notably, the majority in Kenny 
(Finlay CJ, Walsh and Hederman JJ.) held that the detection of crime and conviction of 
the guilty could not supersede the constitutional obligation of the courts as far as 
practicable to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen. It was this latter 
stance with which the Supreme Court in JC had to grapple, which would come later in 
this story. Further interpretations of the exclusionary rule emanated periodically.  
 In People (DPP) v Balfe,427 the applicant sought leave to appeal against her 
conviction for handling stolen property. Most pertinent to the needs of the present work is 
the argument proffered by the applicant that the trial judge wrongly admitted into 
 
423 In the sense that no willing impropriety could be levelled at the Gardaí who orchestrated the investigation, 
incompetence and a lack of care perhaps, but conscious wrong-doing could not be proven on the facts. 
424 The judgment of Walsh J in O’Brien was not followed as it had been deemed in People (DPP) v McMahon 
[1986] IR 393 to be the minority judgment. 
425 [1990] 2 IR 110 (SC). 
426 The process which involved the Peace Commissioner issuing the search warrant pursuant to the Misuse of 
Drugs Act 1977 should have involved an independent assessment of the investigating Garda’s suspicion of 
the location of controlled drugs.  





evidence the finding of goods during an unconstitutional search made on foot of an 
information and warrant.428 It was held by the Court of Criminal Appeal (Murphy J, 
Lavan and Budd JJ.) in dismissing the appeal—having first decided to treat the leave 
application as the appeal—that the fact that the information and warrant did not coincide 
could not be a fatal defect. This sort of defect—although acknowledged as being serious, 
was of a type that fell within the ambit of a ‘patent defect’ as espoused in O’Brien.429 
Murphy J, in analysing the decision reached in O’Brien, interpreted the Supreme Court’s 
decision as meaning that, while the search was not actually authorised by the search 
warrant which had been issued, the search did not constitute a “deliberate and conscious 
violation” of the appellant’s constitutional rights to the inviolability of their home. 
Murphy J’s judgment provides a detailed summary of the exclusionary rule up to that 
point in Ireland and included the Supreme Court’s decision in People (DPP) v Shaw.430 
The majority of that court held that the most appropriate approach was to exclude all 
evidence which was gathered in a deliberate and conscious breach of a person’s 
constitutional rights; however this could not be viewed as being an absolute rule, as 
certain, extraordinary, excusing circumstances may allow unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence to be admitted at trial. The significance of this decision is that the once absolute 
exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence was relaxed. It could be argued that this 
perceived relaxation was not applicable to the vast majority of cases; however Shaw 
signalled a loosening of the reins and a move to the fragmentary trial process.431 Murphy 
J in Balfe, having analysed Shaw, accepted the proposition that what was meant by 
“deliberate and conscious violation of constitutional rights” was still evolving.432 With 
this being the case, does such a formula render the predictability of the evidential 
outcomes more or less attainable through the current trial process? It could also be argued 
that if the admissibility of evidence depends on constitutional rights for viability that the 
determination of any potential breach of such rights will constantly remain in flux as 
constitutional rights are interpreted by the courts.  
 
428 A number of defects were present on the search warrant, including an incorrect address, an incorrect date 
for the alleged offence of larceny (theft) and an incorrect name was used by the Gardaí on the warrant. 
429 [1965] IR 142; the goods seized in Balfe, in pursuance of the clearly defective warrant were properly 
admitted by the trial judge, according to the appellate court. 
430[1982] IR 1. 
431 Such “extraordinary excusing circumstances” included: the imminent destruction of evidence; the saving 
of a victim’s life from peril and the catch-all clause of the over-all justice of the case, meaning if the evidence 
was to be admitted, what shift in the evidential balance of the trial would occur? 





A distinction can rightly be made between the decisions in O’Brien and Kenny, 
with twenty-five years separating O’Brien from Kenny and from Kenny to JC. In O’Brien, 
there was an obvious patent error on the face of the search warrant.  There was no 
deliberate breach of the person’s constitutional rights in that regard. In Kenny, an 
oversight on the face of the warrant was not present; rather the issue pertained to the 
inquiry made by the impartial Peace Commissioner before issuing the warrant. This is a 
distinction in form between O’Brien and Kenny but not in substance. Essentially, both 
cases are similar however in that an action was supposed to be done but was not.433 Such 
a distinction, as posited by Murphy J in Balfe can only be maintained if one accepts, as a 
starting premise, that the discretion to be applied can remain unaltered or uniform 
between that which was utilised in O’Brien and that used in Kenny. This, it could be 
contended, is not a workable solution which is in the best interests of the administration 
of justice, as it lacks the required certainty coveted as a founding stone in the demarcation 
between constitutional and legal rights.  
Murphy J concluded her analysis of the factual nexus in Balfe by placing the 
failure to inquire into the circumstances of the case —for which the search warrant was 
required—amongst the inherent or fundamental defect category as established in Kenny, 
rather than house the defect within the ‘patent type’ defect category of O’Brien. By doing 
so, the public is asked to perform a certain level of mental gymnastics. On the one hand, 
an error which affects the very location of the purported search is deemed redeemable, 
but the fact that the circumstances of the purported search were not inquired into renders 
such an action unconstitutional. This is a distinction which is not easily reconcilable if 
one’s objective is to cater for the accepted distinction between legal and constitutional 
rights which require protection and/or vindication. 
In Byrne v Grey, an application was heard by the High Court by way of judicial 
review which sought an order of certiorari quashing the issue of search warrants under 
the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 (‘the 1977 Act’) (as amended).434 The applicant in Byrne 
challenged the decision-making process by which a District Court judge or a Peace 
Commissioner could issue a search warrant pursuant to s 26 of the 1977 Act.435 Hamilton 
 
433 For instance, in O’Brien getting the correct address and writing it down on the document was not done. 
Likewise, in Kenny, an impartial investigation by the Peace Commissioner was not done.  
434[1988] IR 31 (HC). 
435 The applicant based his application upon the following three grounds: a. it was a judicial function reserved 
to the judiciary by Article 34 and could not be pursued by a Peace Commissioner, b. the respondent Peace 





P refused to grant the sought relief. The President of the High Court held that the 
statutory powers which encroached upon a citizen’s liberty and their right to the 
inviolability of their dwelling should be construed in the manner which is least impactful 
upon individual rights. It was noticeable that Hamilton P did not find that such statutory 
powers must be construed in the least restrictive manner, but satisfied himself with the 
less obligatory formula of “should be construed”.436 In order to have complied with s 26 
of the 1977 Act, the issuing authority was required to possess some information which 
would enable that entity to be satisfied that there were reasonable grounds for suspecting 
that an offence was being carried out.437 The significance that can be gleaned from the 
decision in Byrne is double-limbed: a. that an offence was required to be in train, ie. one 
which has not yet been completed, and b. that an objective test is to be employed when 
determining whether a legitimate suspicion was in fact established. Hamilton P also 
endorsed the practice of a Peace Commissioner issuing a search warrant when approached 
by a Garda member as being constitutionally valid.438 The extensive powers bestowed 
upon the Gardaí under s 26 of the 1977 Act meant that any suspected person could be 
held in detention whilst the search of the premises was being conducted.439 How such a 
system can be evolved whilst still protecting the integrity of the criminal trial is an 
important question which was not adequately dealt with in Byrne v Grey. 
Kenny was applied by the Court of Criminal Appeal in People (DPP) v Lynch.440 
In Lynch, the appellant was convicted of three counts on the indictment for offences 
contrary to the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001.441 The Court of 
Criminal Appeal (Fennelly, Murphy and De Valera JJ.) allowed the appeal. The court 
held that the absolute exclusionary rule principle applied if the constitutional rights of the 
 
the constitutional right of the inviolability of the dwelling guaranteed by Article 40, section 5 of the 
Constitution. 
436[1988] IR 31 (HC). 
437 There is a temporal significance to when an offence is being committed and when it has already been 
committed which serves to limit the provision’s applicability. 
438 In Grey, the searching Gardaí found an amount of heroin and other drug related implements at the premises 
but they had initially sought to enter in relation to cannabis. Nothing particularly significant turns on this fact; 
rather it is highlighted as a further indication of the intricacies involved in the balancing of rights.  
439 These are all acts which are conducted with the presumption of innocence still celebrated as being the 
“golden thread” of the common law system.  
440[2010] 1 IR 543 (CCA). 
441 The appellant was a ‘squatter’ onto premises which was searched, on foot of a warrant, by Garda members. 
The trial judge held that the search warrant had been invalidly issued. However, because the appellant was 
not legally entitled to be in that building, he could not rely upon the protection afforded under Article 40, 
section 5 of the Constitution. Therefore, the evidence was illegally obtained rather than being 
unconstitutionally obtained and, as such, the trial judge exercised his discretion in admitting the questioned 
evidence. The basis of the appeal spoke to whether it could be correctly stated that the flat in which the 





accused were infringed by the search being carried out, even though it was unintentional, 
on the basis of an invalid warrant.442  
The decision in Lynch seemed restricted by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Kenny. In People (DPP) v Mallon, the Court of Criminal Appeal (differently constituted) 
did not follow the decision in Kenny.443 In Mallon the accused applied to have the charges 
levelled against him dismissed.444 The CCA applied the decision reached in O’Brien. 
However, the Court did distinguish their decision from Kenny.445 
The Chief Superintendant is required to be objective and a non-participant in the 
investigation, which is stipulated in the Supreme Court’s decision in Damache v DPP.446 
 
442 The decision means that if the search was deliberate and conscious, the exclusionary rule applied even 
though the breach of the person’s constitutional rights was not deliberate and unconscious. The ex tempore 
judgment of Fennelly J in Lynch bears some consideration, as it establishes that when an actor acts in a certain 
manner, an entirely different status of action can be attributed to those actions which is a status not envisaged 
by the actor at the time of so acting. All that was required was that the actor knew what it was they were 
doing at that time. Further, the court iterated that the constitutional strand of the exclusionary rule was 
absolute, when, if one reviews the locus classicus of O’Brien, it may be argued that the principle espoused in 
O’Brien was never meant to be viewed as being absolute. Evidence was adduced that the issued warrant failed 
to name any particular member of An Garda Síochána, and as such, did not comply with s 48 (3) of the 
Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001. Most observers would deem this to be a patent defect 
which would fall into the O’Brien category as opposed to the ‘inherent defect’ category endorsed in Kenny 
and categorised as such my Murphy J in Balfe. Such a defect rendered the warrant prima facie invalid. 
However, the evidence could remain admissible/untainted depending upon the discretion afforded to the trial 
judge when they are faced with the use of illegally obtained evidence. This argument was attached in Lynch 
to the fact that, as a squatter, the appellant possessed no constitutional right to the dwelling under Article 40.5 
and could be admitted or not by the discretion of the trial judge. It was also found that both sides had agreed 
that if the evidence was obtained in conscious and deliberate breach of the appellant’s constitutional rights; 
that the strict exclusionary rules would apply, which would clearly be to the benefit of the accused/appellant. 
Fennelly J felt bound to follow the decision reached by the Supreme Court in Kenny. As a result, it was held 
in Lynch that the search, being both deliberate and conscious, was sufficient to trigger the exclusionary rule, 
regardless of the intention(s) of the actors in breaching the constitutional rights of the person concerned. 
443[2011] 2 IR 544. Mallon was similar to Byrne v Grey which also had to interpret s 26 of the Misuse of 
Drugs Act 1977. The court in Mallon also held that, in scrutinising a warrant, the court could not adopt a 
deliberate, unreasonable and unreasoning ignorance, which was oblivious to the document’s overall 
intentions.   
444 Pursuant to s. 4E of the Criminal Justice Act 1999, as the warrant was addressed to an invalid address (ie.  
which did not exist). The accused claimed that by dent of the incorrect address being used on the search 
warrant, such an error constituted a deliberate and conscious breach of the constitutional rights under which 
the accused was entitled to seek protection, in particular Article 40.5 of the Constitution. Hunt J in the Circuit 
Court found for the accused and dismissed the charges. On appeal by the prosecution, it was held by the CCA 
(O’Donnell, Gilligan and O’Keefe JJ.) that a mere error would not necessarily invalidate a warrant, especially 
when one considers that the error amounted to form, rather than to substance. A typographical error in a 
warrant was a simple mistake and that there was nothing misleading, unclear, or unintelligible on the face of 
the said warrant; such a warrant could not be deemed to be invalid. 
445See also Simple Imports v Revenue Commissioners [2000] 2 IR 243. 
446[2012] 2 IR 266, Damache centred round the statutory interpretation of s 29 (1) of the Offences against the 
State Act, 1939, as inserted by s 5 of the Criminal Law Act 1976. The facts in the High Court hearing of 
Damache are included by way of context. Damache sought, by way of judicial review, a declaration that s 29 
(1) was repugnant to the Constitution as it permitted a search warrant to be issued against the appellant’s 
home with such warrant not being obtained from an independent source, ie.  a participating Chief 
Superintendent. Damache was unsuccessful with his constitutional challenge before the High Court. The 
decision of the High Court centred upon the proportionality of the provision within the context of the 





In DPP v Birney & Ors,447 the court there held that s. 29 (1) of the Offences against the 
State Act 1939 could be construed as meaning that the issuing Garda had to be 
independent of the investigation for which the search warrant was sought. The court’s 
decision in Birney can be criticised on theoretical grounds. A fragmentary trial process 
was affirmed by the court. By so doing an issue of utmost priority to the trial (evidence 
admissibility) was based on factors which were wholly removed from the fairness of that 
trial.448 Furthermore, by relying on factors such as time necessity and the “strict scrutiny 
test” when issuing search warrants, the court made a decision on the admissibility of 
evidence without, in effect, evaluating the quality of the evidence, its relevance or indeed 
 
(1) was sufficiently proportional and was not contrary to the constitutional rights argued by the appellant. 
Kearns P dealt with the judicial review query on behalf of the applicant with regard to the technical 
appendages inherent in such an application, concluding that the applicant had not embarked upon the review 
with the necessary “promptitude”. Damache appealed to the Supreme Court where the issue was distilled to 
the constitutional viability of s 29 (1) of the 1939 Act. Holding that the provision was indeed repugnant to 
the Constitution, Denham CJ first affirmed the well-established premise in law that the issuing authority 
ought to be independent, Denham CJ in Damache expertly distilled the appellant’s core argument. The 
presumption of constitutionality to s 29 (1) was an issue that was only cursorily analysed by the court. The 
‘double construction’ rule was also applied to the controversial statutory provision, which means that when 
one or more constructions of s 29 (1) are open to the court, one of which is a constitutional premise and the 
other non-constitutional; it is presumed that the Oireachtas intended the constitutional construction. The Chief 
Justice continued by analysing the proportionality of the process maintained through s 29 (1), however earlier 
in her judgment there was an allusion to an already independent overview of the issuing of a search warrant 
by a District Judge, which could, in all likelihood, be circumvented if urgency required it. The Supreme Court 
in Damache satisfied itself to ground such a review of the legislative provision on classic constitutional law 
principles, proportionality and rationality of the interference of an individual’s rights. By adopting the 
proportionality test as the premise of finding the provision unconstitutional, the court effectively decided 
upon the admission of evidence on grounds which are not readily terminable in the law of evidence. This is 
not mentioned by way of criticism; rather it is highlighted as being the necessary forum of consideration 
which is required when assessing the admission of evidence, once removed from the adversarial limitations 
of the trial process. 
447DPP v Birney & Ors [2007] 1 IR 337. The court in Birney, heard how four suspects were arrested for 
potential offences that had been committed contrary to s. 15 of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud 
Offences) Act 2001. The member in charge at the relevant Garda station decided that the four suspects ought 
to be arrested and detained under s 4 of the Criminal Law Act 1997. Each of the four suspects was then 
released from their s 4 detention and rearrested under s 30 of the Offences against the State Act 1939. Each 
accused was subsequently convicted by the SCC for the offence of membership of an illegal organisation 
pursuant to s 21 of the 1939 Act. The Court of Criminal Appeal (Hardiman J, Gilligan and Dunne JJ) in 
dismissing the applicants’ leave application held, inter alia, that s 29 of the 1939 Act did not prevent a 
Superintendent—who was leading the investigation—from issuing a search warrant in the course of an 
investigation in which he was involved. Hardiman J accepted the trial court’s decision on this matter and 
adopted its core reasoning. In so holding, the SCC in Birney distinguished the Supreme Court decision in 
People (DPP) v Owens. Hardiman J in Birney accepted the premise of the court in Owens and stated that that 
decision was not an authority “for the proposition that a search warrant issued pursuant to the provisions of s 
29 of the Act of 1939 must be issued by a Superintendent independent of the investigation in respect of which 
the search warrant is required.” 
448 In deciding against the applicant, Kearns P relied upon the ‘necessity of time’ argument which allows the 
Gardaí to act executively when a judicial function arises. This is settled law in Ireland and was held by the 
High Court in Ryan v O’Callaghan (Unreported, High Court, 22nd July, 1987, Barr J.) and was affirmed as 






reliability.449 Thus, the fragmentary model of evidence admissibility was applied, almost 
inadvertently.450 The admissibility of evidence must be considered in the whole rather 
than on any one particular point in order to maintain the trial’s integrity. The trial judge in 
People (DPP) v Owens accepted that there was insufficient evidence to prove the validity 
of the search warrant and ruled that the search and subsequent arrest and detention were 
unlawful acts.451 The DPP stated a case to the Supreme Court.452 Barrington J in Owens 
wrote:  
The peace commissioner like the Chief Superintendent is a public officer but he is not a 
court of record. A search warrant is also a document which may affect constitutional 
rights. It does not speak for itself in a criminal trial.453 
Judicial oversight of a potentially invasive action on foot of a warrant was required. 
 
c. Key development in Irish evidence law  
 
The case of People (DPP) v JC involved six counts on the indictment emanating from 
three incidents of robbery with an imitation firearm. Counsel for the prosecution outlined 
how the local Gardaí in Waterford applied to the appropriate Chief Superintendant 
pursuant to s 29 of the Offences against the State Act 1939 (‘the 1939 Act’). Having 
successfully obtained the search warrant, the Gardaí found nothing of evidential value at 
the accused’s dwelling. The accused was arrested. During this interviewing phase the 
accused admitted fully to the armed robbery at a ‘Supermacs’ out-let. It was the 
 
449 The strict scrutiny test was outlined by Keane J in Simple Imports v Revenue Commissioners [2000] 2 IR 
243 where it was stated: “These are powers which the police and other authorities must enjoy in defined 
circumstances for the protection of society, but since they authorise the forcible invasion of a person’s 
property the courts must always be concerned to ensure that the conditions imposed by the legislature before 
such powers can be validly exercised are strictly met.” 
450 In DPP v Sweeney, Morris J, in the High Court, held, inter alia, that an issuing Garda member 
(superintendent rank usually) did not have to rely upon direct evidence to form their own opinion in deciding 
whether to refuse or grant a search warrant. They could rely on all the relevant facts including evidence from 
informers. In so holding, the High Court overturned (on a case stated) District Judge Brennan’s determination 
that the warrant was invalidly granted. Judge Brennan outlined the reasons which compelled that court to 
hold the warrant to be invalid. It is also noticeable that the District Court’s original decision is more akin to 
a traditional unitary model of evidence admissibility. For instance, it was both logical and legally informative 
to suggest that evidence proffered on an ancillary issue which could prove to be prejudicial to the defendant 
cannot be annexed from the substantive hearing by basing such segregation upon admissibility theories. 
451 The trial judge had no other option but to direct the empanelled jury to return a verdict of not guilty on the 
charges proffered on the indictment.  
452 In Barrington J’s judgment in Owens, reference was paid to People (DPP) v Byrne [1987] IR 363 where 
the Chief Superintendent who extended the period of detention was deceased by the time the trial came on 
for hearing. The trial judge in Byrne, in similar circumstances to Owens, directed the jury to return a verdict 
of not guilty.  





admissibility of these admissions which was the cause of dispute. As counsel for the 
accused detailed, those three interviews were conducted during an extended period of 
detention which the same Chief Superintendant in Waterford had granted pursuant to s 30 
of the 1939 Act.454  
 
d. The judgment of O’Donnell J in JC 
O’Donnell J’s judgment is at its best when reviewing the state of the law post-
O’Brien up to People (DPP) v Kenny.455 O’Donnell J focuses upon the second of the 
issues raised in the grounds of appeal, namely the Irish exclusionary rule.456 O’Donnell 
J’s is emphasised here as his judgment outlines the rebalance that needed to be executed 
if the modification of the exclusionary rule in Ireland was to take place.457 The judgment 
of Hardiman J is opposed to the essential premise taken by O’Donnell J. The 
unitary/fragmentary models of the trial process are, arguably, encapsulated best within 
these two judgments of the Supreme Court.458 This focus upon the exclusionary rule was 
clearly as a result of the DPP bringing an appeal under s 23 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
2010 to review the trial judge’s decision to exclude the evidence at trial. The question that 
was then posed to the Supreme Court was whether Kenny was decided correctly at all, 
and, if not, what the correct formulation of the exclusionary rule should be?459 
 In paragraph three of the judgment, O’Donnell J provides a general synopsis of 
the ‘traditional’ rules of evidence. Exclusion of evidence is said to be a “function of the 
law of evidence”. Such exclusion was said to be based upon practitioner’s experience as 
to what evidence could be deemed to be reliable and could be allowed go to the jury. 
Such ‘experience’ would allow for a “dispassionate analysis” of the material to be put to 
 
454 That of course is significant when one highlights the fact that the Chief Superintendant in this case 
appeared to also be participating in the investigation of the crime.  
455[1990] 2 IR 110. 
456 The other ground of appeal proffered concerned the scope of appeals which can be brought to the Supreme 
Court by the DPP under s 23 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2010.  
457 O’Donnell J outlined throughout this judgment in JC that probative evidence being excluded was done so 
not without consequences, which seen in the context of the exclusionary rule as interpreted in Kenny meant 
that certain prosecutions would not be able to continue.  
458 Hardiman J’s stance must be viewed with the experiences of the criminal justice system in tis jurisdiction 
over the last 50 years, where there have been instances of the force publique exercising their undoubted 
powers to detriment of the greater good in society. Hardiman J was of the opinion that any recalibration would 
be a significant retrograde step in the vindication of the constitutional rights of the accused and promotion of 
best practice in human rights policing. See People (DPP) v Shortt [2002] 2 IR 696 (CCA); Shortt v An Garda 
Síochána [2007] 4 IR 587 (SC), along with the revelation which emerged most recently from the Sergeant 
Maurice McCabe Commission of Inquiry Report.  
459 An early stumbling block was the issue as to whether the exclusionary rule could be raised properly under 
the parameters of s 23 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2010. The majority of the court held that s 23 enabled 





the arbiters in reaching a determination of the matter at trial. From that exposition of the 
terrain, O’Donnell J states that in the twentieth century courts across the common law 
sphere had to determine evidence admissibility with due regard to how the evidence was 
obtained.460 In an expositive sentence, which may well serve to explain the 
fragmentary/unitary divide, O’Donnell J stated: 
This shift also involves a subtle change of focus away from an inquiry as to what it is 
alleged the accused did or did not do, to how the authorities behaved in investigating the 
alleged offence.461 
This shift, to utilise the Shrock and Welsh terminology, sees the court assessing a case 
from a fragmentary stand-point to a unitary stance. In paragraph 5, O’Donnell J highlights 
that evidence which is sought to be adduced from an arrest or detention is interchangeable 
with evidence derived from a search of certain premises on foot of a search warrant and 
limits his judgment to the area of search warrants and the evidence adduced on foot of 
such a document. O’Donnell J sees no distinction between these areas of evidence 
retrieval.462 It is of interest that at paragraph 6 of the judgment, the judge states that: 
…in two recent decisions which have come before this Court, one of the incidental 
features has been that evidence was excluded consequent under the decision in Damache, 
applying the decision in Kenny and without that issue being subject of any argument or 
appeal…I consider that it is probable that evidence is routinely excluded under Kenny in 
this way without becoming the subject of reported decisions.463 
O’Donnell J contextualised the importance of the exclusionary rule in para. 7, by stating 
that: 
[W]hen one considers that almost all decisions of exclusion of evidence occur at trial 
level, and that until relatively recently it was not possible to appeal from an order 
excluding evidence, then it seems probable that the impact of the Kenny decision at trial 
level has been considerable.464 
 
460 Traditionally, as was seen in Kuruma v The Queen per Lord Goddard relevancy was key to the 
admissibility of evidence rather than how it was actually obtained. Essentially if it was relevant and probative, 
such evidence would be allowed in.  
461People (DPP) v JC [2015] IESC 31, O’Donnell J, para. 3. 
462Ibid, para. 5. 
463Director of Public Prosecutions v Connolly [2014] IESC 28; Byrne and Byrne v Director of Public 
Prosecutions. 
464 It is uncertain at what O’Donnell J understood ‘trial level’ to mean as certainly issues of evidence 
admissibility appear in the District Court, along with trials upon indictment in the Circuit Criminal Court and 





O’Donnell J defended his decision to reassess the exclusionary review despite the fact 
that there is an “absence of a proper evidence based assessment” of the rule in Kenny:465 
One of the distinctions between a legislature making laws, and a court making decisions, 
is that the legislature specifically makes laws of general application for a wide range of 
circumstances, whereas a court makes a decision in an individual case, albeit which on 
occasions will have wider implications for similar cases… The issue for this [C]ourt is 
after all not whether the exclusionary rule in Kenny is inconvenient at a practical level, 
but rather whether as a matter of constitutional law it is right.466 
The court, in its defence of such a reassessment, felt that is was most prudent to ground 
any recalibration of the exclusionary rule within the realms of the constitutional theory of 
rights.467 MacMenamin J also reiterated that the essential focus of the Court should not be 
misled in the premise that unconstitutionally obtained evidence presents a rather basic 
choice between the accused’s protection and the deterrence of bad police practice, when 
stating:  
“…the majority of this court does not reject these considerations as being inconsistent 
with a recalibration, but rather seeks to identify a harmonious process, giving due 
recognition to the rights of protection, the duty of deterrence, and the consideration of 
public policy, and the rights of all citizens.”468 
The central problem with the O’Brien rule was easily identified by O’Donnell J as 
being the scope of the rule’s applicability, with only evidence obtained deliberately, 
consciously, intentionally and in knowing breach of a constitutional right being 
excluded.469 There was also possibly an international influence as to why the Supreme 
Court considered a departure from the strict exclusionary rule devised in O’Brien.470 The 
United States Supreme Court, for instance, in both Weeks and Mapps decided that a 
 
465People (DPP) v JC [2015] IESC 31, para. 8.  
466Ibid. 
467 At para. 33 of O’Donnell J’s judgment, clear justification as to why the court ought to depart from Kenny 
was explained more thoroughly: “First, only deliberate and conscious breaches of constitutional rights could 
lead to exclusion of evidence. But the Constitution is a guarantee of rights against invasion and that guarantee 
is not limited to intentional breaches…Second, even if some culpability is required it is required that capturing 
only deliberate breaches is [sic] insufficient. If there was a reckless breach of a constitutional right, would it 
still be permissible to admit the evidence? Third, the exception for extraordinary excusing circumstances is 
also somewhat problematic. It is not clear what constitutional justification there is for this.” 
468 People (DPP) v JC [2015] IESC 31; [2017] 1 IR 417, 784.  
469People (DPP) v JC [2015] IESC 31, para. 35. 
470 A direct link can actually be drawn between the United States authorities and the judgment of Kingsmill 
Moore J in O’Brien itself at that time. The majority decision in Kenny is of particular import, with its leading 
judgment delivered by Finlay CJ, who acknowledged that the decision in Leon of the United States Supreme 
Court focused upon the issue of deterrence rather than any particular protection mechanism of a perceived 
constitutional right. Finlay CJ believed that O’Brien possessed similar sentiments to those expressed in Leon 





‘good-faith’ exception was warranted in order to taper the harsher effects of strict 
exclusion.471 What was striking in the judgment of White J in United States v Leon was 
the fact that the court found that the exclusionary rule was a common law rule of evidence 
which was initially devised in order to provide an extra buffer of protection to the Fourth 
Amendment rights under the United States Constitution.472 O’Donnell J in JC described 
the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court’s justification for re-calibrating the 
exclusionary rule: 
The decision on admission or exclusion of the evidence involved a balancing test. The 
absolute rule of exclusion exacted too high a price. The unbending application of the rule 
to enforce governmental rectitude would, the Court considered, impede unacceptably the 
truth finding function of the Court and an indiscriminate application of the rule might 
generate disrespect for the law and the administration of justice.473 
This justification, as explained by O’Donnell J is of interest for many reasons. 
Principally, it is highly illuminating when seen within the context of the “truth” finding 
function which was alluded to by the U.S. Supreme Court in Leon.474 By having “truth”, 
which is a concept of variable definition and import, as the main aim, rights, legal or 
constitutional, necessarily require recalibration.475  
Applying the analysis of O’Brien exclusively to the concept of search and seizure, 
O’Donnell J found that there were conceptual issues with the protection of a dwelling 
afforded by the Irish Constitution under Article 40.5. The protection afforded was found 
to be contingent on the “existence or otherwise” of a law, which was required to be in 
place before the protection could be triggered.476 The significance of O’Donnell J’s 
 
471Weeks v United States 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Mapp v Ohio 367 U.S. 643 (1961); furthermore, in United 
States v Leon, the Supreme Court held that a good-faith exception was required to be used so that evidence 
which was reasonably obtained on foot of a search warrant could be admitted at trial. The caveat entered was 
that the search warrant was issued by a “detached and neutral magistrate”. This issue, in Irish law at least, 
was not dealt with again for some time after Kenny, when the Supreme Court struck down s. 29(1) of the 
Offences against the State Act 1939 in Damache v Director of Public Prosecutions, which was subsequently 
the cause of concern in the JC case at trial at Waterford Circuit Court. 
472The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. The exclusionary rule was not a constitutionally protected mechanism, which meant that it could not 
be retained as an independent constitutional right under the United States Constitution. Rather, the 
exclusionary rule in the U.S. could be re-shaped due to this malleability. 
473People (DPP) v JC [2015] IESC 31, para. 44. (O’Donnell J) 
474 If that was so, the protection afforded to the accused by the rules of evidence would not necessarily feature 
as prominently if the truth was required to be discovered as a priority. 
475 Kenny was appealed to the Supreme Court on a point of law of exceptional public importance, at which 
point the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Criminal Appeal’s decision by a 3:2 split.   





analysis is to render the distinction made between constitutional breaches, as opposed to 
legal breaches to be largely nugatory. If the O’Brien rule was applied strictly, ie. with 
only deliberate and conscious constitutional breaches in evidence retrieval being 
excluded, the protection afforded could be consistently sustained.477 However, if this 
extreme position was recalibrated, it could lead to “trivial breaches of regulatory matters 
becoming, without more, breaches of the Constitution, and giving rise to presumptive, if 
not indeed automatic, exclusion of evidence...”478 
Due to the fact that Article 40.5° of Bunreacht na hÉireann was contingent upon 
the ancillary legal rights to provide protection, it was felt, that such a stasis was not 
definite as the legislature could easily alter the “boundaries of what is permissible.”479 
The protection which is ultimately afforded to the dweller is unsatisfactory due to it being 
dependent upon judicial discretion with regard to evidence being obtained illegally.480   
The analysis provided by Finlay CJ with regard to the exclusionary rule is notable: 
To exclude only evidence obtained by a person who knows or ought reasonably to know 
that he is invading a constitutional right is to impose a negative deterrent…To apply, on 
the other hand, the absolute protection rule of exclusion whilst providing also that 
negative deterrent, incorporates as well a positive encouragement to those in authority 
over the crime prevention and detection services of the State to consider in detail the 
personal rights of the citizens as set out in the Constitution, and the effect of their powers 
of arrest, detention, search and questioning in relation to such rights…It seems to me to 
be an inescapable conclusion that a principle of exclusion which contains both negative 
 
477 The effects of the rule in O’Brien were felt though in other areas central to the development of evidence 
law in Ireland. In cases such as People (DPP) v Madden (which involved a suspect being detained without 
charge) or in People (DPP) v Healy (which saw a denial of access to legal advice to a suspect in a Garda 
station) highly relevant evidence was excluded. These cases demonstrated how the Irish courts treated the 
protection of rights in a progressive manner by focusing upon the intention of the investigating Gardaí. This 
meant that if the investigating Gardaí were not aware of the provision, under which they were not obliged to 
continue the detention, it could be argued that such a breach was not ‘deliberate and conscious’. O’Donnell J 
in JC suggests how the initial exclusionary rule could have been sustained if it was altered somewhat to 
include a calibration of the seriousness of the breach, or to include recklessness as to the breach as a vital 
component. Therefore, by modifying the O’Brien exclusionary rule, ie. ‘deliberate and conscious breach’ of 
a constitutional right, so that the “seriousness” and “recklessness” as to the breach would become more crucial 
in the assessment of that evidence’s admissibility, the test was effectively saddled with discretion and 
uncertainty. 
478People (DPP) v JC [2015] IESC 31, para. 36. 
479Ibid, para. 37. 
480 Finlay CJ in Kenny stated that the judgment of Kingsmill Moore J in O’Brien was more concerned with 
illegally obtained evidence rather than unconstitutionally obtained evidence. Finlay CJ opined that “The 
expression of opinion [by Kingsmill Moore J] which formed the majority view of the Court in the People 
(Attorney General) v O’Brien… clearly leaves unresolved in relation to the admissibility of unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence the choice raised by the arguments in this case between the deterrent and absolute 





and positive force is likely to protect constitutional rights in more instances than is a 
principle with negative consequences only.481 
The following is what O’Donnell J in JC stated as being his opinion on the issue: 
I am satisfied that the correct principle is that evidence obtained by invasion of the 
constitutional personal rights of a citizen must be excluded unless a court is satisfied that 
either the act constituting the breach of constitutional rights was committed 
unintentionally or accidentally, or is satisfied that there are extraordinary excusing 
circumstances which justify the admission of the evidence in its (court’s) discretion.482 
The thrust of the argument in the above quotations is that the protection of rights cannot 
be overly diluted, as to do so, would, in effect, serve to act counter-productively in the 
greater There is a clear balance to be struck here. On the one hand, evidence is the 
lifeblood of any criminal trial. On the other hand, the admittance of evidence reflects 
directly upon the standard of Garda investigations. If the investigation is haphazard, the 
onus is on the trial judge not to admit evidence which exacerbates the shoddy police-
work. The trial judge, in effect, acts as the filter in order to uphold the constitutional 
integrity of the trial process. The thesis argues that the trial judge is not only upholding 
the rights of the accused, but, in effect, is upholding the rights and duties of all parties 
involved in the process. Hardiman J suggests, in his powerful dissenting judgment in JC, 
that the majority’s decision could clear the path for more ambiguous rights protection. 
Such a nuanced approach is required when assessing Hardiman J’s core argument, 
however it cannot be the case, that the learned judge could agree that the treatment of the 
exclusionary rule by the Irish courts has been exemplary in its consistency and acuity. 
This, simply, has not been the reality. Clarke J’s judgment attempted to explain the 
limited use of the exclusionary rule ‘test’ as being only applicable when there is a piece of 
evidence present which can effectively turn the case and that could lead to the conviction 
of an accused.483 This analysis leads to the timely debate on whether a conviction based 
upon unconstitutionally obtained evidence could ever really be condoned. Hardiman J 
clearly believed that nothing of this sort could be accommodated within the Irish criminal 
justice system and found this concept to be abhorrent. McKechnie J (also dissenting) 
stated that: 
“By entertaining the reception of evidence obtained thereby, they are in effect giving 
credence to such practices; for they cannot with integrity, disassociate themselves from 
 
481Finlay CJ in Kenny at pgs.133-34. 
482People (DPP) v JC [2015] IESC 31, para 47 of O’Donnell J’s judgment. 





the preceding activities of the gardaí in obtaining evidence, or from the D.P.P. in deciding 
to prosecute on foot of it. What message does that deliver: what respect for the 
administration of justice does that command? Even if on occasion, in isolated cases, 
evidence, reliable and probative, is lost, the same is society’s price for the rule; which in 
any event is infinitely less harmful than the process of its destruction, which I fear has 
commenced.”484 
 
e. The new exclusionary rule test 
Clarke J set out the new exclusionary test in Irish law at para. 7.2. of his judgment.485 It is 
a test that is solely in relation to the systems employed by the authorities whose task it is 
to gather and cultivate evidence for a criminal prosecution. The test is an interesting mix 
of an attempt to open up the previously mandatory inadmissible unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence rule with the force of change which the majority of this Supreme Court 
panel were adamant was required. The next chapter will examine if the test extolled in JC 




484 People (DPP) v JC [2017] 1 IR 417, 733.  
485 The test reads: “(i) The onus rests on the prosecution to establish the admissibility of all evidence. The test 
which follows is concerned with objections to the admissibility of evidence where the objection relates solely 
to the circumstances in which the evidence was gathered and does not concern the integrity or probative value 
of the evidence concerned. (ii) Where objection is taken to the admissibility of evidence on the grounds that 
it was taken in circumstances of unconstitutionality, the onus remains on the prosecution to establish either:- 
(a) that the evidence was not gathered in circumstances of unconstitutionality; or (b) that, if it was, it remains 
appropriate for the Court to nonetheless admit the evidence. 
The onus in seeking to justify the admission of evidence taken in unconstitutional circumstances places on 
the prosecution an obligation to explain the basis on which it is said that the evidence should, nonetheless, be 
admitted and also to establish any facts necessary to justify such a basis. (iii) Any facts relied on by the 
prosecution to establish any of the matters referred to at (ii) must be established beyond reasonable doubt. 
(iv) Where evidence is taken in deliberate and conscious violation of constitutional rights then the evidence 
should be excluded save in those exceptional circumstances considered in the existing jurisprudence. In this 
context deliberate and conscious refers to knowledge of the unconstitutionality of the taking of the relevant 
evidence rather than applying to the acts concerned. The assessment as to whether evidence was taken in 
deliberate and conscious violation of constitutional rights requires an analysis of the conduct or state of mind 
not only of the individual who actually gathered the evidence concerned but also any other senior official or 
officials within the investigating or enforcement authority concerned who is involved either in that decision 
or in decisions of that type generally or in putting in place policies concerning evidence gathering of the type 
concerned. (v) Where evidence is taken in circumstances of unconstitutionality but where the prosecution 
establishes that same was not conscious and deliberate in the sense previously appearing, then a presumption 
against the admission of the relevant evidence arises. Such evidence should be admitted where the prosecution 
establishes that the evidence was obtained in circumstances where any breach of rights was due to 
inadvertence or derives from subsequent legal developments. (vi) Evidence which is obtained or gathered in 
circumstances where same could not have been constitutionally obtained or gathered should not be admitted 






Chapter 6: Evidence law reform evaluated 
 
The discretion of the judge is the first engine of tyranny.  
The laws of a free people should foresee and determine every question  
that may probably arise in the exercise of power and the transactions of industry. 
- Edward Gibbon 
in the History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. 5, Chapter XLV, pg. 394. 
 
Introduction 
The above quotation from Gibbon is one of the more famous ‘sound-bites’ by polemical 
authors describing the inefficiencies and idiosyncrasies of the common law system. This 
chapter seeks to demonstrate that the newly recalibrated exclusionary law in Ireland has 
not provoked a profound realignment of the criminal trial process “tyranny”.486 This 
chapter, therefore, has two main functions. It first details the impact upon the 
admissibility of evidence felt by the decision of the Supreme Court in People (DPP) v JC, 
by analysing criminal trials on indictment in the Circuit Criminal Court, the Central 
Criminal Court and the SCC.487 This thesis has already examined evidence admissibility 
rulings pre-JC. Clarke J’s formulation of the ‘new’ Irish exclusionary rule in a selection 
of observed trials post-JC will be assessed with regard to judicial discretion used in 
admitting or excluding evidence.488 This chapter also argues that Clarke J’s considered 
formula should be placed upon a statutory footing and, in so doing, provides the New 
Zealand Evidence Act 2006 as a potential guide to Irish legislators.489 The chapter begins 
 
486 Please see earlier chapters which explain the theory of pre-trial evidence gathering and the judicial 
discretion shown in this realm and the trial itself, which is more commonly viewed as the trial judge’s more 
proper sphere of influence.  
487 The evidence law of Nigeria has also altered in recent years to a more accessible, statutory based system 
of evidence law which does not reduce judicial discretion. The Nigerian Law Reform Commission stated that 
new statutory provisions should be included in the Nigerian Evidence Act which would make illegally 
obtained evidence generally admissible, with unconstitutionally obtained evidence generally inadmissible at 
trial. How one breach could necessarily be exclusive of the other is not satisfactorily explained.  
488 The structure of the rulings is so dependent upon the presiding judge, which is a finding of the pre-JC 
field-work, that a uniform structure would be of great benefit to all stakeholders. Resistance from the judiciary 
would clearly be found, as it would require more work and greater analysis from trial judges. A more 
structured process of giving rulings would also assist the appellate courts, when they come to review a trial 
judge’s Ruling. For further analysis of the decision reached in JC, See Yvonne Daly, ‘Overruling the 
Protectionist Exclusionary Rule: DPP v JC’ (2015) 19(4) International Journal of Evidence and Proof 270; 
Clare Leon and Tony Ward, ‘The Irish Exclusionary Rule After DPP v JC’ (2015) 35(4) Legal Studies 590; 
Ní Choileáin and Anna Bazarchina, ‘Admissibility of Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence after DPP v JC’ 
(2015) 20(4) Bar Review 83; Dermot PJ Walsh, Walsh on Criminal Procedure (2nd edn, Thomson Round 
Hall, 2016) 784; Nial Fennelly, ‘The Judicial Legacy of Mr Justice Adrian Hardiman’ (2017) 58 Irish Jurist 
81; Aisling O’Connell, ‘Case Comment: DPP v JC’ (2017) Irish Judicial Studies Journal 66; Yvonne Daly, 
‘”A Revolution in Principle”’? The Impact of the New Exclusionary Rule’ (2018) 2 Criminal Law and 
Practice Review 1; Liz Heffernan, Evidence in Criminal Trials (2nd edn, Bloomsbury 2020) chapter 12. 
489 See also the process of statutory development in the area of evidence law in Nigeria in Note, ‘Reforming 





with an assessment of where Irish evidence law rests post-JC and argues that little 
material difference has been felt by the trial courts, in their use of discretion.490 In the 
‘Hamilton report’ published in 2020, the main findings from this very meritorious study 
were primarily that more evidence is being admitted at trial, there is an increase in the 
number of guilty pleas, particularly at the Circuit Court level and that the JC test is not 
being implemented to any great extent in the District Courts. The Hamilton report 
comprised a survey and interviews of practitioners and which encapsulated the post-JC 
period 2016 to 2020. This report builds on the present thesis’ period of analysis from 
May, 2015 – May, 2016. Hamilton’s findings are strikingly similar to the findings 
reached in this thesis in that the applicability of the test is rare and trial judge’s will often 
attempt to decide a matter without resorting to the JC test, if possible. The Hamilton 
finding that a greater number of guilty pleas being entered post-JC is interesting. To put 
this slight increase solely down to JC is misplaced as there may be a number of different 
factors which will impact upon the decision to plead guilty. Further research into this 
finding would be greatly merited. In this chapter’s second part, an argument for reform is 
the primary focus.491  The analysis of the post-JC evidence admissibility landscape begins 
in the three primary criminal courts on indictment comprising: the Circuit Criminal Court, 
the Central Criminal Court and the SCC. 
 
a. JC’s impact assessed 
It would be incorrect to promote the idea that the decision in JC, which was epitomised 
by Hardiman J’s impassioned dissenting judgment, as being a uniquely seismic attack on 
the exclusionary rule in Ireland. It was not. The extreme incarnation of the Irish 
exclusionary rule, post-People (DPP) v Kenny, was unusual when compared to other 
 
490 A qualification is of course required here as the twelve-month observation period post-JC is a limited 
sample size from which to make an accurate assessment. Nonetheless, the review of the period May, 2015-
May, 2016 is included not to provide a sweeping generalisation of the state of Irish evidence law. Rather, it 
is a review of those trials which occurred upon indictment in Irish criminal courts during the stated period 
and is included as an important analysis in and of itself. See Claire Hamilton ‘A Revolution in Principle: 
Assessing the impact of the new evidentiary exclusionary rule’ (2020) Irish Council for Civil Liberties.  
491 It is proffered that Irish evidence law is now more difficult than ever for the practitioner, and public, to 
utilise fully. Such a problem could be remedied through legislative consolidation, rather than codification. 
Such an action would serve to provide greater certainty for stakeholders within the criminal justice system. It 
is highly doubtful whether codification discourages discretionary decision-making. Something more 
profound is required in order to begin the reduction in arbitrary decision-making. A shift in culture, for which 
there is little appetite, is needed within Irish criminal justice if codification was to proceed. Codification will 
impact upon judicial discretion, which will not be tolerated by the judiciary as it will negatively impact upon 
the use of discretion which is viewed by trial judges as being a central tool in fulfilling their role. See Ronald 






common law jurisdictions, and which lead to fourteen Senators of Seanad Éireann to 
propose the exclusionary rule’s abolition.492 The Criminal Law (Admissibility of 
Evidence) Bill 2008 sought to abolish the exclusionary rule outright from Irish evidence 
law.493 
The Supreme Court majority’s decision in People (DPP) v JC altered the 
exclusionary rule in Irish law, from an automatic, pro forma exclusionary stance to a 
discretionary exclusionary rule.494 Any modifications to the practice of court procedure, 
especially in the criminal courts, are witnessed through a gradualist process, rather than 
any sudden change to the manner in which criminal trials are conducted.495 The following 
analysis begins with the Circuit Court (Dublin), then moves to analyse the Circuit Court 
in the provincial circuits of Ireland, before detailing the Central Criminal Court’s 
treatment of JC and then, finally, to the SCC’s reaction to JC, with all courts being 




492 For instance, the following jurisdictions all possess less strict variations of the exclusionary rule than the 
post-Kenny Irish version:  In the United Kingdom, In Attorney Generals Reference (No. 3 of 1999) [2001] 2 
AC 91; in Canada, R v Collins [1987] 1 SCR 265; in Australia, Ridgeway v The Queen [1995] AC 197; in 
New Zealand, R v Grayson and Taylor [1997] 1 NZLR 399 and R v Shaheed [2002] 2 NZLR 377 and in the 
United States, United States v Leon 468 U.S. 897 (1984).     
493 One of the more laudable aims, however, of the 2008 Bill was to place the admissibility issue onto a 
statutory footing, which would, presumably bring judicial discretion within the parameters of the legislative 
formula. As the Explanatory Memorandum to the 2008 Bill stated: “The exclusionary rule is a creation of the 
courts and given the undesirable effects of this rule (which automatically excludes evidence which has been 
illegally obtained although in many cases essential to the prosecution of some of the most serious crimes), it 
is appropriate that the rules of evidence in this regard be put on a statutory basis and brought into line with 
that applicable in other common law jurisdictions.” The 2008 Bill’s primary aim was to “…abolish the rule 
of evidence, generally referred to as the Exclusionary Rule, in relation to criminal proceedings and replace it 
with modern statutory provisions taking into account the jurisprudence of the Irish Courts, the Courts of other 
common law jurisdictions, the European Court of Human Rights and current academic commentaries on the 
subject.” The Private Members’ Bill was signed by 14 Senators and sponsored by three, including a former 
Minister for Justice. 
494 [2015] IESC 31. See Conor O’Mahony, ‘Supreme Court Relaxes Exclusionary Rule- Latest Shift in a 
Finely Balanced Debate’ available at http://constitutionproject.ie/?p=496; accessed at 15:30 on 5th May, 2016. 
In People (DPP) v Kenny [1990] 2 IR 110, the Supreme Court imposed a strict, automatic exclusion of 
evidence obtained unconstitutionally pursuant to Article 38.1. of the Irish Constitution, which states that an 
accused person must be tried “in due course of law.” Lynch J in his dissenting judgment at pg. 142 stated that 
there may be adequate, excusing circumstances which would effectively allow for a degree of judicial 
discretion in admitting such contested evidence. Lynch J in Kenny stated that evidence obtained in not entirely 
ideal circumstances should only be excluded if there is an “element of blame or culpability or unfairness 
(including any such element to be inferred by the reasonable application of the doctrine ignorantia juris haud 
excusat)”. 
495 It would also be incorrect to suggest, therefore, that the sample size which this study includes, ie. trials 
between May, 2015 and May, 2016 (approximately twelve months since the Supreme Court delivered their 
majority decisions in April, 2015.) is, in any way, comprehensive. The writer qualifies this analysis on the 
basis that it is a rather small, limited sample size, where any statements as to the alterations in the law must 





b. The Dublin Circuit Criminal Court post-JC 
 
The first month included in this court’s analysis saw four trials being heard in the Dublin 
Circuit Criminal Court.496 Four more substantial trials were heard by the Dublin Circuit in 
June, 2015 and were conducted without recourse to a recalibration of the modified 
exclusionary rule. The last month before the long vacation in 2015, saw no reference to 
the JC decision in either of the four cases heard during that month. As the legal year 
ended, the immediate impact of the JC decision, on the Circuit Criminal Court in Dublin 
at least, was non-existent. This is not at all surprising as the JC decision was in the throes 
of being finalised at this juncture, with most practitioners being unsure as to its ultimate 
definition. The months of the Hilary term in the Dublin Circuit Court proved to be 
oblivious, in effect, to the Supreme Court’s ruling the previous April, with twenty-one 
trials upon indictment being heard in the period May to December, 2015 in the Dublin 
Circuit Criminal Court without a single recourse to the “seismic” decision reached in JC. 
 
c. The Provincial Circuit Criminal Court’s treatment of JC 
 
The Circuit Criminal Court, sitting in County Wexford, required that trial judge to rule as 
to whether evidence, obtained by Gardaí during a search on foot of a search warrant 
which was subsequently illegally executed, could be admitted at trial.497 The Circuit 
Court Judge dealt with the matter in a thorough manner and relied heavily upon the 
decision in People (DPP) v JC in reaching his final ruling on admissibility.498 The 
contested search warrant was issued by the local District Court Judge, pursuant to the 
provisions of s 6 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006 (as amended).499 The Circuit Court 
 
496 These four trials were relatively short in length and between them, only contained two rulings pertaining 
to the admissibility of evidence. Both rulings were made without recourse to the JC decision as constitutional 
rights were not directly engaged, nor raised by Counsel in these cases. 
497 Trial notes on file with author, Wexford Circuit Criminal Court, South Eastern Circuit. The application, 
made by the Defence, argued that the obtaining of this evidence was both illegal and in breach of the accused’s 
constitutional rights, namely, the inviolability of the private dwelling. 
498 [2015] IESC 31. 
499 Section 6 (1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2006, in turn, at the time of promulgation, amended section 10 
of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous) Provisions Act 1997 which sought to detail the circumstances in 
which a District Court Justice could grant a search warrant in connection to an arrestable offence, ie.  an 
offence for which upon conviction, of a second offence or otherwise, a custodial sentence of 5 years or more 
can be bestowed. The reporting Garda Member who provides the information on oath to the District Court in 





Judge applied Clarke J’s modified exclusionary rule test as espoused in JC, but stressed 
the operative paragraph of the Clarke J judgment as being: 
The test which follows is concerned with objections to the admissibility of evidence 
where the objection relates solely to the circumstances in which the evidence was 
gathered and does not concern the integrity or probative value of the evidence 
concerned.500 
The Wexford Circuit Criminal Court example allowed the author to observe how Clarke 
J’s judgment was treated in a trial situation. It is clearly binding on lower courts, but the 
process of how the new ‘test’ of inadvertence is interpreted by the lower courts is still 
within the sole remit of the trial judge.501 The thrust of the ‘Clarke test’ is that if evidence 
is unconstitutionally obtained, the prosecution, who possesses such evidence and seeks its 
admittance at trial, must establish that it is, in fact, admissible.502 The Clarke test 
inculcated the historical features of evidence admissibility: relevance and necessity. 
Clarke J states: 
As part of that obligation, it seems to follow that the onus in seeking to justify the 
admission of evidence taken in unconstitutional circumstances places two separate 
obligations on the prosecution. The first is to put forward whatever argument or basis it is 
suggested nonetheless justifies the admission of the relevant evidence. Second, and of 
equal importance, there must rest on the prosecution an onus to establish any facts 
necessary to justify such basis.503  
Clarke J established a third limb to the general admissibility rule in his judgment in JC. It 
was axiomatic, to Clarke J at least, that an accused could not be placed in the position of 
having to effectively prove, on the civil standard of proof, that evidence proffered against 
them was obtained by unconstitutional means.504 A striking element of the test is the 
standard of proof which is placed upon the prosecution in establishing that the contested 
 
500 People (DPP) JC [2015] IESC 31, judgment of Clarke J. This qualification made by Clarke J to the test, 
which he was about to distil in the Supreme Court, is firmly, therefore, concerned with the conduct of the 
Garda members who are responsible for the retrieval, maintenance and processing of evidence that can, 
potentially, be used in criminal trials in this State.  
501 The test, as stated by Clarke J, is clearly the most operative part of the judgment, however, a different 
emphasis was placed on certain sentences of that same delineated test by the presiding trial judge in the 
present example. 
502 One could presume, having never read the Clarke J ‘test’ that this is done through the basis of the 
foundational principles of evidence; relevance and necessity parameters.  
503 People (DPP) v JC [2015] IESC 31, per Clarke J at paragraph 5.  
504 As Clarke J stated in his JC judgment, again at paragraph 5 thereof: “Thus it seems to me the following 
must also form part of the test: where objection is taken to the admissibility of evidence on the grounds that 
it was taken in circumstances of unconstitutionality, the onus remains on the prosecution to establish either 
that the evidence was not gathered in circumstances of unconstitutionality or that, if it was, it remains 





evidence was obtained constitutionally and, if otherwise obtained, that it, nevertheless, 
ought to be admitted in evidence at trial. The higher criminal standard of proof of beyond 
reasonable doubt is a threshold that is particularly exacting and means that most, if not 
all, unconstitutionally obtained evidence will fall by the wayside, and not be deemed 
admissible evidence.505 
In the Wexford Circuit Criminal Court example, the trial judge first established 
that that element of the Clarke test, pertaining to the deliberate and conscious breach of 
the accused’s constitutional rights, was not applicable to the case, and was therefore not 
detained by that element of the exclusionary test.506 The Circuit Court judge, in the 
binding part of his ruling, stated: 
…but I'm so satisfied that, if one were to put the facts of this case on the spectrum as set 
out by Mr. Justice Clarke in his judgment, with the O'Brien case on one end of the 
spectrum and the Kenny case on the other end, it certainly would move to the left of the 
Kenny case.  But I'm satisfied that the exclusionary rule shouldn't apply…507 
Therefore, without any “deliberate and conscious” breach of the accused’s constitutional 
right to inviolability of the dwelling, the Gardaí were inadvertent in their pre-trial 
evidence gathering techniques, but were not punished effectively for being so, as the 
evidence was admitted against the accused. 
 
d. Central Criminal Court: post- JC  
Most Central Criminal Court trials, observed in the immediate months post-JC, did not 
touch upon the intricacies of that judgment and, more specifically, the exact parameters of 
the test extolled by Clarke J. This is due, in part, to the specific function of a trial court 
 
505 As is stated in the new exclusionary rule test: “The test should also contain the following elements: any 
facts relied on by the prosecution to establish any of the matters referred to must be established beyond 
reasonable doubt.” An investigation into the minds of those obtaining the evidence unconstitutionally, in an 
effort to establish whether this action was a “deliberate and conscious” breach of the accused’s constitutional 
right will also be undertaken on a subjective test basis. The test, as currently stated by the JC decision, largely 
shifts the burden of proof in unconstitutionally obtained evidence scenarios, onto the prosecution, whereas 
pre-JC saw the prosecution’s burden being relatively meaningless, in that unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence was always inadmissible. 
506 The Wexford Circuit Criminal Court judge stated as follows: “At paragraph 5.10, he [Mr. Justice Clarke] 
says, "The test, therefore, requires the following", and he goes on to talk about the "deliberate and conscious 
violation of constitutional rights", but I am so satisfied that there was no deliberate and conscious violation 
of constitutional rights, having heard the facts opened to me [in the Wexford case].” Additions made by 
author.   





within the Irish criminal justice system.508 The JC exclusionary rule was usually engaged 
within the context of a search warrant.509 An example of this scenario, from the Central 
Criminal Court, arrived in a trial, which was observed by this author in July, 2015.510 
Counsel for the prosecution sought to admit the evidence gathered on foot of the defective 
search warrant and based his argument on the “inadvertence” exception inherent within 
the Supreme Court judgment of Clarke J.511 Having quoted from the Clarke J judgment, 
the Senior Counsel seeking the evidence to be admitted, stated: 
[A]nd I'd point out…what the Court is concerned with primarily is the question of admissibility of 
evidence and… engaging in a balancing exercise whether evidence obtained unconstitutionally or 
whatever, provided the Court is satisfied that it's unconstitutionally or illegally obtained evidence 
ought to be admitted. And the effect of the JC case really is that, and I think it's stated in the 
various judgments, that there is of course a public interest in ensuring that evidence which is 
relevant and probative be admitted. 
In delivering a practitioner’s understanding of the alteration to the Kenny judgment, 
which previously had been the main authority for the exclusionary rule in this 
jurisdiction, the prosecuting Senior Counsel opined that: 
There are two tensions…there's a tension between the administration of justice and 
a sense that evidence which is relevant and admissible should be put before the tribunal of 
fact…evidence which is taken in deliberate and conscious violation of Constitutional 
rights is still excluded, except in exceptional circumstances. But that in relation to other 
evidence it's necessary to look at everything and to see whether as I say, there is 
something which indicates that the evidence should be excluded…mistakes will be made 
which do not really involve the deliberate trampling on a person's constitutional rights 
and cannot be relied upon as grounds to exclude evidence.512    
 
508 In this regard it is not the function of the trial judge to make a targeted ruling which encompasses a matter 
of trial which is wholly irrelevant to the Ruling which they are being asked to make during the currency of a 
criminal trial.  
509 Which search warrant was deemed to have been defective at the time of execution. 
510 People (DPP) v J.D., Central Criminal Court July 2015, trial notes on file with author. 
511 The issues of evidence admissibility, as pertaining to this example, concern the taking of a statement from 
the accused in circumstances which were argued to be unconstitutional, along with the validity of a search 
warrant which was executed by investigating Garda members in relation to the accused in this trial. The 
prosecuting Senior Counsel stated his argument thus: “Even if the Court were to take the view that the warrant 
was in some way defective and that, as a result, there was a breach of constitutional rights, in my submission 
the case is clearly within the exceptions envisaged in the decision of the majority of the Supreme Court in the 
case of JC. And in that regard, if I might turn to the provisions or the sentiments uttered by Mr. Justice Clarke 
at paragraph 5.12... "I consider that including an exception of that type properly meets the balance and the 
interests engaged in this case…As a result of a subsequent decision of the courts, it became clear that 
a particular form of warrant was invalid. That fact was not known at the time of the evidence gathering at 
issue in this case.” 
512 Central Criminal Court, July 2015, Day 5, trial notes on file with author. 
The Senior Counsel, examining the significance of JC, first referred to the historical lineage of the 





A striking omission by this submission in relation to the exact meaning of the JC 
decision, is an observation mentioned by Hardiman J in his dissenting judgment in JC, in 
that the discretion to categorise which “mistakes” harm an accused’s constitutional rights, 
and which “mistakes” do not, is an extremely arbitrary allowance for discretion. Further 
clarification would define the exact parameters as to how these decisions can and ought to 
be reached.513  
The argument proffered by the defence was arguably quite vacuous, as it is almost 
impossible to fully estimate the precise fears and apprehensions of the Supreme Court’s 
decision when applying JC to every circumstance of possible unconstitutionality 
performed by An Garda Síochána.514  
 
e. Central Criminal Court’s admissibility ruling 
 
The trial judge’s ruling, in answer to these lengthy submissions by opposing Counsel as 
to the implementation of the Supreme Court’s decision in JC, which submissions ran over 
three days, was considered overnight by the presiding trial judge.515 With regard to the 
 
decided was that absent any conscious and deliberate violation of a constitutional right, the evidence would 
be admissible unless the Court excluded it in the exercise of discretion… the exercise of the discretion 
involved the balancing of the public interest in the detection and punishment of crime, and ensuring that 
individuals are not subjected to illegal or inquisitorial methods of investigation.”   
513 The Defence, in seeking to have the contested evidence ruled inadmissible, stated the premise of their 
argument as being: 
…there's no real engagement here, Judge, and in the end, counsel for the prosecution says, well if it was taken 
in breach of Constitutional rights, it's just inadvertence…that is precisely the type of approach which the 
minority judges in JC were fearful of… that these types of issues would simply be dismissed as inadvertence, 
and that's what this Court is actually being invited to do by the failure to engage with the test required under 
JC. Central Criminal Court July 2015, Day 6, trial notes on file with author. 
514 The following extract indicates how JC can be manipulated, to suit one’s particular needs:  
“…it is about public policy considerations. But the fact of the matter is that O'Brien has been held by the 
majority in JC not to be sufficient. The whole argument was that Kenny replaced O'Brien and Kenny went 
too far. But Clarke J and O'Donnell J both say O'Brien didn't go far enough. And yet, counsel for the 
prosecution is purporting to invite this Court to apply a test which was part articulated in O'Brien long before 
JC and it's been replaced by JC. And the prosecution hasn't actually engaged with the test required under JC. 
It is striking to note the confidence with which this Senior Counsel states, quite categorically, that JC has 
actually replaced the 1965 O’Brien judgment; such a claim requires further and greater delineation as to how 
JC actually performs such a function. It may be recalled that under O’Brien, the Supreme Court majority 
held, in part, that unconstitutionally obtained evidence is not admissible except in “extraordinary excusing 
circumstances”. How this formula of words in O’Brien relates to the “inadvertence” meaning of JC is 
currently unclear. There is also a dispute as to which Supreme Court judges in O’Brien actually formed the 
majority, and whose judgments are thought to be binding on subsequent decisions in the area of evidence 
admissibility. It is mostly conceded that Walsh J’s judgment holds sway, with Kingsmill Moore J’s judgment 
being treated as the leading minority judgment.  
515 The ruling reached several pages, which is a superficial indication as to how the ruling was broached by 





issue of the acquisition of a statement from the accused in circumstances which may be 
viewed as being unconstitutional by investigating Garda members, the trial judge ruled: 
I also accept the contention by Counsel for the Defence that it is for the prosecution to 
satisfy the Court that a statement of this kind is admissible. I can say I am so satisfied and 
in my view, there is no basis on the evidence or on the submissions on which the 
statement shall be deemed inadmissible and therefore I will deem the statement 
admissible.516    
There was no allusion to the JC decision directly by this observed trial judge, however, in 
accepting, and therefore, adopting the argument of the defence, it was followed by the 
trial judge. 
 
f. Search warrant issues- the basis of the ruling in the Central Criminal Court 
 
The second and third issues, which fell to be determined by the observed trial judge, were 
in relation to the constitutionality of evidence obtained on foot of a search which was 
undertaken pursuant to a contested search warrant, whose legality was challenged by the 
accused, on two main grounds;  
i. the obtaining of the warrant was argued to be ultra vires517 and  
ii. the execution of said warrant.518  
 
516 Trial notes on file with author. 
517 Under section 10(1) and 10(2) of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997, as substituted 
by the provisions of section 10(1) and 10(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2006 (as amended). 
518 Section 10(1) of the 1997 Act states that: "A judge of the District Court on hearing evidence on oath given 
by a member not below the rank of inspector may if he or she is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds 
for suspecting that evidence of or relating to the commission of specified offences including an indictable 
offence involving the death of a person is to be found in any place, issue a warrant for the search of that place 
and any persons found at that place."   
Section 10(2) of the 1997 Act sets out: "A warrant under this section shall be expressed to and shall operate 
to authorise a named member, accompanied by any other member to enter within one week of the date of 
issue of the warrant if necessary by use of reasonable force, the place named on the warrant and to search it 
and any persons found at that place and seize anything found at that place, or anything found in the possession 
of a person present at that place at the time of the search, which the said member reasonably believes to be 
evidence of, or relating to, an offence referred to in subsection 1."  
Section 10 (1) of the 2006 Act states: "If a judge of the District Court is satisfied by information on oath of 
a member not below the rank of sergeant, that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that evidence of, 
or relating to, the commission of an arrestable offence is to be found in any place, the judge may issue 
a warrant for the search of that place and any persons found at that place."    
Section 10 (2) of the 2006 Act states: "A search warrant under this section shall be expressed and shall operate 
to authorise a named member accompanied by such other members or persons or both as the member thinks 
necessary, a) to enter at any time or times within one week of the date of issue of the warrant on production 
if so required of the warrant and if necessary by the use of reasonable force, the place named in the warrant, 
b) to search it and any persons found at that place and c) to seize anything found at that place or anything 
found in the possession of a person present at that place at the time of the search, that that member reasonably 
believes to be of evidence of, or relating to, the commission of an arrestable offence." Under the 





The trial judge, in a rather succinct, and unambiguous précis of her stated task, 
considered the following dilemmas to be her primary concern: 
…the issue really for the Court to decide is whether there is some defect in the warrant 
which resulted in this particular search being legal, and if so, what are the consequences 
of that? Mr. Justice Clarke in the JC case stated that the onus is on the prosecution to 
establish the admissibility of the relevant evidence. In establishing either a) that the 
evidence concerned was not gathered in circumstances of unconstitutionality or b) that if 
it was, it remains appropriate for the Court to nonetheless admit the evidence.519  
The crucial burden of proof falling upon the prosecution was mentioned by the trial 
judge. Clarke J’s “inadvertence test” was also delineated into two distinct stages. The 
presumption of inadmissibility is still clearly retained by the JC decision, however, the 
prosecution possesses the opportunity to prove that such evidence ought to be admitted in 
the interests of the proper administration of justice. It is, one would observe, unfortunate 
that the trial judge, when referring to the Clarke J test, did not deem it appropriate to 
clarify the required standard of proof towards which the prosecution must work in 
admitting such contested evidence, which O’Donnell J, as well as Clarke J in JC, 
intimates to be the criminal standard of proof. The trial judge stated that she possessed no 
issue with the quality of the information provided to the District Court, pursuant to s 10 of 
the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997, but that “the form of the 
warrant as issued is disputed.”520  
 
g. Search warrant cases and inadvertence 
 
In People (DPP) v Gormley and White, Clarke J in the Supreme Court, stated that search 
warrant cases, ie. cases in which the validity of a certain search warrant either in issuance 
or execution is contested, can be divided into two categories.521 It is not merely 
 
on oath of a member not below the rank of sergeant, that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that 
evidence of, or relating to, the commission of an arrestable offence is to be found in any place as ascertained 
by the investigating Garda members. The District Judge then issues the warrant in a stated form, upon being 
satisfied that the requirements have been duly fulfilled by the applying Garda.   
519 Central Criminal Court, July 2015, Day 6, trial notes on file with author. 
520 Ibid. 
521 Clarke J, in a clearly defined judgment, set out by delineating first principles in relation to search warrant 
cases, by initially defining the function of a judicial warrant: A warrant permits persons authorised by the 
same to carry out acts which would otherwise be unlawful. Persons may be arrested and thus have their liberty 
curtailed who might not otherwise be capable of legitimate arrest and detention. Persons may be required to 
have their premises, including a dwelling house searched and relevant materials and evidence removed. 
Persons who are affected by a warrant are prima facie obliged to submit to the terms…A person whose rights 





coincidental that Clarke J delivered this appraisal of the function of a search warrant, 
which, put simply, allows for a lawful suspension of a citizen’s constitutional rights for 
the period of time which pertains to the warrant’s execution. Clarke J was focused on 
what a correctly constituted warrant takes away from the citizen, albeit temporarily and 
how best to temper judicial discretion in issuing a warrant.  
Two main points are required to be made at this juncture. First, that Gardaí who 
are acting under a legally valid search warrant must still behave constitutionally in doing 
so, and second, the Gardaí must adhere to the search warrant’s purpose. There is no 
discretion in these issues for the Gardaí. Failure to do either will engage judicial 
discretion. It is a difficult argument to sustain however, that Gardaí who have acted 
unconstitutionally, must then suddenly become guardians of the very constitutional rights 
which they have previously breached. Clarke J had stated in Gormley and White however, 
that: 
I am satisfied that, in general terms, a warrant issued by judicial authority is valid if a) it 
specifies the legal power which is being exercised by the issuing of the relevant warrant, 
b) it specifies, or it can reasonably be implied from the text that the relevant judge is 
satisfied that it should be issued and c) it does not contain on its face any recital or other 
statement which would reasonably lead to the conclusion that the judge issuing a warrant 
had approached the question of whether it was appropriate to issue the warrant on an 
incorrect basis having regard to the relevant statute. 
Bearing these pronouncements of the law in relation to search warrants in mind, the trial 
judge, in the observed example, relied heavily upon O’Donnell J’s judgment in JC, in 
reaching her determination.  
 
h. The O’Donnell J influence 
 
The trial judge interpreted O’Donnell J’s judgment as being one which encouraged the 
admissibility of evidence from a range of sources, so long as such evidence was cogent, 
reliable and necessary. The trial judge was also cautious in her ruling in relation to 
evidence admissibility. The presiding judge sided with the majority in JC on the basis that 
most people would expect, observing from afar, that relevant evidence must be admitted, 
and that if such evidence was not admitted, the trial’s integrity would be irreparably 
 
authorises. Secondly, such a person is entitled to know the legal basis on which it is said the warrant was 
issued, because it is that legal basis which requires them to submit to something which would otherwise be 





harmed.522 A trial judge, therefore, cannot be expected to pronounce the law that covers 
issues which do not pertain to that trial before them. Such law-making, in a general sense, 
can only be broached by the legislature.523 The premise of O’Donnell J’s stance is, 
however, rather narrow, if not bordering on the myopic.524 It is a narrow stance taken by 
O’Donnell J in the sense that any judgment of the Supreme Court on such an important 
matter as the exclusionary rule will have repercussions on a range of criminal 
prosecutions, some which may not yet have entered the criminal justice system.525 Is it 
not a tad unrealistic to suggest that a judge who makes a decision, either at trial or 
appellate level, does not envisage that their decision may have repercussions for other 
cases that are currently being heard or will be heard in the future? The judgment reached 
at appellate level will impact on how the trial judge exercises their discretion in 
determining contentious issues of evidence admissibility.526 
 
i. The observed trial judge’s ruling 
 
The ratio of the trial judge’s ruling arrived in the succinct summary and stated: 
There is no evidence of reckless or grossly negligent disregard of the Constitution or 
indeed of any subjective consideration or motive. What occurred was due to an 
inadvertence, it was an error which was unintentional. In those exceptional circumstances, 
the Court is satisfied it is appropriate for the Court to admit the illegally obtained 
evidence from the vehicle.   
 
522 Which would lead one to ask whether the integrity of the innumerable trials conducted pre-JC was 
compromised? 
523 The trial judge, in the Central Criminal Court, in this regard, stated: “Mr. Justice O'Donnell drew 
a distinction between the legislature specifically making laws of general application for a wide range of 
circumstances, whereas a court makes a decision in an individual case. He stated that the core function of the 
court is to decide the case before it, and that whatever law a court makes must merge from the facts and the 
exigencies of the individual case; that the jurisdiction of the trial court is only to hear and determine matters 
relevant to the issues before it.”  This general statement of the different functions of a trial court, and those 
of the legislature, are correct. 
524 Sigmund Samuel, ‘The Codification of Law’ (1943) 5(1) The University of Toronto Law Journal 148, 
149. Samuel cites the example of French trial judges pronouncing arrets de reglements at the end of the 
eighteenth century which went beyond the parameters of the trial before them presently, and which sought to 
provide guidelines for similar cases which were yet to be heard or were being heard at that time. Of course, 
these are separate systems of criminal justice administration, however in the intervening 226 years, both 
systems have converged to an extent one would scarcely have thought imaginable in previous decades.    
525 At paragraph 5 of O’Donnell’s judgment, the learned judge quotes approvingly from the judgment of 
Kingsmill Moore J in People (AG) v O’Brien [1965] IR 142, 161 which is rather conservative in its stance: 
“It would not be in accordance with our system of jurisprudence for this Court to attempt to lay down rules 
to govern future hypothetical cases.” 
526 It would be hard to imagine that the trial judge in JC did not envisage the possibility that her ruling, in 





The trial judge notably couched her ruling in terms of an illegally obtained piece of 
evidence, immediately discarding the possibility that it was an unconstitutional breach by 
using the “inadvertence” clause as stated by Clarke J in JC. Noticeably, the trial judge 
utilised the “inadvertence” criteria to, effectively, convert what would have been an 
unconstitutional breach into an illegal breach instead. As has been previously stated, such 
a conversion allows judicial discretion to be used, as under Kenny, as an unconstitutional 
breach would render the use of discretion practically irrelevant. The judiciary will almost 
certainly be placed in a position of assessing the investigator’s use of its discretion and 
how this was then assessed and implemented by the trial judge’s discretion.  
 
j. Special Criminal Court: post- JC 
 
The references made by this Court to the Supreme Court judgment in JC were rare.527 
This is due to a number of factors, which centred on how this Court actually conducts its 
workload.528 It could also be argued that the same restrictions, with regard to time, were 
felt in the other courts analysed, but that JC seemed to have more of an impact in these 
courts than in the SCC. The reason as to why this is the reality must be regarding the 
composition of the SCC and the subject-matter of its cases. In a case observed by the 
author which came before the Special, an application was made by Counsel for the 
accused with regard to the admissibility of evidence.529 The ruling, succinct as it is, states: 
While the Court is entirely satisfied that there were no mala fides on the part of the gardaí 
in this case the argument that there was no conscious violation of the accused's right does 
not hold water, having regard to the judgment of the Supreme Court in DPP v JC.530 
There is, unfortunately, no elaboration with regard to the impact of JC and there was no 
indication that the three-judge panel of the SCC agreed or disagreed with aspects of the 
JC test. It appeared to be merely mentioned by way of a pro forma mention of the Clarke 
J. test, in rejecting the evidence’s admissibility argument. It is regrettable that the judges 
of the SCC did not deem it entirely necessary to provide their own interpretation of the 
Supreme Court decision, which would, at least, serve to enlighten the observers, as well 
 
527 In the allotted observation period (May, 2015-May, 2016). 
528 It must also be noted that the Special Criminal Court, along with the Central Criminal Court, did not hear 
any cases during the vacation periods within the observation period for this thesis.  
529 Which was gathered by the Gardaí in relation to a search conducted with regard to a charge of possession 
of a firearm and ammunition in Dublin city. 





as the accused, as to how they reached their ruling that the evidence was inadmissible in 
this particular instance. 
 
k. Evidence law reform evaluated 
 
Reforming evidence law is not easily done due to the disparate nature of its sources. Two 
such methods of reform are codification and consolidation. The first issue which requires 
to be broached, however, is defining what it means to codify a law. When one 
understands the premise of codifying a law, then the codification of the law is a matter of 
volume.531 The starting premise in analysing the current state of evidence law in Ireland is 
that the judiciary is afforded the necessary discretion to either admit or exclude evidence 
depending upon the facts and intricacies of the case before that particular trial judge.532 
This is true within other jurisdictions, where the process of evidence law codification is 
far more developed than in Ireland.533 The fieldwork research phase exposed the many 
difficulties which are present when a rule of evidence is required to be applied. One 
method of simplifying the process would be to reduce the theory of evidence rules to first 
principles.534 Those founding principles of evidence law pertained to the jury and its 
protection during a criminal trial. Such protection was not a physical protection. Evidence 
law, instead, served to shield the jury from evidence which was prejudicial to the accused, 
and was of a nature which would serve to overly influence that jury’s deliberation 
process.535 The jury, however, does not apply the rules of evidence. They are really the 
benefactors of these rules’ grounding function. It is left to the practitioners and judiciary 
to actually implement these archaic rules.536 The process of codifying the rules of 
evidence may reduce the more pernicious aspects of judicial discretion (ie. 
 
531 Frank Gahan, ‘The Codification of Law’ in The Transactions of the Grotius Society, Problems of Peace 
and War, Papers Read before the Society in the Year 1922 (1922) 8 Cambridge Law Journal 107. Gahan sets 
out what codification can actually achieve, with the crucial determinant being: 
“Codification of law may mean no more than the reduction of law into a compact form, setting out existing 
law in the form of concise general principles. Such a code is a mere consolidation or digest of the law; its 
concern is not so much with the substance as with the form of law. On the other hand, codification may be 
much more ambitious. It may aim at supplying a complete logical system of ideal law.” 
532 Gahan, ‘The Codification of Law’ 107, where the author demonstrates his argument that codification’s 
disadvantages can be readily seen in the German rationalism theory of evidence, where attempting to provide 
a rule for every known scenario leaves the judge with little more than a box ticking exercise to complete.  
533 Thomas M. Mengler, ‘The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence’ (1988-89) 74 Iowa Law 
Review 413.  
534 Mengler, ‘The Theory of Discretion’ Iowa Law Review 413, 414. 
535 Ibid.  
536 Cecilia Ní Choileáin and Anna Bazarchina, ‘Admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained evidence after 





unpredictability) and simplify the trial process. Such a suggestion is not revelatory.537 In 
fact, other common law jurisdictions can provide salutary lessons for proponents of the 
codified model. 
 
l. The constitutional arguments for codification 
 
The Law Commission of England and Wales provided an extensive, two volume report 
into the merits of devising a criminal code for that jurisdiction.538 It is not possible to 
directly compare the report’s contents, as it focused on the substantive criminal law rather 
than evidence law, however the actual process of codification was considered 
comprehensively. In the report’s first volume, the benefits of law codification were 
summarised by the Society of Public Teachers of Law: 
The virtues and advantages of a Code that [the Code team’s Report] identifies 
(accessibility, comprehensibility, consistency and certainty) relate to essentially lawyerly 
concerns: what needs to be stressed is that they serve the more profound aspirations of 
due notice and fair warning characteristic of a system that seeks to adhere to the principle 
of legality.539 
It is noticeable, that even in 1989, the consulted groups felt that attributes such as 
certainty and comprehensibility were “lawyerly concerns” only.540 Some of the same 
concerns, which are in issue with regard to the substantive criminal law, are echoed in 
relation to the development of evidence law. The ‘Code Team’, in their Report to the 
Commission, could well have been speaking of the law of evidence, rather than the 
substantive criminal law: 
The haphazard development of the law through the cases, and a multiplicity of statutes 
inevitably leads to inconsistencies, not merely in terminology but also in substance. 
Codification must seek to remove these.541 
With regard to another stated aim of the codification process, that of obtaining certainty, 
the Commission’s Report states that: 
 
537 Frank Gahan, ‘The Codification of Law’ 112, where a direct advantage of codification was stated as being: 
- “Codification has the great advantage of filling the dustbin; and, as at the date of the code, it brings the law 
up-to-date, ready to face modern times with modern ideas, modern machinery, modern weapons.” 
538 The Law Commission (Law Com. No. 177) ‘A Criminal Code for England and Wales’, Vol. 1, Report and 
Draft Criminal Code Bill (17th April, 1989) (London, HM Stationary Office), 5.  
539 The Law Commission, ‘A Criminal Code for England and Wales’ 5. 
540 The question, as to whom this Code was aimed, was categorically answered by the Society’s contribution 
to the Commission.  





The common law method of resolving uncertainty by “retrospective” declaration of the 
law is objectionable in principle.542  
These arguments were generally repeated by the New Zealand Law Commission in its 
Report on the proposed codification of New Zealand evidence law, which eventually 
produced the Evidence Act 2006 (NZ). This is significant in that it demonstrates that 
certainty, accessibility and consistency are problematical issues for any area of law which 
has been, or still is, dominated by the common law.543 What the proponents are stating, in 
effect, is that the common law system produces these defects naturally, for which 
codification is then deemed to be the remedy. The issue of predictability is contested and 
Cross, in particular, argues that the common law, rather than inculcate instability in 
decision-making, actually provides a high degree of predictability, despite judicial 
discretion being a fundamental tenet of the common law system.544 Max Weber disagrees 
with this assertion, however, stating that the former British Empire territories prospered 
commercially in spite of its judicial-class.545 
The Law Commission of England and Wales focused on four key advantages 
which codification would instil. Codification would make the criminal law more 
accessible, more comprehensible, more consistent and more certain. These are all 
laudable aspirations, however the Report fails to explain how this would actually be 
achieved through codification rather than another method, such as legislative 
consolidation.546 For instance, under the heading ‘certainty’, the Report’s authors state 
that “a statute or case may state the law obscurely, so that it is impossible to be certain as 
to the law to be applied to a particular problem.”547 This criticism is, however, somewhat 
misplaced. Ambiguous legislation occurs not because of the actual process of legislative 




542 The Law Commission, ‘A Criminal Code for England and Wales’ 7. 
543 For an alternative view, which borders on the jingoistic, see Robert Ludlow Fowler, ‘The Future of the 
Common Law’ (1913) 13(7) Columbia Law Review 595, 596. 
544 Frank B. Cross, ‘Identifying the virtues of the Common Law’ (2007) 15 (1) Supreme Court Economic 
Review 21-59, 22. Such predictability in decision-making promotes commercial activity, with various 
academic studies producing findings which demonstrate that common law based economies are more 
commercially successful than economies governed by different legal systems.  
545 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (University of California, 1978) 
814. 
546 The Law Commission. ‘A Criminal Code for England and Wales’ 7. 
547 Ibid. 
548 Given that not every piece of legislation is unusable for want of certainty, it must, as a result, be possible 





m. The arguments against codification 
The first argument against the codification of the criminal law in England and Wales 
centred upon the perceived impossibility of a single ‘code’ encompassing the labyrinthine 
complexity of the criminal law.549 The next argument against codification focused upon 
codification’s “immutability”.550 Such a problem would crystallise the law even if 
erroneous according to codification’s detractors. The limited role of the courts within a 
codified system could be viewed as being an adverse consequence of the codification 
process.551 The criticism that the courts would, in effect, be side-lined from the 
interpretation process of law was rejected by the Law Commission, as the judiciary would 
still be called upon to interpret the new code.552 Other commentators raised the thorny 
issue of ensuring that the judiciary, when interpreting the code, or a piece of legislation, is 
actually giving vent to Parliament’s intentions for that legislation.553 This objection is 
misplaced. This is a criticism of statutory interpretation rather than the legislative or 
codification process. The most alarming argument against the codification of the law was 
wholly ill-conceived. This objection essentially stated that it would be unfair to ask 
practitioners who have learnt the law once, to go and do so again.554 The presumption 
would be that lawyers who have been comfortably asserting the criminal law for many 
years are so institutionalised that they would be incapable of adapting to a criminal 
code.555  
Instead of codifying law, which is a concept alien to many common lawyers even 
today, the process of legislative consolidation should be reviewed and improved so that 
the benefits of codification, accessibility and certainty, can be felt without actually 
engaging the codification process. The process of consolidating Irish evidence law has 
been widely discussed within Irish evidence law circles, and was also the subject of a 
Law Reform Commission Issue Paper in 2013.556 It would seem that the most cogent 
 
549 The Law Commission. ‘A Criminal Code for England and Wales’ 8. The report’s authors rebutted this 
‘comprehensiveness’ argument on the grounds that “[C]odification is still desirable even if this process does 
not result in all of the common law being replaced.” 
550 Ibid. One contributor to the report, who was consulted before publication, stated that: “The outstanding 
defect of codes is that, unless they are stated in terms so general as to be unacceptable to the modern codifier, 
they must inevitably lead to the ossification of the law and to the perpetuation of error…” 
551 Ibid, 8-9. 
552 Ibid, 9, where the report states in reference to the role of the courts: “…it will still be the function of the 
court to interpret the codified law and to apply it to differing circumstances.” 
553 Ibid, 10. 
554 Ibid. 
555 See Charles Phineas Sherman, Roman Law in the Modern World (1917 Boston Book Company) for a 
strident defence of the codification process in the United States. 





argument for codification is accessibility, as the common law is no longer fit for purpose. 
The most appropriate argument against codification is the very real danger of fossilising 
the law, which stunts development. 
 
n. Consolidation of Irish evidence law- a lack of progression 
 
The Law Reform Commission’s work on evidence in Irish law is meritorious.557  The 
Issue Paper in 2013 is welcome, and the final Report of the Law Reform Commission is a 
worthwhile document which was published in 2016, which focuses, inter alia, upon the 
improved consolidation of evidence law in this jurisdiction. .558  
One of the main purposes of the ‘Evidence Project’ undertaken by the Law 
Reform Commission was the publication of a Draft Bill of Evidence Consolidation, 
which would, effectively, consolidate all the relevant pre-1922 and post-1922 evidence 
legislation.559 There was a distinct aim of the Commission to publish a Bill as an 
appendix to its Report on Evidence which would act as the precursor to a greater Bill of 
Evidence.560 Moreover, it would be naive to suggest that just because the Law Reform 
Commission recommends a certain Bill of Reform, that the legislature will act 
accordingly, although the precedence is that the Government of the day does appear to 
 
557 Its Issue Paper was the precursor to a more extensive project on reforming three particular areas of 
evidence law, namely: the rule against hearsay, documentary (including) electronic evidence and expert 
evidence, which have been published in various formats since 2008. Ibid, 2. Law Reform Commission, 
Consultation Paper on Expert Evidence (LRC CP 52- 2008); Law Reform Commission, Consultation Paper 
on Documentary and Electronic Evidence (LRC CP 57-2009) and Law Reform Commission, Consultation 
Paper on Hearsay in Civil and Criminal Cases (LRC CP 60- 2010). 
558 A Report was published in 1988 by the Law Reform Commission on the Rule Against Hearsay in Civil 
Cases (LRC 25- 1988) which clearly was limited to that branch of the law. One would have thought that when 
the Commission did come to deal with hearsay evidence in a criminal context, it would have concentrated on 
criminal law solely, as hearsay evidence is crucial to the criminal trial process. It did not do so, despite the 
fact that in its 2013 Consultation Paper on the Consolidation of Evidence Law in Ireland it was stated: - 
“This general approach would be subject to some exceptions such as in the area of hearsay in respect of which 
the Commission is currently inclined to the view that separate treatment for civil and criminal proceedings is 
required”. Nonetheless, the Commission combined both civil and criminal law hearsay into the same 
Consultation Paper in 2010. Previous to the 1988 Report on hearsay in civil cases, there was a published 
Working Paper on ‘The Rule Against Hearsay’ in 1980 (LRC WP9-1980). See also Consolidation and Reform 
of Aspects of the Law of Evidence (LRC Report: 117-2016). 
559 The general purposes of the draft Bill were stated as being: (1) to consolidate in a single Bill (and update 
where necessary) the existing legislation on the law of evidence, both pre-1922 and post-1922, that remains 
relevant; (2) to consolidate and reform in the same Bill the existing law on hearsay, documentary (including 
electronic) evidence and expert evidence, whether derived from common law or legislation; (3) to thereby 
contribute to a possible future comprehensive statement in legislative form of the entire general law of 
evidence. 
560 Such a stated, structured approach to reform in this area of law is admirable and consistent to other 
jurisdictions. It still, must be observed, that it places Irish evidence law at least 10-15 years behind a 





listen to the Commission. The Issues Paper is, by nature, limited in its scope. It merely 
provides a précis of evidence legislation which requires some form of reform, ie. either 
repeal or amendment. The codification process has also been tried and developed in the 
United States, New Zealand and in Canada, which requires brief analysis.  
 
o. The New York Tale 
 
The travails in New York in introducing an Evidence Code have been widely highlighted, 
with comparisons made with how the Uniform Penal Code, or its preceding Model Code, 
were adopted.561 Six failed attempts in approximately 150 years to codify New York’s 
evidence law reveals a pattern that: 
Regardless, of their specialty, those members of the [b]ar generally having the burden of 
proof, both civil and criminal, enthusiastically support codification while the defense (sic) 
bar aggressively…opposes it.562 
Salken, somewhat simplistically, states that the tensions created between the bench, and 
indeed the Bar of New York, is generated from the ancient argument for and against 
codification, which in turn can be distilled to the argument as to whether laws should be 
created by judges or by legislators.563 Other commentators have suggested that tensions 
between Bar and Bench is due to a lack of evidence law education amongst legal 
practitioners.564 Gard suggests, in particular, that the fundamentals of the rules of 
evidence, and what a codification process can hope to achieve, are misunderstood by the 
majority of lawyers in the United States.565 It is important to highlight why attempts to 
codify have been scuppered in New York, and why, in New Zealand, gestures to the 
codification process have been more successful.566 A common reason, as suggested by 
 
561 Margaret A. Berger, ‘The Federal Rules of Evidence: Defining and Refining the Goals of Codification’ 
(1983-84) 12 Hofstra Law Review 255, 258. 
562 Barbara C. Salken, ‘To Codify or not to Codify- that is the Question: A Study of New York’s Efforts to 
Enact an Evidence Code’ (1992) Brooklyn Law Review 58(3) 641, 642. 
563 The theory of codifying the common law of England, for instance, is evident from the reign of Henry VII 
in the early sixteenth century. In 1833, William IV taxed a Royal Commission to report on whether the 
criminal law of England could be codified. That Commission submitted a Report which effectively stated that 
codification would create greater uncertainty. 
564 Spencer A. Gard, ‘Kansas Law and the New Uniform Rules of Evidence’ (1953-54) 2 University of Kansas 
Law Review 333, 335.  
565 Gard, ‘Kansas Law’ (1953-54) 2 University of Kansas Law Review 333, 336. 
566 Sigmund Samuel, ‘The Codification of Law’ (1943) 5(1) The University of Toronto Law Journal 148, 
where the ancient dividing lines between the common law and civil law systems were drawn: “There is the 
jus non scriptum, sacred to English lawyers; and there is the jus scriptum, equally sacred to civilians.” 
Tensions between the two systems, their advantages and disadvantages have been highlighted for a period of 





Gard, as to why there is an innate reluctance towards codification is the traditional 
common law method of the adherence to precedence: 
The [b]ar is noted, generally speaking, for its sentimental devotion to precedent and its 
natural inclination to cling to the idea that a trial is primarily a contest of wits. Perhaps we 
all find it easier and more comfortable to operate under the fiction of infallibility of 
common law doctrine.567  
The criminal trial is, at times, an archaic process, however, just because it is an unwieldy 
organism does not, necessarily, mean that it cannot be reformed. Presumably, if society is 
a hostage to its criminal justice system; a system which ought to serve the interests of that 
society, an immediate rebalancing action is required.  
 
p. Ohio and Indian relations in codification  
 
Common law jurisdictions can face the codification process together. Ohio’s Evidence 
Code was directly influenced, for example, by the James Fitzjames Stephen inspired India 
Evidence Act 1872.568 Ohio’s State legislators witnessed the scale of the achievement 
obtained by Stephen’s India Evidence Act and were energised by this precedent, along 
with other examples within the United States.569 Blackmore opines that in Ohio, when the 
Rules of Evidence did eventually arrive, it was a quick process, but the initial gestation 
period for these rules was overly protracted.570 The reasons for the delay in Ohio adopting 
codified laws of evidence were twofold: 
1. The Rules of Evidence in Ohio did not form an intelligible Code; and 
2. The Rules created a direct tete-á-tete between the different branches of State 
government and which engaged the separation of powers doctrine.571 
These potential barriers in Ohio were eventually overcome, however in New York, the 
arguments appear to have been more entrenched. Four primary points of dispute were 
 
567 Spencer A. Gard, ‘Kansas Law’ (1953-54) 2 University of Kansas Law Review 333, 338. 
568 Josiah H. Blackmore II, ‘The Ohio Evidence Rules: 105 Years of Heritage and Dilemma’ (1976-77) 6 
Capital University Law Review 533, 534. 
569 The example of the ‘true’ evidence Code of California again displayed what could be achieved through 
the process of codification. The process in Ohio was initiated by the then Chief Justice of that State, William 
O’Neil CJ in 1975 when a 26-person advisory committee was formed under the control of Ayers J of the 
Knox County Court of Common Pleas. A first draft Report was submitted by this Committee in 1976. This 
draft set of Evidence Rules were presented to the floor of the Ohio General Assembly in January, 1977.   
570 Blackmore II, ‘The Ohio Evidence Rules’ 541. 





relentlessly pursued by opponents to codification in New York.572 The third point, posited 
in New York, was that the codification process envisaged for that State would create 
greater unpredictability for all concerned. This concern was a direct descendent of 
Wigmore’s dissent to the American Law Institute Code of Evidence: 
…any proposal to hand over a subject to the “discretion” of the Trial Judge is to most 
practitioners ominous, and fertile of forebodings. Such proposals would have to be 
carefully protected by safety-measures.573 
The safe-guards, to which Wigmore alludes, are the appellate courts, which operate as 
reviewers of procedure rather than fact, as the trial at first instance is the best accepted 
platform from which to derive the facts of a contested matter, such as a criminal trial. 
Wigmore’s above quotation perceives a clear disdain from practitioners for judicial 
discretion and the associated unpredictability which pertains to such a mechanism.574 
There is a contrarian opinion available however, which suggests that the codification 
process does not actually curtail judicial discretion.575 The very first legislative reform 
Committees in the United States, which were tasked to delineate the process of 
codification, never envisaged that judicial discretion would be curtailed, let alone 
eradicated.576 The process of reviewing the rules of procedure, rather than a review of the 
substantive law is clear in the distinction between evidence law and the substantive 
criminal law. Professor Morgan supports this assertion: 
In such a system it seems too clear for debate that the rules which determine the legal 
relations between the parties when all the facts are known or assumed are rules of 
substance. All other rules have to do with the methods by which the machinery for the 
 
572 The four central points of opposition in New York were as follows: 1. The Courts were the best forum for 
the development of the law of evidence because of the intimacy that that forum has with the cases/matters 
which regularly come before those Courts; 2. Codification would prevent the natural development of the law 
of evidence, which had developed in this way for centuries; 3. Codification would actually create greater 
uncertainty and unpredictability than previously felt; and 4. That the real advocates for codification were legal 
academics who sought structured texts which were easier to manipulate than actual practitioners who were 
used to dealing with various sources of law at once.  
573 John H. Wigmore, ‘The American Law Institute Code of Evidence Rules: A Dissent’ (1942) 28 American 
Bar Association Journal 23, 24. 
574 Sigmund Samuel, ‘The Codification of Law’ (1943) 5(1) The University of Toronto Law Journal 148, 
150. In post-revolutionary France, the restraint placed upon judges extending the law found that “… the 
impulse toward codification sprang from the fear that the contrary system, of a free finding of law, was bound 
to favour those social classes from whom the judges were recruited.” 
575 Josiah H. Blackmore II, ‘The Ohio Evidence Rules: 105 Years of Heritage and Dilemma’ (1976-77) 6 The 
Capital University Law Review 533, 536.    





administration of justice is set in motion, the methods by which the limits of the 
controversy are defined and the materials for decision are to be presented and handled.577  
Any development of the law, so long as such safe-guards are in place, should not, as a 
result, be stymied. 
 
q. New Zealand lessons 
 
In New Zealand, the exclusionary rule for inadmissible evidence has been placed upon a 
statutory basis and has served to create two distinct consequences. It first places these 
‘Rules’ on a more consistent footing which cannot be easily altered and opens up the 
plethora of legislative interpretation approaches. By doing so, however, a second 
consequence emerged. It effectively takes pressure off presiding judges, who are already 
performing a taxing role amidst the throes of an adversarial trial process, by placing the 
application and discretionary elements of the Rule on an external basis. In essence, the 
exclusionary Rule is now externalised with greater transparency and less mystification for 
all concerned. It is a necessary, and in some ways, democratising process of the Irish 
criminal trial which sees placing the exclusionary rule on a statutory footing, and then a 
process of evidence law consolidation.  
The codification of a disparate body of law, such as evidence law, is challenging, 
especially for a criminal justice system which has been ingrained with the concept that if 
there is an evidential dispute in a trial context, the first crutch upon which to rest is the 
mountain of case-law generated in that area. Consolidation could, therefore, be the most 
appropriate mechanism. Common law tradition, along with the traditional role of the 
judiciary, is a significant barrier to reform in any institutionalised system of thought. The 
process of reform in New Zealand, however, ought to serve as an example to Ireland of 
what to avoid in the reform process, and for what should be sought to be achieved when 
consolidating evidence legislation. 
 
r. The New Zealand Evidence Act 2006 
 
The end result of reforming its version of evidence law in New Zealand arrived with the 
Evidence Act 2006. The process for reform, however, had begun in 1989, when the then 
 
577 Edmund, M. Morgan, ‘Rules of Evidence- Substantive or Procedural’ (1956-57) 10 Vanderbilt Law 





Minister for Justice for New Zealand lodged a Reference with the Law Commission 
which simply stated: 
Purpose: To make the law of evidence as clear, simple and accessible as is practicable, and to 
facilitate the fair, just and speedy judicial resolution of disputes.578  
The Minister for Justice also placed a Reference with regard to criminal procedure which, 
when read in conjunction with the above reference, may afford a more complete overview 
of the reform process in New Zealand. It reads as: 
To devise a system of criminal procedure for New Zealand that will ensure the fair trial of 
persons accused of offences, protect the rights and freedoms of all persons suspected or 
accused of offences, and provide effective and efficient procedures for the investigation 
and prosecution of offences and the hearing of criminal cases.579 
The above reference by the Minister for Justice is quite revealing. If read literally, it 
presumes that the criminal justice system that prevailed in that jurisdiction was not 
capable of ensuring a fair trial, incapable of protecting the rights of the accused and was 
ineffective and/or inefficient. That was somewhat of a stark admission that evidence law 
in New Zealand was not fit for purpose. In a report compiled by the New Zealand Law 
Commission, it was argued that: 
Problems resulting from ancient rules of the judge-made common law, themselves often 
neither precise nor readily accessible, have been met by ad hoc statutory reforms which 
have in turn presented difficulties of construction and of scope.580  
The Law Commission’s report loses much of its weight in delivering a limited argument 
for reform, as timely reminders that reform was indeed required were clouded with the 
clearly reformist bent of the report’s authors. A more balanced approach to the 
advantages and disadvantages of consolidation would have been far more beneficial.  
Turner J, for instance, illustrated by whom and how such required reform should 
be advanced: 
 
578 This glacial pace was instigated by the then Minister for Justice for New Zealand, Geoffrey Palmer, whose 
reference clearly envisaged a central role for the judiciary in driving the necessary reform process. 
579 New Zealand Law Commission Report, Evidence: Reform of the Law (Report 55, Vol. 1, Wellington, 
1999) XVIII. 
580 New Zealand Law Commission Report, Evidence: Reform of the Law (Report 55, Vol. 1, Wellington, 
1999) XVII. The Evidence Act 1908 in New Zealand contained many of the statutory codification of the basic 
elements of the evidence corpus of law, which was periodically amended or, indeed, supplemented by various 
legislation which arrived in response to significant alterations in the law of evidence in New Zealand. One 
such example was the promulgation of the Evidence Amendment Act (No. 2) 1980 in Wellington in response 





…[t]he law of evidence is Judge-made law, directed to the control of the processes by 
which Judges daily endeavour to do justice...if it requires modification, that modification 
is particularly a matter with which the Judges should be entrusted.581 
The tensions between the branches of government are clear in Turner J’s language, and 
that of the Law Commission, which sought to obtain change through the parliamentary 
process: 
The Evidence Code is intended to replace most of the existing common law and statutory 
provisions on the admissibility and use of evidence in court proceedings. The significant 
reform proposed by the Code will not achieve its purpose unless it is accompanied by a 
change in approach by practitioners and the judiciary.582 
The process of evidence reform is not without its critics. The main issues concerning 
codification/consolidation is one of culture for many traditional common law lawyers. 
This chapter has shown that codification is an active process in common law jurisdictions, 




The JC judgment has altered discretion-based implementation of the exclusionary rule. 
That is clear. If the rule goes down one road which sees controversial evidence being 
admitted at trial, such a rule requires to be afforded parameters which must be done 
through appropriate legislation. If the rule goes down the other road, with the rule’s 
implementation developing conservatively, which is yet to be confirmed, the need for 
legislation in relation to the rule, may not be so urgent, but is still being requested here, as 
there is no faith that the appellate courts will ensure a consistent refinement of the test. 
This lack of faith is based on the analysis of how the appellate courts have handled other 
areas of evidence law, where judicial discretion is central and their failure to intervene in 
a meaningful way. Codification may not be fit for purpose. The alternative, which is 
argued for, is the process of consolidation, which requires greater input from many 
sources in Irish law reform, including the Law Reform Commission, who has been tardy 
on this subject to date.  
 
581 Ibid, per Turner J. in Jorgensen v News Media Ltd. [1969] NZLR 961, 990-991. 
582 New Zealand Law Commission Report, Evidence 3. The final sentence in the above quotation is of 





 There is of course a place for the appellate courts to refine the law of evidence in 
this jurisdiction. The next chapter will detail the appellate courts’ role and evaluate its 



































The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘refinement’ as: 
The refining of a substance or product; the removing of impurities or unwanted elements 
by some process, or series of processes.583 
It is somewhat of an artificial construct to suggest that a term (which is normally 
associated with manufacturing industries) could be applied to the process of judicial law-
making. The term implicitly requires that a simplification or reduction in an item’s 
quantity is undertaken.584 Evidence rules, disparate as they are in source, still form an 
identifiable corpus of law which can be utilised at trial, even though evidence law has not 
been successfully refined through codification in Ireland.585 The doctrine of stare decisis, 
instead, is supposed to fuel consistency in the application of judicial discretion.586 This is 
not to conflate the roles of judicial law-making with the function of a final court of appeal 
overturning its own past decision, on a particular point of law.587 Both are examples of 
judicial law-making actions which seek to refine prospective law.588 Previous chapters 
have established that judicial discretion plays a pivotal role in deciding upon evidence 
admissibility, and that that discretion does not extend to the application of evidence rules. 
This chapter argues that it is the appellate courts’ role to accept the refinement of 
evidence principles, in the same manner that the legislature —at times in the past— has 
attempted to consolidate statutory evidence law.589 It is further argued that this task of 
 
583 Oxford English Dictionary (Online Version) available at www.oed.com <accessed on 9th September 2017 
at 09:43>. 
584 Richard M. Re, ‘Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court’ (2014) 114(7) Columbia Law Review 1861-
1911 where Re argues that the process of narrowing is a practice that is not unique to the United States federal 
system.  
585 LRC 117-126, Report on the Consolidation and Reform Aspects of the Law of Evidence (Law Reform 
Commission 2016), 341; Margaret Berger, ‘The Federal Rules of Evidence: Defining and Refining the Goals 
of Codification’ (1983-84) 12 Hofstra Law Review 255, 259, wherein Berger argues that codification leads 
to less evidence being excluded from the triers of fact in the United States. 
586 Robert Noonan, ‘Stare Decisis, Overruling, and Judicial Law-Making: The Paradox of the JC Case’ (2017) 
57 The Irish Jurist 119-143. Stare decisis is a common law doctrine which can only work effectively if a 
certain deference is shown to past judgments. 
587 Noonan focuses only on the issue of courts of a concurrent level (ie. the Supreme Court) overruling its 
own past decisions as a source of law-making, without focusing on the role of the appellate courts in their 
role as the refining body of legal principle. 
588 This chapter will focus primarily on the trials which have been outlined earlier in the study and which, 
over the course of tie, have been appealed to the superior appellate courts present in Ireland.   
589 The Law Reform Commission’s evidence codification project and the aborted Codification Bill brought 





refinement is hampered by the deference appellate courts show trial courts, particularly in 
the determination of facts. 
An assessment of whether the current Irish court architecture is conducive to the 
refinement of evidence law principles is undertaken in this chapter with the following 
outline:  
a. the identification of observed trials from a specified period of field-work,  
b. the identification and an assessment made of which trial courts furnished most 
and least appeals within this specified period, in order to examine why this may be so,  
c. identification of rulings of evidence admissibility within the trials at first 
instance, and  
d. conducting an assessment as to how the grounds of appeal were treated by the 
appellate courts.590  
The chapter seeks to illuminate whether the appellate courts are capable of performing 
their role in regulating judicial discretion, by refining evidence law principles. To make 
this assessment, the current appellate court system requires to be first outlined. 
 
a. Chapter methodology 
The trials analysed in previous chapters, and in the current chapter, were all matters 
brought on indictment and/or scheduled offences sent forward for trial from the District 
Court to either the Circuit Criminal Court, the Central Criminal Court or the SCC 
respectively.591 The trials analysed were heard at first instance throughout the calendar 
 
Appeal (Criminal) and the Supreme Court. The Thirty-Third Amendment to the Constitution of Ireland 1937 
altered the Appellate Court structure in Ireland which had been in its pre-Referendum state since the 1960s. 
The cases which have been studied previously have been on indictment and/or scheduled offences under the 
Offences against the State Act 1939, and so appeals from such trials are heard by the Superior Courts within 
the Irish court structure. However, as mentioned above, the Circuit Court does act as a court of appeal for 
District Court matters, along with the High Court which can hear both cases stated by a District Court Judge 
and a consultative case stated during the currency of a trial before the District Court. The Irish legislature’s 
main contribution to the consolidation process is still the Criminal Evidence Act 1992 (No. 12 of 1992) (as 
amended).  
590 This is a limited study and does not purport to be a definitive identifier of particular trends in the appellate 
courts when it comes to refining evidence principles. It is, instead, a snap-shot of the appellate courts’ function 
from a period of timeIt is incorrect to insinuate that every ground of appeal brought by the appellant was due 
to a ruling made by the trial judge in question in a voir dire. The judge’s charge to the jury after both sides 
have finished their case remains a source of grounds of appeal.  
591 Criminal Procedure Act 1967, s 4A as inserted by s 9 of the Criminal Justice Act 1999 (commenced by 
Criminal Justice Act 1999 (Part III) (Commencement) Order 2001 (SI No. 193 of 2001) art. 2. The first year 
of this study, as has been already mentioned, was 2012. Criminal trials heard in this year, and which have 
been subsequently appealed, have been heard at this stage in most of the cases. Some criminal trials which 
were appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal, for some appeals lodged before the establishment of the new 
Court of Appeal in October 2014. Some trials, which were heard in 2012, and which were appealed to the 





year of 2012. These appeals were taken from each of the three courts which have been 
included in the study to date and have either been heard on appeal by the Court of 
Criminal Appeal, the Court of Appeal and/or the Supreme Court. It is sought to broadly 
analyse the appellate court’s decision in relation to how that court interpreted its role in 
the development of evidence law. 
 
b. Brief background to the current appeals system  
The busiest criminal trial courts in Ireland are the District Courts, from which a de novo 
appeal lies to the Circuit Court wherein that District Court sits.592 An appeal from the 
Circuit Criminal Court goes to the Court of Appeal, as does an appeal from the Central 
Criminal Court.593 The appellate court system in Ireland was significantly altered with the 
passing of the thirty-third amendment to the Constitution referendum, which introduced 
the ‘new’ Court of Appeal in 2014.594 This realignment is crucial to an assessment being 
made of whether the appellate courts are in a position to effectively regulate judicial 
discretion. 
 
point of law of public importance. For an assessment of the machinations of the new Court of Appeal which 
sits in divisions dedicated to either civil or criminal matters (with the criminal division sitting permanently in 
the Courts of Criminal Justice in Dublin) see Ms. Justice Mary Finlay Geoghegan, ‘The New Supreme Court 
and Court of Appeal: 2014 to 2016 and their Future’ (2017) 20(1) Trinity College Law Review 5-29, in which 
Finlay Geoghegan J laments the fact that the number of judges on the Court of Appeal has not been increased 
to meet demand. There are currently sixteen (16) permanent members of the Court of Appeal, with two ex 
officio members (the Chief Justice and the President of the High Court).  
592 This appeal is a de novo (a new trial) appeal to the Circuit Criminal Court where the Circuit Judge will 
hear the matter without a jury and is limited, in sentencing terms, to the jurisdiction of the District Court 
below, usually a maximum cumulative figure of twenty-four months’ imprisonment. Section 18 (1) of the 
Courts of Justice Act 1928 (as amended by s 100(14) of the Criminal Justice Act 2006) states: “An appeal 
shall lie in criminal cases from a Justice of the District Court against any order (not being merely an order 
returning for trial or binding to the peace or good behaviour) for the payment of a penal or other sum or for 
the doing of anything at any expense or for the estreating of any recognizance or for the undergoing of any 
term of imprisonment by the person against whom the order shall be made.” For a broad analysis of the 
volume of cases before the District Court in modern times, and an analysis of the jury system on the island 
of Ireland see John D. Jackson, Katie Quinn and Tom O’Malley, ‘The Jury System in Contemporary Ireland: 
In the Shadow of a Troubled Past’ 1999 (2) Law and Contemporary Problems 203-32.     
593 The statutory foundation of the Central Criminal Court is found in s 11 of the Courts (Supplemental 
Provisions) Act 1961. 
594 The People were asked, on the referendum ballot paper, if they agreed with the proposal- (a) to amend the 
Constitution for the purpose of establishing a court to be called the Court of Appeal, (b) as a consequence, to 
amend other provisions of the Constitution, in particular, the provisions relating to the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court to hear and determine appeals from the decisions of the High Court and of other courts, and 
(c) to delete subsection 5 of Article 34.4 of the Constitution, known as the “one judgment” rule, relating to 
decisions of the Supreme Court on a question of whether a law is valid having regard to the provisions of the 
Constitution.”  
The Thirty-Third Amendment Referendum was passed by the People of Ireland with a total number of votes 
in favour of the Amendment totalling 795,008, with 425,047 votes against the proposal. Results obtained 
from Referendum Results 1937-2015 (Department of Housing, Planning, Community and Local Government, 





Article 34.4.1° of the Irish Constitution details the Court of Appeal and its 
function in broad terms.595 The establishment of the first, permanent intermediary court 
between a criminal trial court on indictment and the Supreme Court in this jurisdiction 
was meant to promote the reincarnation of the Supreme Court as an exclusively 
constitutional court.596 The Executive Summary of the Report of the Working Group on a 
Court of Appeal 597 stated: 
…that there is general international acceptance that appeal courts fulfil one of two 
functions. The first is to correct the errors of lower courts. The second is to ensure the 
consistency and coherence of the legal system by providing guidance to lower courts in 
cases involving issues of public interest or concern.598 
Raz also points out that an appellate court must regulate trial judge discretion.599 Having 
considered other options in alleviating the series of cases which were waiting to be heard, 
or were waiting to obtain a hearing date before the Supreme Court, the Report of the 
Working Group recommended the establishment of a Court of Appeal as an intermediary 
court with a clear role in shaping criminal evidence law.600 The Working Group’s 2009 
Report also recommended that a ‘leap frog’ mechanism should be established, so that 
certain cases could still be appealed, for example, directly from the High Court to the 
 
595 Article 34.4.1° states: “The Court of Appeal shall— i save as otherwise provided by this Article, and ii 
with such exceptions and subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law, have appellate jurisdiction 
from all decisions of the High Court, and shall also have appellate jurisdiction from such decisions of other 
courts as may be prescribed by law. 2° No law shall be enacted excepting from the appellate jurisdiction of 
the Court of Appeal cases which involve questions as to the validity of any law having regard to the provisions 
of this Constitution. 3° The decision of the Court of Appeal shall be final and conclusive, save as otherwise 
provided by this Article. 
The enabling legislation passed by the Oireachtas was the Court of Appeal Act 2014, s 8. 
596 It was envisaged by the Fine Gael/Labour coalition government that the Supreme Court’s four-and-a-half-
year case back-log would be transferred, in effect, to a Court of Appeal, leaving the Supreme Court to, 
eventually, become a truly constitutional court. 
597 The background to the Referendum began in December 2006 when the Fianna Fáil/Progressive Democrat 
Coalition government established the Working Group on a Court of Appeal.    
598 Report of the Working Group on a Court of Appeal (May 2009) 4.  
599 Joseph Raz, The Concept of a Legal System: An Introduction to the Theory of Legal System (2nd edn, 
Clarendon Press 1980) 97.   
600 Report of the Working Group on a Court of Appeal, 13. Prior to the Thirty-Third Amendment to the 
Constitution being voted on by the People of Ireland, there was an automatic right to appeal from the High 
Court to the Supreme Court. For a criticism that the establishment of the new Court of Appeal has not 
alleviated the problem of an access to justice for appellants, and that for a more fundamental change in the 
way appeal cases are heard in Irish appellate courts, See Seth Barrett Tillman, ‘The Court of Appeal Backlog’ 
2017 (35) 15 Irish Law Times 206-08. Tillman argues, in effect, for the significant reduction of oral hearings 
in appeal cases with paper-only appeals being the norm rather than the exception, which would, according to 
Tillman, serve to reduce the amount of time the judiciary on the court of appeal must hear oral arguments 
which are usually already in the papers anyway. Tillman also found, having analysed the Courts Service 
Annual Report for 2016 that the Court of Appeal has increased the back-log of cases which are waiting to be 





Supreme Court.601 Due to the new system of appeals which was created upon the 
establishment of the Court of Appeal in October 2014, the Supreme Court now hears 
appeals predominately from the Court of Appeal, in instances where a point of law of 
public importance is successfully raised, or the Supreme Court determines that, in the 
interests of justice, it is necessary for that court to hear the appeal. The decision whether 
to hear the matter on appeal in the Supreme Court is called a ‘determination’.602  
 
c. Appeals in 2012 
The following figures are derived from the three criminal trial courts which possess the 
jurisdiction to hear charges brought by indictment in Ireland.603  
 









# of Trials 39 55 74 36 
# of appeals from 
these trials 
4 9 13 5 
% going to appeal 10 16 18 14 
*Note: All courts were observed over the calendar year rather than the legal year 
 
The SCC was the second least likely court to produce an appeal from its verdict. The 
reason as to why the SCC is one of the least appealed against trial courts, within the 
context of this study, is not immediately clear.604 The structure of the trial in the SCC 
should not, one would think, be wholly different from the ordinary courts of criminal 
justice which would lead to the insistence of fewer appeals being brought.605  
 
d. Practitioner insight into the Special Criminal Court 
During the field-work research phase, interviews were conducted with several 
experienced criminal law practitioners.606 Two Counsel, in particular, spoke fluently on 
 
601 Report of the Working Group on a Court of Appeal 13.  
602 It was one of the initiatives of the Report on a Court of Appeal, and an initiative which was clearly 
supported by Denham CJ, to publish these determinations on the courts service website, www.courts.ie.  
603 The Circuit Criminal Court (Dublin and Provincial), the Central Criminal Court and the Special Criminal 
Court. These figures are derived from records on file with author and by a scan of the judgments published 
by the appellate courts who have heard these cases and from which a written judgment is available to the 
public.  
604 One possible reason for so few appeals being taken by parties in the Special Criminal Court could be the 
fact that that court possesses professional fact-finders. As part of the field-work undertaken, prominent 
Special Criminal Court practitioners were contacted for their views on the running of trials in that Court. 
605 One difference is the handling of evidence by professional judges in a unique manner.  





the issues they face when presenting a trial in the non-jury court.607 Their responses are 
included at this juncture as they reveal the complexity of conducting a trial in the SCC, 
which may proffer reasons as to why this court does not render more appeals. Counsel 
‘A’ was asked in interview by the author:  
 
Author: How many years’ experience would you have in practicing in the Special?  
 
Counsel ‘A’: Very quickly, after I was on, I practiced in the Special on both sides, very 
early on, my first trial in the Special was [name of accused], who has since been killed, 
that was certainly in the ‘90s at some stage, em, it’s different, it’s not at all different in 
relation to a voir dire, because one judge or three judges is the same thing in the voir 
dire, what they have heard, if they have ruled things out, well they still carry on and act 
as jury. 
 
Author: And what’s your view on the judges seemingly taking one cap off and then 
proceeding as if they hadn’t heard that evidence? 
  
Counsel ‘A’: Well, it depends on whether or not you can humanly do that, em, I think it’s 
not best practice, even though I think they do make an effort, I mean I think they are 
pretty conscientious; the group that are currently there, certainly the High Court judges 




Counsel ‘A’: …so you are dependent upon somebody quite deliberately putting it out of 
their mind… it’s part of the problem in relation to disclosure up there [the Special 
Criminal Court], you can’t use the court to be the disclosure filter…608 
 
Counsel ‘A’ then described how the dynamics of the SCC are conducive to an even more 
intense adversarial atmosphere than in the ordinary courts of criminal justice: 
 
Counsel ‘A’: Well, in practice the Special Criminal Court is, em, what I call the ‘EA 
Games Defence’…  
 
607 Counsel ‘A’ is a practicing Senior Counsel with over twenty years’ experience in the criminal courts. 
Counsel ‘B’ is an experienced junior counsel, first beginning their practice in the criminal courts in 2002.  





Author: You’ll have to elaborate on that…  
 
Counsel ‘A’: … Do you know there used to be, do you know the computer games, ‘EA 
Games’ is one of the companies that makes them, and they used to have an ad…it would 
stop and a man’s voice would say “EA Games- Challenge Everything”. That was their 
logo line, or whatever it was, so the Special Criminal Court is the “EA Games Court”, 
you challenge, in practice, you challenge everything, because your client, usually, 
certainly in membership cases or anything to do with the IRA, you are going to have very 
little [sic] instructions, if anything, other than “I’m not guilty, so do your best” …  
 
Counsel ‘A’: Well it is, and the way it’s run in practice is that it is, the trial within a trial 
is adopted into the trial so it’s not done a second time whereas in the jury courts you have 
a voir dire and evidence is heard and then the jury comes out, and yeah, that has its own 
flaws because witnesses know now obviously where issues are, but it’s still a preferable 
way of doing it… in the Special they hear the voir dire and almost universally adopt the 
evidence of the voir dire into the trial without it being repeated. 
…  
And in terms of how it is artificial to the rules of evidence, I’m not sure, I mean there is 
an actual voir dire, the same rules of evidence apply, its once they’re then admitted, well 
they are admitted usually on the basis of evidence having being heard in technically a 
voir dire or if they are excluded, well then, you’re back to the problem of how the tribunal 
of fact puts it out of its mind seeing that it is the same tribunal that decided on the law.  
 …  
 
But in terms of the rules of evidence, no in fact the Special is in some ways, some of the 
judges in the Special are much more precise in the application of the rules of evidence 
because, I suspect, that they have more experience of them, every single case they do, 
every single point is pretty much taken, so they are more alive to them, and you find often 
in other courts, judges who are much less familiar with even the process, even criminal 
judges who are much less familiar with it and much more sceptical of the whole idea of 
voir dires and technical rules of evidence, so in some ways the Special, strangely enough, 
you can get a better hearing of the technical issues of admissibility, than you might get in 
a…in a jury court. 






Counsel ‘B’ also conducted trials in the SCC and his answers reveal further reasons as to 
why it was the least appealed against trial court in 2012: 
 
Counsel ‘B’: I think that the SCC is a court where you may find that when you’re 
defending that you get points decided in your favour which you mightn’t get decided in 
your favour in the jury courts.  
 …  
 
I think that the judges there, because it’s an area where you are dealing with the Offences 
against the State Act 1939 usually, and there are a lot of technical issues with arrests 
under that Act, with detentions under that Act and also, especially in membership cases, 
because the judges recognise that the Chief Super’s opinion evidence is so powerful and 
it’s also not really subject to strong review; they’re very careful to ensure that all of the 
other evidence in the case that might go to be corroborative of that is admissible and they 
are, or have been prepared to rule out evidence in cases where perhaps judges in a jury 
trial might not have been, and I think it’s on the basis that they know that the stakes are 
high but also there is, they know that there are very strong powers granted to the Gardaí 
and to the State in general. So, in those cases, they actually require 100% adherence to 
them, and if there’s any slippage, they will give the benefit of the doubt to the accused 
person on the admissibility of that evidence… 
 
…it is different because a jury isn’t there, I think a jury has a good effect on lawyers 
because you have to try and explain things and make it understandable for them, I think 
people are slightly better behaved, I think in the SCC it has its own peculiar atmosphere, 
and it’s different because you can say things short-hand to the judge that you wouldn’t 
say before a jury, the judge will or the judges will understand it, but it does mean that it 
doesn’t run exactly the way a trial would before a jury...I think the worst rows I’ve ever 
seen between lawyers and judges have been in the non-jury court where temperatures get 
very high and I think a jury has an effect where people are a little more civil, certainly in 
my experience the most tense atmospheres in a trial court that I’ve been in have all been 
in the Special. 
 
It appears, according to these two experienced SCC practitioners, that the trial procedure 
in that court, whilst being intense, produces a higher quality of admissibility rulings than 
those delivered in the ordinary jury courts. Both Counsel spoke of feeling, in a sense, that 





court. The rulings delivered were of a more comprehensive quality, as the SCC’s bench 
were used to dealing with evidence admissibility issues.609 Both Counsel did not believe 
that the quality of rulings, which appeared to be higher in the SCC, had, in any way, 
something to do with the fact that there were fewer constraints on the judges in the non-
jury court regarding progressing the trial expeditiously due to the presence of a lay-
jury.610    
 
e. The appellate courts’ refinement process 
The court which faced the fewest appeals in 2012 was the SCC.611 The element of the 
verdict against which an appeal was lodged is included (ie. whether the appeal was 
against the sentence or conviction or both) and, most importantly, an analysis of how the 
appellate courts developed its role in the development of the rules of evidence, if the 
opportunity arose to do so of course.612 This foundational question is posed for all 
judgments of the appellate courts who heard appeals in these matters.  
The Supreme Court in People (DPP) v Madden set out the parameters in which 
the Court of Criminal Appeal (as it then was) could interfere with the decision reached by 
the trial court.613 It was held by O’Higgins CJ, inter alia, that:  
…the Court of Criminal Appeal will normally accept a finding of fact made by the court 
of trial, but the Appellate court is free to draw its own inferences from the facts so found 
or from matters admitted.614   
O’Higgins CJ relied on the old Court of Appeal (Ireland) decision in Aberdeen Glen Line 
Steamship Co. v Macken (The SS “Gairloch”).615 In The SS “Gairloch”, Holmes LJ 
 
609 This particular point of reason does not elicit the sort of logic that one would expect considering that trial 
judges, albeit not dealing in the same volume of admissibility issues than their Special Criminal Court 
counterparts, still deal with several admissibility issues per trial, on average. Furthermore, the Special 
Criminal Court’s bench is usually drawn from the ordinary criminal court’s list of presiding judges.   
610 The consensus being that conscientious judges would read the materials in preparing their rulings 
regardless of perceived time constraints regardless of the jury’s presence.  
611 It is intended to examine the judgments of the appellate courts who heard the appeals from trials which 
had been heard in the SCC. 
612 There is an element of an artificial construct about the above methodology in the sense that not every time 
an appeal is lodged against a sentence or conviction for example will allow the appellate court the opportunity 
to pronounce on high about which direction of the laws of evidence ought to take in the future and, equally, 
not every appeal will afford the opportunity to forge a new direction for the laws of evidence. Having 
recognised this encumbrance however, it is necessary to state that the Court of Appeal/Supreme Court can 
only deal with the appeals that are brought, and this thesis examines the appeals which have been brought, 
not those which ought to have been brought. 
613 [1977] 1 IR 336 (SC).  
614 Ibid.  





referred to the role of the appellate judge in relation to the extent to which that judge 
could intervene in a trial court’s ruling: 
When a Judge after trying a case upon viva voce evidence comes to a conclusion 
regarding a specific and definite matter of fact, this finding ought not to be reversed by a 
Court that has not had the same opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses unless it 
is so clearly against the weight of the testimony as to amount to a manifest defeat of 
justice.616  
Madden was followed in People (DPP) v Campion, where Birmingham J wrote that: 
The arguments advanced on behalf of the defence invite this Court to substitute its views 
for those of the trial judge on matters of primary fact. The established jurisprudence of 
appellate courts in Ireland indicate that primary facts are for the courts of first instance 
which have seen and heard the evidence given and seen the evidence tested in cross 
examination.617  
The following paragraphs will seek to explore how the principles, as extolled by Irish 
appellate courts, have contributed to an appropriate safeguard against the more 
unpredictable elements of judicial discretion.  
 
f. Appealed cases from the Special Criminal Court 
Five cases tried before the SCC in 2012 resulted in a written judgment emanating from an 
appeal court at either the intermediary Court of Appeal level, or the Supreme Court of last 
resort.618 The most significant of which was the judgment delivered by the appellate 
courts in People (DPP) v Derek Palmer and Joseph Clarke, which was heard at first 
instance by the SCC in December 2012. The matter was subsequently heard by the Court 
of Appeal, which delivered judgment in July 2015.619 There were two voir dires 
conducted during the hearing of the trial in the SCC.620 It may be assumed that these voir 
 
616 Aberdeen Glen Line Steamship Co. v Macken (The SS “Gairloch”) [1899] 2 IR 1, 18.  
617 [2015] IECA 190, para [35].  
618 An appeal determined by the Supreme Court may of course, be taken, in certain circumstances to the 
European Court of Human Rights. It is difficult to ascertain how many other appeals were heard by an 
appellate court in which no written judgment was issued. The appellate court, of course, could deliver an ex 
tempore judgment rather than issue a reserved judgment. The problem here is that ex tempore judgments, 
even on appeal, are not usually published by the legal databases such as courts.ie, Justis and westlaw.ie for 
example.  
619 [2015] IECA 153, one of the Counsel interviewed as part of the field-work of this study acted as counsel 
for one of the accused.   
620 Trial notes on file with author. The 2012 trial against this accused (his co-accused was also found guilty 
but did not appeal) was in relation to a membership of an unlawful organisation charge pursuant to s 21 of 
the Offences against the State Act 1939 (as amended by s 48 of the Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 





dires, as set-pieces, could be the elements of the trial from which the grounds of appeal 
may be derived.   
 
g. The subject-matter of the voir dires in Palmer and Clarke 
The first voir dire broached by the Special Criminal Court arrived on the trial’s third day 
and emanated from the first named accused’s testimony.621 Defence submissions focused 
upon the accused’s detention after the vehicle he was driving was stopped by Gardaí.622 
The voir dire’s issue was whether Palmer had been lawfully detained whilst the search of 
the vehicle was carried out, but allegedly, before any formal arrest was affected, along 
with the appropriate caution being administered.623 It transpired that the Gardaí asked the 
first named accused to hand over the vehicle’s keys and the engine was turned off 
throughout the search.  
The prosecution addressed the Court on this voir dire first, as the State possessed 
the burden of proving that the accused was lawfully detained before his arrest. Counsel 
for the prosecution argued: 
His car was being searched, lawfully searched, there was nothing wrong with that, but he 
himself — nobody tried to prevent him walking away, using shank's mare, as it were, to 
leave the area if he so wished. And it hasn't been put to any member of An Garda 
Síochána that he was being corralled, that he was forcibly being kept at the scene, so I 
submit that his detention doesn't arise until 22:35.624   
Defence Counsel focused upon the evidence given by Gardaí who were controlling the 
scene in his submissions. The scene comprised ten men standing against a wall, one of 
whom was the first named accused.625 The issue was distilled to the accused’s assertion 
 
621 Legal argument on the issue had just been heard and the Court delivered its ruling there and then, in ex 
tempore fashion. 
622 The occupants were then asked to get out and stand against a nearby wall whilst Gardaí searched the 
vehicle. 
623 The vehicle which the first named accused was driving was stopped by Gardaí at approximately 22:00 on 
the night in question. The first named accused’s arrest was affected at approximately 22:35, upon which he 
was conveyed to a local Garda station in north County Dublin. The voir dire was essentially concerned with 
the period of time between 22:00 and 22:35 when the Gardaí were searching the vehicle which the first named 
accused was driving and during which time the first named accused was asked to stand against a nearby wall.   
624 Trial notes, People (DPP) v Palmer & Clarke, Day 3, on file with author. The evidence of the Garda 
member who stopped the vehicle on the night came on day 2 of the trial, where he stated: “They were being 
detained for the purpose of the search, Judge, and that while other units arrived they were there to assist us 
while I conducted a search in the car." 
625 The evidence in relation to the scene was given on the second day of the trial and Counsel cited a particular 
exchange with one Garda member in cross-examination:  
“Garda witness: There was a number of guards in close proximity to the gentlemen present at all times. 





that he was not searched during this detention period of thirty-five minutes and, as such, 
this period of detention was unlawful. The Gardaí who testified could not accurately 
recall if the first named accused was in fact searched at all during this thirty-five-minute 
period.626  
 
h. The trial court’s voir dire ruling in Palmer & Clarke 
The Special Criminal Court rejected the defence application that the accused had been 
illegally detained. The defence argued that since the accused was not searched under s 30 
of the Offences against the State Act 1939 (as amended) during the thirty-five-minute 
period between being initially stopped and being arrested; he should have been allowed to 
leave the scene unimpeded. The court, in its ruling stated, inter alia: 
We found him [the accused] to be evasive and inconsistent in his evidence and he raised 
matters that were not put to garda witnesses. As it transpired, the accused was not 
searched until immediately after his arrest, but this does not take away from the fact there 
was a bona fide intention to search him. The arrest merely intervened…the Court is 
satisfied that the accused was not detained other than in the course of a lawful search and 
there was no breach of his constitutional or legal rights.627 
The ruling was succinct, but it is also laced with judicial discretion on whether the facts 
of the situation could be assimilated into the application of the law of evidential 
admissibility.  
 
i. Subsequent rulings in Palmer & Clarke and verdict 
The second defence application was for a directed acquittal verdict to be issued.628 The 
SCC’s ruling was issued after an overnight interval. The Court’s verdict came after the 
evidence in the trial had been heard, which had been comprehensive. The matters argued 
by the defence regarding the directed verdict were not, however, dealt with by the Court 
 
weren't going to leave? Garda witness: Well, at that time there was no indication that anything like that was 
going to happen. The 10 gentlemen, they were standing together, herded together like sheep." 
626 Defence counsel summed up his argument as being: “But critically, in circumstances where a guard tells 
a citizen that he is being detained for the purpose of a search, then in my respectful submission, it is incumbent 
upon the guards to actually effect or carry out that particular search.” 
627 People (DPP) v Palmer & Clarke, trial notes, Day 3, on file with author.  
628 The directed acquittal application was grounded on the following grounds: a. the admissibility of the 
activities at a house in County Dublin, b. the admissibility of the Chief Superintendent’s opinion, c. the 
admissibility of fingerprint evidence found on a Republican paramilitary magazine located in the vehicle the 
accused was driving at the time of arrest, d. the fact that the accused was pictured in a magazine piece 
attending a Republican funeral, e. the balaclava found in the back seat of the said vehicle, and f. the accused’s 





in chronological order. The objection to the Chief Superintendent’s opinion evidence was 
ruled upon as: 
This [ground] relates to the opinion evidence of the Chief Superintendent and the fact that 
the confidential information that he relies upon was not shared with the prosecutor. And it 
is incumbent upon the prosecutor herself to consider that material. We can find no basis 
for what would, in our view, amount to an exercise in setting down new procedures to be 
followed by the prosecution.629 
The Court held that the inferences drawn under s 2 of the Offences against the State 
(Amendment) Act 1998 due to the accused’s failure to answer relevant questions in Garda 
interviews were appropriately drawn: 
The Court is satisfied that the said failures of each of the accused to answer the questions 
was [sic] wilful, deliberate and calculated. The Court is satisfied beyond doubt on the 
evidence that the section [s 2 of the 1998 Act] was explained to each of the accused on 
a number of occasions by the gardaí in the course of interview…The Court is satisfied 
that it is entitled to draw an inference that the accused…was a member of the IRA from 
their failures to answer the questions.630 
The fingerprint evidence issues, for example, were not corroborative factors of the Chief 
Superintendent’s belief evidence.  
 
j. The Court of Appeal’s judgment in Palmer 
One of the two accused appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeal.631 The appeal 
grounds were outlined by that Court at paragraph 3 of its judgment: 
First, it is contended that the belief evidence of the Garda Chief Superintendent should 
not have been admitted by the Special Criminal Court because the Director of Public 
Prosecutions had not been able to assess the reliability of that evidence. Secondly, the 
trial Court should not have accorded weight to that evidence when the officer refused to 
give any information as to the basis of his belief. Thirdly, the appellant submits that the 
trial Court erred in determining that the appellant had refused to answer questions and in 
drawing inferences from such erroneous determination.632 
 
629 People (DPP) v Palmer & Clarke, trial notes, Day 10, on file with author.  
630 Ibid, trial notes on file with author. 
631 [2015] IECA 153, notably on the copy of the Court of Appeal’s judgment accessed via westlaw.ie, the 
name of the judge who penned the judgment is not given. The appellant (Palmer) was subsequently sentenced 
by the Special Criminal Court to 6 ½ years’ imprisonment, with one year suspended. The appellant appealed 
against his conviction and, if that was unsuccessful, the sentence imposed on the grounds of severity.  
632 Ibid, para 3. The grounds more fully stated are as follows: Ground No. 1: The learned Trial Judges erred 
in allowing into evidence and/or in giving weight to the opinion evidence of Detective Chief Superintendent 





At paragraph 32, the Court of Appeal rejected the contention that the Director should 
have first viewed the confidential information over which the Chief Superintendent 
claimed privilege, and with which he formed his opinion that the accused was a member 
of an unlawful organisation: 
The section [s 3 (2) of the 1972 Act] does not refer to a Chief Superintendent's opinion 
being reviewed by the Director of Public Prosecutions. Any review by [T]he Director of 
Public Prosecutions of the Chief Superintendent's belief would not be admissible as it is 
his belief that is provided for by the legislation. The information that is available to the 
Chief Superintendent may not be such as would be intelligible on its own, per se, and any 
examination of such material by the Director of Public Prosecutions could, in any event, 
be a pointless exercise.633  
The Court of Appeal relied on the Supreme Court’s judgment in People (DPP) v Special 
Criminal Court, where O’Flaherty J held that an accused’s Counsel could request that the 
SCC itself view the documents/file over which privilege was claimed by a Garda Chief 
Superintendent.634 
The Court of Appeal rejected the first appeal ground but, in doing so, that Court 
reiterated that the ‘belief evidence’ is of the Chief Superintendent being called as a 
witness only. It is not the belief of the multitude of sources which form that member’s 
opinion:  
This ground of appeal and the submissions supporting it suffer from the misunderstanding 
that the evidence before the Court is of the Officer passing on hearsay information. The 
distinction may at first- sight appear to be a fine one between a belief based on 
confidential information from a variety of sources, on one hand, and reporting 
 
based and therefore had no opportunity to assess the reliability of that evidence or the suitability of the claim 
of privilege over it. Further or in the alternative, this evidence should not have been admitted without being 
subject to independent scrutiny and confirmation. Ground No. 2: The learned Trial Judges erred in law and 
in their assessment of the facts in allowing into evidence and/or giving weight to the opinion evidence of the 
Detective Chief Superintendent regarding membership of an illegal organisation when the Chief 
Superintendent declined to provide any information or detail as to the basis upon which his opinion was 
arrived at. Con-joined Ground Nos. 4 and 5: The learned Trial Judges erred in determining that the appellant 
had failed to answer questions material to his membership of the Irish Republican Army in the answers which 
he gave under caution, prior to the invocation of s 2 of the Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act 
1998, and the learned Trial Judges erred in law and on the facts in assessing that the appellant had failed to 
answer questions material to his membership of the Irish Republican Army, within the meaning of s 2 of the 
Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act 1998, and in weighing this as evidence of his guilt. 
633 [2015] IECA 153, para 32.  
634 The Court of Appeal further commented that: “In the Special Criminal Court/Ward case, O'Flaherty J 
agreed with the judgment of Carney J in the High Court that when the issue of privilege is raised, the Court 
of trial can review the material. It was submitted that it was open for the appellant to make a request of the 
Special Criminal Court to review the information that was in the possession of the Chief Superintendent to 
ascertain the veracity of same. He did not do so.” Ibid, para. 34. This is not a novel venture for a trial court 





information provided by others, on the other hand. However, as the case of Donnelly & 
Ors makes clear, the distinction is an important one for a proper understanding of the 
section and how it operates.635 
The appellate court did assert an interpretative point on s 3 (2) of the Offences against the 
State Act (Amendment) 1972, which does provide guidance for future references to this 
type of evidence; a common feature in membership trials in the SCC. 
 
k. Court of Appeal’s finding on failure to answer questions ground 
This ground challenged the trial court’s finding in relation to the appellant’s failure to 
answer relevant questions going towards his guilt.636 The appellate court was emphatic in 
its rejection of the defence argument, stating at para. 51:  
This Court is of the view that the Special Criminal Court considered the questioning of 
the accused carefully and arrived at a conclusion which is unchallengeable on appeal. 
There is no basis for suggesting that the Court was mistaken in its assessment and this 
Court finds no basis on which it would be entitled to interfere with the considered 
judgment of the Special Criminal Court on this matter. 
It could be argued that the criminal trial process in the Special Criminal Court is stultified 
by this type of legislation. The invocation of s 3(2) of the Offences against the State Act 
1972 and s 2 of the 1998 Act, for example, means that the appellate court is at a severe 
disadvantage in attempting to develop the jurisprudence of evidence law.637 
 
l. Appeals from the Central Criminal Court 
People (DPP) v Jonathan Dunne 
The Central Criminal Court heard a murder trial in January 2012 in which the accused 
was convicted.638 The first voir dire came at the end of the prosecution’s case, at which 
 
635 [2015] IECA 153, para 44. 
636 Pursuant to s 2 of the Offences against the State (Amendment) Act 1998. 
637 The Court of Appeal’s reluctance to tailor its judgment on evidence admissibility rulings for the Special 
Criminal Court is limiting the role of that Court from playing its refining role as an appellate jurisdiction. 
Deference is undoubtedly shown to the trial court. The trial court, in this instance, is a court which operates 
under a procedure that is different, even if not unique, from the ordinary courts of justice. Surely the Court 
of Appeal should approach appeals derived from the Special Criminal Court in a different manner? The next 
phase of this analysis seeks to compare the level of interaction with its refining role by the Court of Appeal 
in appeals brought from trials heard before the Central Criminal Court against those appeals brought from the 
Special Criminal Court. 





point, defence Counsel raised evidence admissibility issues in relation to causation and 
duress.639 The causation application was refused.640 The trial judge held that: 
It was clear that the defendant's actions do not have to be the sole cause of the result. 
Providing his actions were an operating and substantial cause of the result, he can be 
convicted.641   
The trial judge reviewed the Irish jurisprudence on causation and ruled finally that “[I]t is 
sufficient if the injuries caused by the applicant were related to the death in more than 
a minimal way.”642 The second application sought the duress defence to be left to the 
jury. This application was also refused, with the trial judge issuing a pithy ruling: 
I had occasion to look at this issue recently, and I'm satisfied that the current state of Irish 
law is that duress cannot be availed of as a defence in a murder trial. This application is 
refused. Jury back, please.643 
The accused appealed his conviction to the Court of Criminal Appeal.644  
The jury had an issue at trial with the causation proof. The jury foreman asked the trial 
judge to define murder and to clarify causation.645 In response, the trial judge stated the 
statutory definition of murder found in s 4 of the Criminal Justice Act 1964646 and 
continued:  
Now, [the victim] was killed unlawfully, there's no doubt about that, nobody contends 
otherwise. The person who killed him, intended to kill him, or cause him at least serious 
injury, there's no doubt about that…So, he was killed unlawfully; the person who killed 
 
639 The trial judge rightly remarked that it is a rare occurrence that causation is actually raised as a defence at 
all in a murder trial.  
640 If the application had been successful, the trial judge would have directed the jury to return an acquittal 
verdict. 
641 People (DPP) v Jonathan Dunne, trial notes, Central Criminal Court, Day 5, on file with author. 
642 Ibid.  
643 Ibid. 
644 People (DPP) v Jonathan Dunne [2014] 2 ILRM 481; [2014] IECCA 29 (O’Donnell J, Moriarty and 
Herbert JJ). The grounds of appeal were summarised in the following précis: It was argued on behalf of the 
appellant that the learned trial judge erred in law and in fact on three grounds: first in refusing the application 
for a direction to the jury on the issue of causation consequent upon the decision not to provide full medical 
intervention; secondly in refusing to allow the issue of duress to go to the jury as a defence on behalf of the 
appellant; and thirdly by stating in response to a question posed by the jury that the appellant killed the 
deceased and intended to kill him, which it was argued effectively amounted to a direction that the appellant 
was guilty of murder. 
645 The exact wording of the question posed by the jury foreman was “Judge, could you please read out again 
the definition of murder, and also the explanation of causation, please?” 
646 Criminal Justice Act 1964, s 4 states: “(1) Where a person kills another unlawfully the killing shall not be 
murder unless the accused person intended to kill, or cause injury to, some person, whether the person actually 
killed or not. (2) The accused person shall be presumed to have intended the natural and probable 





him intended to kill him. The person who killed him was the accused. The accused person 
is presumed to have intended the natural and probable consequences of his actions.647 
It was held, inter alia, by the Court of Criminal Appeal, in dismissing the appeal, that 
“where the charge is one of murder, the threshold which must be reached in order to 
prove causation is that the injuries caused by an accused related to the death in more than 
a minimal way. There could be no doubt in this case…that causation had been 
established.” 
 
m. Duress ground in Dunne 
The Court of Criminal Appeal relied on its decision in People (DPP) v Patchell, in which 
it was held that the duress defence was unavailable in Irish law in a murder trial.648 The 
Court of Appeal declined to further develop further this defence, holding instead that: 
While there might be a residual argument as to whether this jurisdiction should adopt 
another approach, and if so whether that should be achieved by judicial decision or 
legislative change, the limited arguments and material advanced by the appellant in this 
case did not afford any compelling basis for considering that the court should depart from 
the decision in Patchell.649  
The trial judge’s answer to the jury’s question was, according to the Court of Criminal 
Appeal, not to be read in isolation to the rest of the judge’s charge. The appellate court 
signalled that due to the inactivity of the legal teams after hearing this answer, is was safe 
to surmise that it “…was difficult to argue that the jury would have been led to 
misunderstand the issue they had to decide.”650  
The appellant thought it desirable that in the public interests an appeal should be 
brought to the Supreme Court.651 In his determination of the causation ground in the s 29 
application, O’Donnell J in the Court of Criminal Appeal, having already rejected the 
substantive appeal, stated:  
Put perhaps at its height, the applicant contends that where a person dies from pneumonia, 
and after a decision made by doctors and family to refrain from providing certain medical 
 
647 People (DPP) v Jonathan Dunne, trial notes, Central Criminal Court, Day 6, on file with author. 
648 People (DPP) v Patchell (unreported judgment, Court of Criminal Appeal, 10th June 2013).  
649 People (DPP) v Jonathan Dunne [2014] 2 ILRM 481.  
650 Ibid.  
651 [2014] IECCA 44, the appellant sought to appeal the issues of causation and duress to the Supreme Court 
which were involved in his trial and subsequent appeal. The appellant brought an application to the Court of 
Criminal Appeal pursuant to s 29 of the Courts of Justice Act 1924 (as amended by s 22 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 2006) to request that Court to certify the case as involving a decision which involves points of 





treatment, he cannot properly or lawfully be said to have been murdered by the applicant 
in an attack some two years earlier. This Court considers then that the issue is one which 
should be considered by the final court of appeal in the judicial system. 
With regard to the duress ground, O’Donnell J held that:  
Duress as a defence is itself a matter of common law, and the decisions for and against 
the extension of duress to charges of murder are themselves judicial decisions. It is 
argued however that the law in Ireland is reasonably clear, and that this position cannot, 
or at least should not, be altered save by legislation. That in itself however, is a 
component of the question, which may itself require to be determined by the final court of 
appeal which, it is argued, reinforces the argument that the decision in law is a point of 
law of exceptional public importance.652 
As the s 29 application judgment epitomises, the Court of Criminal Appeal felt it unwise 
to make an authoritative restatement of the law on duress and/or causation.653  
 
n. The Supreme Court’s judgment in Dunne 
 
O’Malley J held that the duress was a defence at common law which this State inherited 
upon being founded in 1922. The Supreme Court also felt that this was a long-established 
rule of law and to alter it would have a significant impact on murder trials. This was an 
action which the Supreme Court was not prepared to take and the duress defence still 






652 [2014] IECAA 44, 45. The Court of Criminal Appeal, in the substantive appeal hearing, found that the 
causation issue was settled law in Ireland and that the duress defence, as argued before that Court, could not 
be departed from its current formulation. 
653 The Court of Criminal Appeal certified two questions for determination by the Supreme Court: (i) Where 
the date of death alleged in an indictment for murder occurs at a point of time removed from the incident and 
actions alleged against the accused and after the intervention (itself lawful) of a third party, may the accused 
be convicted of murder? (ii) May duress be raised as a defence (whether full or partial) to a charge of murder? 
654 O’Malley J, in her Supreme Court judgment, cited Hogan & Whyte’s text The Irish Constitution, where 
at pg. 984, it states: “As far as [common law principles are] concerned, it is plain that whereas the courts have 
a traditional role in extending and developing the common law (and thus, where necessary, overruling earlier 
Supreme Court decisions), there are recognised boundaries beyond which the courts cannot go. In other 
words, while the Supreme Court has latitude to relax the stare decisis rule where to do otherwise would be to 
re-enforce an earlier decision which is erroneous or not in harmony with modern legal values, nevertheless 
considerations of judicial continuity together with the maxim communis error facit jus place real restraints on 
that freedom where the Court is asked to overrule a decision of long-standing or uproot a rule which has 





o. People (DPP) v Jonathan Douglas 
This murder trial was heard by the Central Criminal Court in 2012 and it also reached the 
Supreme Court.655 The Court of Appeal had given its judgment on the substantive appeal 
taken.656 There were several voir dires in this trial, a trial which lasted nine days.657  
 
p. How the trial judge ruled 
The trial judge did make a ruling with regard to ground ‘a’ and admitted the statement in 
accordance with the provisions of s 16 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006:  
As it happens, I was the trial judge in the case which led the Oireachtas to enact section 
16 and I have always been concerned that it shouldn't become part of the ordinary 
furniture of the criminal law… This case is in the category that this provision was 
intended for, and I am satisfied to the standard of beyond reasonable doubt that the 
prosecution have brought themselves fully within the provisions of section 16.658 
In relation to ground b. the trial judge assisted the jury by stating that a Detective Garda, 
during his testimony, had used the phrase “gangland killing”: 
The word "gangland" has connotations. It shouldn't have been said... So forget about any 
words like "gangland" which have connotations and bear connotations. You decide the 
case on the evidence and strictly on the evidence, and on that basis alone, and in 
particular, as I say, subject to the legal directions to be given by me, which won't be given 
until all the evidence is in.659 
Ground of appeal ‘c’ was in relation to the accomplice evidence and was ruled upon in 
the following exchange:  
Trial Judge: There's ample evidence to go to the jury and it's a matter for them to resolve 
any conflicts in the case. I do not find the material witnesses to be alibi witnesses.  I mean 
-- you know what I mean…660 
 
Defence Counsel:  …the witnesses themselves have given evidence that they were afraid, 
and they were being suspected. As indeed did [name of witness] who emphasised they 
 
655 The Supreme Court had to first establish if there was a substantive point of law that would necessitate a 
full hearing.  
656 The same trial judge presided in both the Dunne and Douglas trials.  
657 The appellant relied on four primary grounds of appeal: a. the admission into evidence of certain statements 
pursuant to s 16 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006; b. the admission into evidence of the reference to a 
“gangland killing” during the trial’s currency; c. the accomplice evidence issue and d. the trial judge’s refusal 
to discharge the jury. 
658 People (DPP) v Jonathan Douglas, trial notes, Central Criminal Court, Day 2, on file with author.  
659 Ibid.  





thought they were all under arrest. And I don't put any value on that. Ultimately, it's 
a matter for the jury, but it's there in my submission. 
 
Trial Judge:  I don't find them to be accomplices.661 
The fourth ground of appeal was based upon the trial judge’s refusal to discharge the jury, 
especially after the Detective Garda had used the term “gangland killing” in his oral 
testimony.662  
 
q. The Court of Appeal’s judgment 
The Court of Appeal’s judgment was delivered by Mahon J and dealt with the s 16 issue 
at length.663 Mahon J held: 
The court is satisfied that the learned trial judge did not err in his decision to admit the 
evidence of the statements of Ms. D and Mr. S, on the basis that they were a matter 
ultimately for the jury to decide as to their truthfulness and voluntariness, and to do so in 
the context of their subsequent rejection of their content and the steps taken to withdraw 
the statements and/or make new statements.664 
The Court of Appeal rejected that ground, holding that the jury had been adequately 
charged by the trial judge in relation to the s 16 statements. In relation to the “gangland 
killing” reference ground, the Court of Appeal held that: 
Clearly, the reference to “gangland murder” ought not to have been uttered by the garda 
witness. It was however a reference made at a very early stage of a lengthy trial, and was 
made very much “out of the blue” and without any prior warning that it, or anything 
 
661People (DPP) v Jonathan Douglas, trial notes, Central Criminal Court, Day 8, on file with author.   
662 Furthermore, the s 16 issue related to a witness statement made contemporaneously to the murder in which 
the witness stated that the accused admitted to her that he had shot the victim that day. The same witness later 
sought to retract her statement maintaining that she had been coerced into saying those words by Gardaí. A 
video was then shown to the jury of the Gardaí reading back the statement to the witness who had just made 
that statement. Counsel for the accused had then sought to discharge the jury on this basis as they would have 
to be told that she retracted her statement but it would nevertheless be admitted into evidence. This application 
was refused. 
663 The trial judge explained the s 16 mechanism to the jury as follows: “Now, Madam Foreman, I want to 
give you an explanation of something that is going to happen. In the ordinary course of events, the witness 
gets into the witness box, gives the evidence the party who is calling the witness is seeking and then is cross 
examined by the other side, and that is the form evidence takes. Now, there is one circumstance where the 
Oireachtas … that's the ladies and gentlemen down in Leinster House... has decided that a statement which 
the witness made at an earlier stage can be given in evidence as evidence of the factual matters it contains. 
So, you are going to be allowed to hear as evidence something that this witness said at the time of these 
events, and that constitutes evidence in the case, and you are allowed treat it as evidence, but, as with all 
evidence, you have to consider the weight of the evidence. That's entirely a matter for you. You could accept 
it in its entirety, you could reject it in it's entirely [sic], you can accept some bits of it and reject others, you 
can give it great weight, little weight, or no weight at all. That is entirely a matter for you.” 





similar, was about to be stated. It was comprehensively addressed with the jury on the 
following day by the learned trial judge, and in a manner which is likely to have negated 
any risk of prejudice towards the appellant that may have arisen from the use of the 
term…This ground of appeal is therefore rejected.665  
All grounds of appeal were dismissed by the appellate court.666 
 
r. Other appeal judgments 
In another judgment, involving an appeal from a trial heard in the Central Criminal Court 
in 2012, the Court of Criminal Appeal dealt with the issue of the partial defence of 
diminished responsibility.667 The appellant’s argument was that the verdict returned was 
perverse. The Court of Criminal Appeal deferred to the limited role that it has as an 
appellate court, particularly with regard to interfering with a verdict reached by a jury of 
peers.668  MacMenanim J held that the verdict reached was not perverse, as it was not 
based on a tenuous or incredible witness statement.669 That court further held that the 
issue of diminished responsibility was one for the jury with which to contend.670 
Provocation was the central feature of the appeal brought to the Court of Criminal 
Appeal in the matter of People (DPP) v Shahzad Hussain, a murder trial heard in 2012 in 
the Central Criminal Court.671 The ground of appeal which involved evidence 
admissibility was dealt with by Clarke J:  
The first point to be made in that context is that it is principally a matter for the trial judge 
to form a judgment, in the light of the state of the evidence as a whole and the issues 
which have emerged at the trial, as to whether a particular piece of evidence should be 
admitted where an objection of that type is raised. The trial judge is in the best position to 
 
665 DPP v Jonathan Douglas [2015] IECA 320, 332. 
666 This was due to the fact that the prejudicial effects of the evidence admitted, ultimately, did not over-
power the probative nature of the evidence. 
667 People (DPP) v Tomkins [2012] IECCA 82. The appellant had been convicted for the murder of his brother 
at their farmhouse in County Wicklow. The other partial defence of provocation was a central plank of the 
defence case. Diminished responsibility, pursuant to s 6 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006, is only available in 
Irish law for a charge of murder.    
668 MacMenamin J, delivering judgment for the Court, stated at para. 18: “…this court has repeatedly 
emphasised that it has no power to substitute its own subjective view of the case for that of the jury.” The 
Court also relied upon the decision in People (DPP) v C. (P.) [2002] 2 IR 285, where Murray J emphasised 
the Court of Appeal’s reluctance to interfere with a verdict in a situation where one witness’ credibility is the 
only ground of appeal. Murray J stated at 296 of the Report, that an assessment of such a witness’ credibility 
was a matter “manifestly within the province of the jury”.      
669 [2012[ IECCA 82, para 52.  
670 The thrust of the appellant’s claim was that the jury had not been properly charged on the two defences in 
question.  
671 [2014] IECCA 26, a second ground was also raised regarding the admissibility of photographic evidence 
which was argued by the appellant to have been more prejudicial than probative. The Court of Criminal 





make a judgment on such issues and this Court should only interfere with a trial judge's 
decision in that regard in a very clear case.672  
Clarke J was clearly relying on the relevancy element of evidence admissibility.673     
In People (DPP) v Greg Crawford, the Court of Appeal dealt with several grounds 
of appeal lodged by the appellant.674 Birmingham J appeared to circumvent the central 
issue of certain items of evidence being obtained pursuant to s 29, by finding that the 
Gardaí had powers under s 5(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 2006, which allowed for the 
search and collection of evidence.675 The Court of Appeal did not deem the evidence 
retrieved to be done so illegally.676 
In People (DPP) v Collins, the Court of Appeal heard an appeal from a murder 
trial conducted in the Central Criminal Court in 2012.677 On the first ground, the trial 
judge did recharge the jury on the use of the term “assassination”, which was deemed by 
Sheehan J to be sufficient.678 The trial judge, it was deemed by the Court of Appeal, was 
dealing with an unexceptional case which did not necessitate issuing directions on an 
alternative verdict. In those circumstances, the trial judge’s charge was deemed 
adequate.679 
 
672 People (DPP) v Shazaad Hussain [2014] IECCA 26, para. 7.1. Clarke J showed deference to the trial court 
in assessing whether to admit the photographic evidence of abdominal injuries suffered by the victim and 
stated that the trial judge was within his jurisdiction in assessing this aspect of admissibility. 
673 Clarke J stated at para. 7.2 of his judgment: “It was, therefore, open to the trial judge to form the view that, 
broadly speaking, contemporaneous photographs of the injuries might be of assistance to the jury in 
addressing those questions. In those circumstances it seems to the Court that the admission or otherwise of 
the photographic evidence in question was well within the range of options which were open to the trial 
judge.” 
674 The ground of appeal analysed in most depth was that the trial judge had erred in law in admitting evidence 
which had been garnered under a warrant issued under s 29 of the Offences against the State Act 1939, which 
was subsequently found to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in People (DPP) v Damache [2012] 
IESC 11. 
675 The stipulation being that the area which is searched is designated a crime scene by a member of An Garda 
Síochána not under the rank of Superintendent.  
676 The Court stated that: “[G]iven that he [the trial judge] was not dealing with evidence obtained by 
underhand methods or anything of that nature, it is understandable that he would exercise a discretion as he 
did.” The Court of Appeal did analyse the trial judge’s use of discretion within the context of it being an 
illegally obtained evidence issue if it was to be viewed circumspect at all, [2015] IECA 25, para. 17. The 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Crawford was delivered two months before the Supreme Court’s decision 
in JC, however, JC, arguably, would not have made a difference to the decision.  
677 The appellate court analysed whether the trial judge’s charge was fair and whether he had made excessively 
negative comments regarding the defence’s case and whether the trial judge had correctly directed the jury 
regarding manslaughter, [2016] IECA 350, the second ground of appeal focused on whether the trial judge 
had directed the jury correctly or at all on the issue of unlawful and dangerous manslaughter and gross 
negligence manslaughter.   
678 Sheehan J in Collins stated at para. 17: “We are strengthened in our view by the fact that the defence 
counsel did not raise any issue by way of further requisition in relation to this aspect of the trial judge's re-
charging of the jury despite having been invited to do so by the trial judge.” 
679 The Court of Appeal in Collins stated at para. 40: “In our view, there was nothing unusual about this case 







The above chapter reveals certain points of note:  
a. that the Court of Appeal (formerly the Court of Criminal Appeal) is reluctant to 
interfere with the trial court’s finding of fact and will not usually do so, including 
evidence which is sought to be entered for a substantive defence such as duress or 
evidence of substantive causation; 
b. the rulings made by the SCC, after a voir dire was conducted in relation to an 
evidence admissibility point, were more comprehensive and more thoroughly 
reasoned than rulings made on similar applications by the Central Criminal Court;  
c. The SCC was the least appealed against court in 2012; 
d. The SCC practitioners did not believe that a jury not being present in the SCC had 
any impact (either negative or positive) on the rulings and the reasoning offered 
by the judges in the exercise of their discretion to admit or exclude evidence; and 
e. The cases reviewed did not uncover a willingness of the appellate courts to lay 
down principles of evidence law. 
The above are somewhat surprising, particularly when one considers that the 
professional factfinders in the SCC are the same people who will be applying the law 
to the facts as found, yet this process attracts the fewest appeals. It is also interesting 
to note that practitioners believe that rulings made in the SCC are of a higher calibre 
than those delivered in the ordinary courts of justice. The presence of three 
professional judges instead of just one is clearly a factor in this observation. The 
appellate courts also possess a very limited and defined jurisdiction, and the deference 
shown to trial courts does curtail what influence appellate courts have in regulating 







judge directed that an alternative verdict not be advanced by the defence was open in this case he could have 






a. Initial comments 
Evidence is not an easy subject to declare definitive terms which have long lasting 
effects. It is a subject that is as malleable as it is important to our criminal justice system. 
Judicial discretion has been at the corner-stone of the evolution of the law of evidence, 
from its origins to the present day situation whereby we have in Ireland a quasi-codified 
corpus of law, which is a half-way house between full codification. Discretion is, 
arguably, a necessary element of an efficient criminal justice system. A review of some of 
the common law jurisdictions which has been briefly undertaken in this piece, reveals that 
judicial discretion in evidence admissibility is a common feature in all of these other 
criminal justice systems. Some common law jurisdictions have attempted to confront the 
more intransigent aspects of judicial discretion within the law of evidence. But some 
common law jurisdictions have shown themselves to be more adept than others in 
progressing necessary reform in this area. New Zealand is a prime example of a 
jurisdiction with a similar legal history to Ireland which has seized the initiative and has 
arguably lead the way in evidential law reform.  
 Ireland can still perform well in this area too, there is still time to do so of course. 
In order for the reform to occur in this jurisdiction however, a bravery of sorts will be 
required from key stakeholders within the Irish criminal justice system. This bravery is 
not one which is cavalier, but is a bravery from key stakeholders that is meaningful and 
data based. In 2020, we have had an excellent report from Professor O’Malley wherein 
the issue of pre-trial hearings once again raised its head, this time within the context of a 
review of how sexual offence trials are conducted in this jurisdiction.680 Listening to 
Professor O’Malley who co-authored the report in relation to pre-trial hearings, in 
subsequent radio interviews and presentations, there is a certain weariness in the voices of 
advocates for such reform.681 This is understandable and it is a frustration shared by 
members of the judiciary interviewed for this thesis. But this bravery needs to be grasped 
by all the stakeholders of the criminal justice system, not just one group in particular. 
Trial judges, appellate judges, practitioners, accused, victims and legislators are all 
 
680 Review of Protections for Vulnerable Witnesses in the Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Offences 
(August, 2020). 
681 One such presentation by Professor O’Malley came at the Annual National Prosecutor’s Conference hosted 





required to adapt and to learn if reforms are to be made and implemented. It remains to be 
seen if this bravery is present in this jurisdiction.  
 The voir dire process, as exposed in this thesis, is a mechanism which is not fit for 
purpose in its present guise and certainly in its current frequency. It is a disruption to the 
flow of evidence in a trial and extends the length of time that jurors are kept within the 
trial process. The evidence from trial judges is that the length of time that jurors are kept 
waiting from hearing admissible evidence is not a source of time pressure for them in 
dealing with the issue in a voir dire. This is the correct approach to take by trial judges 
and is commendable but the present situation still does not prevent disruption to juror’s 
lives. The voir dire feature of a criminal trial should be reformed by the introduction of 
pre-trial hearings for all criminal trials brought on indictment.  
 The voir dire stage in a criminal trial on indictment is fuelled by judicial 
discretion. Limiting the frequency of voir dires is one major reform that is required for 
criminal trials on indictment, but so too, proper procedures in the curtailment of the 
exercise of judicial discretion are needed. This jurisdiction can benefit from guidance 
from other jurisdictions in how this can be done. This thesis has also proffered evidence 
that judicial discretion is less in issue when rulings are based upon relevant legislation. 
By placing issues of evidence admissibility on a statutory footing this may reduce judicial 
discretion, it will not eliminate judicial discretion nor should judicial discretion 
necessarily be eliminated. The other avenue open to the stakeholders of the Irish criminal 
justice system is to properly resource appellate courts and almost redefine the appellate 
courts’ role within the Irish criminal justice system. Judges should really be brave enough 
to define how trial courts should tackle individual instances of evidence admissibility and 
outline properly drafted guidelines which are to be applied in similar scenarios, not just in 
the case being appealed. The appellate courts are not doing this presently. The JC 
judgment is important as the Supreme Court attempted to do just this, setting out specific 
guidelines in a form of a test for evidence admissibility in certain scenarios.682 The 
argument proffered by this thesis is not that the Supreme Court should not have done this 
or should have gone perhaps further; it is rather now that we have this test, why not place 
it upon a statutory footing so that transparency and refinement of that test can be further 
developed.683 Of course the test can be looked at again by a differently constituted 
 
682 People (DPP) v JC [2015] IESC 31.  
683 In the Balance in the Criminal Law Review Group: Final Report: future Court of Appeal judge Gerard 





Supreme Court perhaps, but reform will be slow and that route lacks the transparency 
which is ingrained within the legislative system present in Ireland.  
  
b. Concluding thoughts    
Where there is an issue of reform that requires to be debated, various theories are usually 
expounded to support both sides of that debate. The debate surrounding changing the way 
judicial discretion is administered and placing this discretion in a pre-trial environment 
does require a shift in emphasis. But it is a shift to the nascent trials within the common 
law system when evidence and the narrative of the trial flowed in a continuous way. The 
common law is a system which has some features which have served our society well 
over the centuries, but it does possess features which are open to abuse and may be used 
to stymie development or reform. The natural law tendencies of the common law legal 
system are not illusory; it is a thread which runs deep in our legal culture. This thesis does 
not ask for a reduction of this emphasis as that is unrealistic and would result in Ireland 
essentially jettisoning its common law legal foundations. What is desirable is a proper 
debate on how best we could realign our trial process to better reflect our modern day 
society. Positivist law is not the easy answer to this issue, but a realignment as to how 
judicial discretion is administered in evidence admissibility issues at trial, through the use 
of drafted legislation, is an option which is most definitely worth exploring.  
 Education will also be required for Courts Service personnel, practitioners, the 
judiciary and An Garda Síochána to both provide momentum and to enrich this reform. 
This educational facet should encompass the duty for transparency, to give coherent 
reasons for certain decisions, to provide advocacy training for practitioners so that 
coherent arguments can be made and this should start in our third level institutions for 
those students who feel they will be practising advocates. In other jurisdictions, 
particularly in France, colleges for future judges, albeit in a very different system, are 
present where future members of the judiciary are effectively trained. This could be 
looked at in this jurisdiction too because at present members of the judiciary, especially 
new members of the judiciary which were interviewed for this thesis, were absolutely 
 
present iteration in 2007, which was when the Report was published. Dr. Hogan outlines in his dissent that if 
the exclusionary rule is constitutionally derived, it cannot, therefore, be overturned by an Act of the 
Oireachtas. However, the recommendation made is that the ‘test’ as outlined in the judgment of Clarke J in 
JC should not be overturned, merely placed upon a statutory footing, where itself is beholden to a presumption 
of constitutionality. The trial judge which implements the ‘JC test’ will be upholding the law in due course 
of law and the trial’s integrity would not be impacted in any way. The constitutional parameters of the 





open to further training. The days of not disturbing the rock of the criminal trial process 
in order to see what lies underneath, is not an option for Ireland if we want to have a 
progressive criminal justice system. This will require a considerable amount of work in 
order to implement such educational reforms and institutions, but as the preceding 




































Aristotle, The Politics (University of Chicago Press 1984) 
 
Bentham, Jeremy, Rationale of Judicial Evidence Specially Applied to English Practice 
Vol 5, Book IX (Hunt & Clarke 1827) 
 
Best, W.M., Russell, John, A., and Morgan, James Appleton The Principles of the Law of 
Evidence (BiblioBazaar 2009) 
 
Burrill, Alexander M., A Treatise on the Nature, Principles and Rules of Circumstantial 
Evidence, especially that of the Presumptive Kind, in Criminal Cases (Voorhis Baker 
1868) 
 
Bennion, Francis, Understanding Common Law Legislation: Drafting and Interpretation 
(OUP 2001) 
 
Brady, Conor, The Guarding of Ireland: The Garda Síochána and the Irish State 1960-
2014 (Gill & MacMillan 2014) 
 
Bernays, Edward, E., Crystallizing Public Opinion (New York Boni and Liveright 1923) 
 
George, Robert P., (ed), Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays (OUP 1992) 
 
George, Robert P, Natural Law Ethics in Theory and Practice: A Joseph Boyle Reader John 
Liptay and Christopher Tollefsen (eds) (Catholic University of America Press 2020) 
 
Harrison, Alice, The Special Criminal Court: Practice and Procedure (Bloomsbury Press 
2019) 
 
Hart, H.L.A., Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory 
(Clarendon Press 1982) 
 
Langbein, John H., The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (OUP 2003) 
 
Maitland, Frederic M., and Montague, Francis C. Colby, James F., (ed), A Sketch of 
English Legal History (G.P. Putnam & Son’s 1915) 
 
Mill, John Stuart, Utilitarianism (Hackett Publishing 1979) 
 
Morgan, David Gywnn and Hogan, Gerard, W., Administrative law in Ireland (4thed, 
Round Hall 2012) 
 
O’Malley, Dessie, Conduct Unbecoming (M.H. Gill & Co., 2015) 
 







Rastall, W. Les Terms de la Ley (Stationer’s Company London 1624) 
 
Raz, Joseph, The Concept of a Legal System: An Introduction to the Theory of Legal 
System (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 1980) 
 
Sherman, Charles Phineas, Roman Law in the Modern World (Boston Book Company 
1917) 
 
Sopinka, John, Lederman, Sidney N., and Bryant, Alan, W., The Law of Evidence in 
Canada (2nd edn, Butterworths 1999) 
 
Starkie, Thomas A Practical Treatise of the Law of Evidence (T. & J. W. Johnson & 
Company 1876) 
 
Stein, Alex, Foundations of Evidence Law (OUP 2005) 
 
Stephen, James Fitzjames, A Digest of the Law of Evidence (Little, Brown & Co. 1877) 
 
Thayer, James Bradley Select Cases on Evidence at the Common Law (C.W. Sever & 
Co., 1892) 
 
Twinning, William, Rethinking Evidence: Exploratory Essays (2nd edn, CUP 2006) 
 
Walker, James M., The Theory of the Common Law (Little, Brown & Co. 1852) 
 
Walsh, Dermot, PJ, Walsh on Criminal Procedure (2nd ed., Round Hall, 2016)  
 
Weber, Max, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (University of 
California, 1978) 
 
Wigmore, John Henry, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at 




Alfange, Dean Jr., ‘Jeremy Bentham and the Codification of Law’ (1969-70) 55 Cornell 
Law Review 58 
 
Allan, T.R.S., ‘Hearsay Exception Subject to Relevance. Relevance Subject to Hearsay’ 
(1985) 44 (3) Cambridge Law Journal 345 
 
Amar, Akhil Reed, ‘Against Exclusion (Except to Protect Truth or Prevent Privacy 
Violations)’ (1996-97) 20 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 457-66 
 
Barrett Tillman, Seth, ‘The Court of Appeal Backlog’ 2017 (35) 15 Irish Law Times 206-
08 
 
Berger, Margaret, A., ‘The Federal Rules of Evidence: Defining and Refining the Goals 






Blackmore II, Josiah, H., ‘The Ohio Evidence Rules: 105 Years of Heritage and 
Dilemma’ (1976-77) 6 Capital University Law Review 533 
 
Bruncken, Ernest, ‘Interpretation of the Written Law’ (1915-16) 25 Yale Law Journal 
129, 130 
 
Bruncken, Ernest, ‘The Common Law and Statutes’ (1920) 29 (5) Yale Law Journal 516 
 
Calabresi, Guido, ‘An Introduction to Legal Thought: Four Approaches to Law and to the 
Allocation of Body Parts’ (2003) 55 Stanford Law Review 2113-51 
 
Chauncey, Charles, ‘Contempt of Court’ (1881) 29 (2) The American Law Register 81 
 
Cohen, Neil, B., ‘Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of 
Imperfect Knowledge’ (1985) 60 New York University Law Review 385 
 
Cross, Frank, B., ‘Identifying the virtues of the Common Law’ (2007) 15 (1) Supreme 
Court Economic Review 21-59 
 
Damaska, Mirjan J., ‘Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two models of Criminal 
Procedure: A Comparative Study’ 121 (3) (1973) University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 506-89 
 
Dufraimont, Lisa, ‘Evidence Law and the Jury: A Reassessment’ (2008) 53 McGill Law 
Journal 199 
 
Easterbrook, Frank H., ‘Method, Result, and Authority: A Reply’ (1985) 98 (3) Harvard 
Law Review 622 
 
Ellsworth, Phoebe, C., ‘Are Twelve Heads Better Than One’ (1989) 52 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 205 
 
Ervin Jr., Sam J., ‘Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence’ (1970) 35 (1) Law and 
Contemporary Problems’ 108 
 
Ewart, John, S., ‘The Canadian Constitution’ (1908) 8 (1) Columbia Law Review 27 
 
Fairlie, John A., ‘The Separation of Powers’ (1923) 21(4) Michigan Law Review 393 
 
Finlay Geoghegan, Mary, ‘The New Supreme Court and Court of Appeal: 2014 to 2016 
and their Future’ 2017 20(1) Trinity College Law Review 5-29 
 
Fisher, George, ‘The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector’ (1997-1998) 107 Yale Law Journal 575 
 







Frank, Jerome, ‘Are Judges Human? Part One: The Effect on Legal Thinking of the 
Assumption That Judges Behave like Human Beings’ (1931) 80 (1) University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register 17 
 
Frank, Jerome, ‘What the Courts Do in Fact: Part II’ (1931-32) 26 Illinois Law Review 
761 
 
Freund, Ernest, ‘Interpretation of Statues’ (1916-1917) 65 (3) University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 207 
 
Gahan, Frank, ‘The Codification of Law’ in The Transactions of the Grotius Society, 
Problems of Peace and War, Papers Read before the Society in the Year 1922 (1922) 8 
Cambridge Law Journal 107 
 
Gallanis, T.P., ‘The Rise of Modern Evidence Law’ (1998-99) 84 Iowa Law Review 499 
 
Gard, Spencer, A., ‘Kansas Law and the New Uniform Rules of Evidence’ (1953-54) 2 
University of Kansas Law Review 333 
 
Goodpaster, Gary, ‘On the Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial’ (1987) 78 (1) 
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 118 
 
Haskar, Vinit, ‘Coercive Proposals [Rawls and Gandhi]’ (1976) 4 (1) Political Theory 65 
 
Hoffmaster, Barry, ‘Understanding Judicial Discretion’ (1982) 1 (1) Law and Philosophy 
21 
 
Jackson, John, D., Quinn, Katie and O’Malley, Tom ‘The Jury System in Contemporary 
Ireland: In the Shadow of a Troubled Past’ 1999 (2) Law and Contemporary Problems 
203-32 
 
Kmiec, Keenan D., ‘The Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial Activism”’ (2004) 
92(5) California Law Review 1441 
 
Koh, Harold, Hongju, ‘Setting the World Right’ (2006) 115(9) Yale Law Journal 2350 
 
Laun, Rudolph, ‘Stare Decisis’ (1938) 25 (1) Virginia Law Review 12 
 
Lehman, Irving, ‘Technical Rules of Evidence’ (1926) 24 (5) Columbia Law Review 509 
 
Lempert, Richard, ‘The New Evidence Scholarship: Analysing The Process of Proof” 
(1986) 66 Boston University Law Review 439 
 
Lysaght, L.J., ‘Bentham on the Aspects of a Law’ (1973) 24 Northern Ireland Law 
Quarterly 383 
 
Matasar, Richard A., and Bruch, Gregory, S., ‘Procedural Common Law, Federational 
Jurisdictional Policy, and Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent State Grounds 






McKenzie, N.A.M., ‘Conflict of Laws’ (1937) 2 (1) University of Toronto Law Journal 
122 
 
Mengler, Thomas, M., ‘The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence’ 
(1988-89) 74 Iowa Law Review 413 
 
Morgan, Edmund, M., ‘Rules of Evidence- Substantive or Procedural’ (1956-57) 10 
Vanderbilt Law Review 467 
 
Murphy, Colleen, ‘Lon Fuller and the Moral Value of the Rule of Law’ (2005) 24(3) Law 
and Philosophy 239 
 
Nance, Dale, A., ‘The Best Evidence Principle’ 73 (1987-88) Iowa Law Review 227-297 
 
Nicholson, Peter, P., ‘The Internal Morality of Law: Fuller and His Critics’ (1974) 84 (4) 
Ethics 307 
 
Ní Choileáin, Cecilia and Bazarchina, Anna, ‘Admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence after DPP v JC’ (2015) The Bar Review 83 
 
Noonan, Robert, ‘Stare Decisis, Overruling, and Judicial Law-Making: The Paradox of 
the JC Case’ (2017) 57 The Irish Jurist 119-143 
 
Note, ‘Reforming the Law of Evidence in Nigeria’ (2000) 44 (1) Journal of African Law 
128 
 
Note, ‘Stare Decisis’ (1920) 34(1) Harvard Law Review 74 
 
Note, ‘The Presumption of Constitutionality’ (1931) 31 (7) Columbia Law Review 1136 
 
Noyes, John, Janis, Mark W., Zoller, Elizabeth and Butler, William E., ‘The Common 
Law Tradition’ (1989) 83 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of 
International Law) 547-556 
 
O’Mahony, Conor, ‘Supreme Court Relaxes Exclusionary Rule- Latest Shift in a Finely 
Balanced Debate’ available at http://constitutionproject.ie/?p=496; accessed at 15:30 on 
05/05/2016 
 
O’Malley, Tom, ‘Sentencing Guidelines, Legal Transplants and an Uncertain Future’ 
(2019) 29 (4) Irish Criminal Law Journal 94-104 
 
Postema, Gerald J., ‘Law as Command: The Model of Command in Modern 
Jurisprudence’ 35 (1) Nous 470-501 
 
Re, Richard, M., ‘Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court’ (2014) 114(7) Columbia 
Law Review 1861-1911 
 
Salken, Barbara, ‘To Codify or not to Codify- that is the Question: A Study of New 






Samuel, Sigmund, ‘The Codification of Law’ (1943) 5(1) The University of Toronto Law 
Journal 148 
 
Schauer, Frederick ‘On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law’ 155 (1) (2006) 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 165-202 
 
Sherman, Charles P., ‘The Romanization of English Law’ (1914) 23(4) Yale Law Journal 
318 
 
Shrock, Thomas S., and Welsh, Robert, C., ‘Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as 
a Constitutional Requirement’ (1974-75) 59 Minnesota Law Review 251 
 
Stone, Julius, ‘The Ratio of the Ratio Decidendi’ (1959) 22 (6) Modern Law Review 597-
620 
 
Tapper, Colin, ‘Austin on Sanctions’ (1965) Cambridge Law Journal 271 
 
Tribe, Laurence, ‘Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process’ (1971) 
84 Harvard Law Review 1329 
 
Urofsky, Melvin, I., ‘William O. Douglas as a Common Law Judge’ (1991) 41 (1) Duke 
Law Journal 133 
 
Walzer, Michael, ‘Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands’ (1973) 2 (2) Philosophy 
and Public Affairs 160 
 
Wigmore, Dean, ‘Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure’ (1922) 8 
American Bar Association Journal 479  
 
Wigmore, John, H., ‘The American Law Institute Code of Evidence Rules: A Dissent’ 




Criminal Procedure in Scotland (Second Report) (Cmnd 6218) 
 
Working Group on the Jurisdiction of the Courts, The Criminal Jurisdiction of the Courts 
(The Courts Service, Dublin 2003) (‘The Fennelly Report’) 
 
The Law Commission (Law Com. No. 177) ‘A Criminal Code for England and Wales’, 
Vol. 1, Report and Draft Criminal Code Bill (17th April, 1989) (London, HM Stationary 
Office) 
 
Law Reform Commission, Consultation Paper on Expert Evidence (LRC CP 52- 2008) 
 
Law Reform Commission, Consultation Paper on Documentary and Electronic Evidence 
(LRC CP 57-2009) 
 
Law Reform Commission, Consultation Paper on Hearsay in Civil and Criminal Cases 






Law Reform Commission on the Rule Against Hearsay in Civil Cases (LRC 25- 1988) 
 
Working Paper on ‘The Rule Against Hearsay’ in 1980 (LRC WP9-1980) 
 
New Zealand Law Commission Report, Evidence: Reform of the Law (Report 55, Vol. 1, 
Wellington, 1999) 
 
LRC 117-126, Report on the Consolidation and Reform Aspects of the Law of Evidence 
(Law Reform Commission 2016) 
 
Report of the Working Group on a Court of Appeal (May 2009) 
 
Review of Protections for Vulnerable Witnesses in the Investigation and Prosecution of 





CC 12- Practice Direction-Pre-Trial Procedure Dublin Circuit, County of the City of 
Dublin, dated 17.10.12. 
 
Practice Statement (HL: Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 WLR 1234 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
